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1. Executive Summary 
Decades of repressive military rule, civil war, corruption, bad governance, isolation, and 
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have rendered 
Burma’s1 health care system incapable of responding effectively to endemic and emerging 
infectious diseases.2 Burma’s major infectious diseases—malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis 
(TB)—are severe health problems in many areas of the country. Malaria is the most common 
cause of morbidity and mortality due to infectious disease in Burma. Eighty-nine percent of the 
estimated population of 52 million lived in malarial risk areas in 1994, with about 80 percent of 
reported infections due to Plasmodium falciparum, the most dangerous form of the disease.3 
Burma has one of the highest TB rates in the world, with nearly 97,000 new cases detected each 
year.4 Drug resistance to both TB and malaria is rising, as is the broad availability of counterfeit 
antimalarial drugs. In June 2007, a TB clinic operated by Médecins Sans Frontières–France in 
the Thai border town of Mae Sot reported it had confirmed two cases of extensively drug-
resistant TB in Burmese migrants who had previously received treatment in Burma. Meanwhile, 
HIV/AIDS, once contained to high-risk groups in Burma, has spread to the general population, 
which is defined as a prevalence of 1 percent among reproductive-age adults.5 
 
Meanwhile, the Burmese government spends less than 3 percent of national expenditures on 
health, while the military, with a standing army of over 400,000 troops, consumes 40 percent.6 
By comparison, many of Burma’s neighbors spend considerably more on health:  Thailand 
(6.1%7), China (5.6 %8), India (6.1%9), Laos (3.2%10), Bangladesh (3.4%11), and Cambodia 
(12%12). 
                                                           
1 This report uses the name Burma rather than Myanmar. This is the form preferred by the leaders of Burma’s pro-
democracy movement, the legitimate winners of the 1990 elections. In Burma, “Bamah” and “Myanma” have both 
been used for centuries, being respectively the colloquial and the more formal names of the country in the Burmese 
language. 
2 The International Crisis Group reported in December 2006:  “According to the UN resident coordinator, the 
situation [in Burma] does not yet qualify as a humanitarian crisis but ‘there are geographic pockets of acute need in 
the country as well as aspects of suffering that constitute both a national and regional emergency,’ and conditions 
continue to deteriorate. The country, he warns, is not only losing the fight to stop the progression of serious health 
epidemics within the general population but also the skills and capacities necessary to cope with these and other 
development challenges.” International Crisis Group, Myanmar:  New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Crisis Group 
Asia Briefing No. 58, December 8, 2006 at 3.  
3 See Frank Smithuis, Treating and Preventing Malaria in Myanmar, Amsterdam:  Médecins Sans Frontières–
Holland, 2006 at 9. 
4 See Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2005 at 63. 
5 See Jon Cohen, “The Next Frontier for HIV/AIDS:  Myanmar,” Science, 301:5640, September 19, 2003, 1650–55.  
6 Budget data from the Burmese military authorities varies considerably. Many sources quote official health 
expenditures of 3 percent per annum. See, for example, World Food Programme, “Myanmar must do more to help 
its hungry millions,” press release, August 5, 2005. However, foreign diplomats in Rangoon have reported that the 
official 2006/2007 budget for health is 2.4 percent. Moreover, it is unclear how much of the official health budget 
represents foreign aid dollars, which has been placed at 13 percent.  
7 This is the figure for 2000. See Ministry of Public Health, Royal Thai Government at 
www.moph.go.th/ops/thealth. 
8 This figure is for 2003. See China Statistical Yearbook, 2003 and 2004, National Bureau of Statistics (China 
Statistical Press). 
9 This figure is for 2002. See National Health Accounts, World Health Organization, 2005. 
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In response to the Burmese government’s chronic neglect to care for the health of its citizens, 
UN agencies and international aid organizations began arriving in Rangoon in the 1990s. Under 
the watchful eye of the military authorities, they launched programs aimed at lessening the 
burden of infectious diseases, and by 2004, 41 aid organizations were operating in Burma with a 
total budget of approximately $30 million. That same year, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) signed a contract with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to disperse $98.4 million over a five-year period to combat infectious 
diseases in Burma. 
 
But in August 2005 the Global Fund terminated the contract, explaining that new travel 
restrictions imposed by the Burmese government had severely limited the ability of the UNDP 
and its implementing partners to access project sites. Four months later, Médecins Sans 
Frontières–France (MSF) announced it was pulling out of Burma for similar reasons, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said it had suspended visits by its medical 
staff to prisons because the Burmese authorities had insisted that ICRC doctors be accompanied 
by members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a junta-backed 
social organization with direct ties to military leaders, including Senior General Than Shwe. In 
February 2006, the Burmese government issued guidelines to international organizations 
formalizing the kinds of travel restrictions that had led to the departure of the Global Fund and 
MSF–France.  
 
To fill the breach left by the Global Fund’s withdrawal, the European Union, along with 
Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, launched the “Three Diseases Fund,” 
or 3D Fund, in October 2006. The fund, worth $99.5 million over five years, aims to bypass the 
central government to provide aid to UN agencies, international and local nongovernmental 
organizations, and “civilian administrations” to fight infectious diseases in Burma. The 3D Fund 
will “target those most at risk of being infected by each of the three diseases, with a particular 
focus on those who have limited or no access to public health services due to geographical or 
security considerations, or for reasons of ethnicity, gender, stigmatization or financial status.”13 
The 3D Fund has stated that its resources will “be used effectively, efficiently, transparently, 
accountably and equitably … with an emphasis on achievement of programme outputs.”14  
 
Against this background, our two centers—Human Rights Center, University of California, 
Berkley and the Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health—launched a research project in July 2006 to understand the factors that have 
contributed to Burma’s dire health situation and to the spread of infectious diseases in Burma and 
across its borders. We also wanted to see if it was possible to deliver international aid to combat 
infectious diseases in Burma in a manner that would be transparent and accountable, reach those 
most in need, and promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
10 This figure is for 2003. See http://www.who.int/countries/laos. 
11 This figure is for 2003. See http://www.who.int/countries/bangladesh. 
12 This figure is for 2002. See National Health Accounts, World Health Organization, 2005. 
13 United Nations Office for Project Services, Three Diseases Fund:  Assessing Funding, Handbook for 
Implementing Partners, Rangoon, Myanmar, 2007 at 6. 
14 Information about the Three Diseases Fund can be found at http://www.3dfund.org. The quote appears in a 
strategic paper entitled “Proposal:  Three Diseases Fund, 16 May 2006” provided to the Human Rights Center 
(HRC), University of California, Berkeley by UNDP in August 2006. The strategic paper is on file at HRC. 
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We began our research by dispatching teams of researchers to Rangoon and the border regions of 
China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. During these missions, researchers gathered data about 
infectious diseases—primarily HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and lymphatic filariasis—from 
health clinics operated by local governments and nongovernmental organizations. The teams also 
interviewed health professionals, government officials, and representatives of nongovernmental 
and community-based organizations that operate preventative programs and provide therapeutic 
care to patients. After the initial trip, researchers made repeat visits to Burma and the border 
regions of Thailand and India to collect further information. In addition, one of our researchers 
interviewed staff members of the Global Fund in Geneva and representatives of the European 
Union in Bangkok charged with drafting the strategic plan for the 3D Fund. All interviews were 
conducted in accordance with procedures established by the Office for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of the University of California, Berkeley and Johns Hopkins University.15 
 
This report is premised on four precepts related to health and human rights (see “Introduction”). 
First, successful public health infrastructures, programs, and outcomes are usually a result of 
good governance and a respect for human rights. Second, respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law helps to ensure accountability, transparency, responsible use of 
health expenditures, and rapid and equitable delivery of relief in areas of armed conflict. 
Inversely, serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that affect the 
movement of large population groups can cause or exacerbate the spread of infectious diseases. 
This is particularly true among migrant or internally displaced populations who generally lack 
access to appropriate health services. Third, as the World Health Organization (WHO) affirmed 
in 2001, public health interventions for vulnerable groups are most effective if they also succeed 
in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the rights of people marginalized by society.16 Finally, 
donors and nongovernmental organizations working in the health sector, especially in countries 
with highly repressive regimes, have a responsibility to respect and promote the human rights of 
those they serve.  
 
We offer the following conclusions and recommendations: 
Health Care System in Burma 
 
• The Government of Burma must develop a national health care system that is 
participatory and incorporates human rights so as to ensure that health care is 
distributed effectively, equitably, and transparently. Promoting participation as a feature 
of health system reform is now commonplace. With the rise of Primary Health Care in 
the 1970s, community involvement was seen as an essential ingredient of a nation’s 
health improvement. More recently, the emphasis has shifted to stakeholder consultation 
in sector reform. With the rise of rights-based approaches, emphasis is increasingly being 
placed on the participation of service users not as “beneficiaries” or “consumers” but as 
citizens who have the right to have a say in shaping health care policies. Community 
                                                           
15 Given the sensitivity of the topic, we have erred on the side of caution and chosen not to provide the names of 
most of those we interviewed. 
16 World Health Organization, Transforming Health Systems:  Gender and Rights in Reproductive Health—A 
Training Curriculum for Health Programme Managers, WHO/RHR/01.29, Geneva, 2001. 
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participation in the promotion and implementation of prevention and treatment programs 
is essential in any campaign to combat infectious diseases. 
 
Burma must develop a health care system that provides medical treatment and 
preventative care to all citizens, especially the most marginalized members of society 
including the very poor, ethnic and religious minorities, refugees and the displaced, 
persons living in conflict and cease-fire zones, and persons belonging to socially 
stigmatized groups including commercial sex workers, injecting drug users, and men who 
have sex with men.  
 
• The Government of Burma should increase its expenditures in health and education. 
Decades of neglect by Burma’s military government have turned the country into an 
incubator of infectious diseases. Those of gravest concern are HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, acute respiratory infections, filariasis, and diarrheal diseases. The authorities 
have a responsibility to protect the people of Burma and residents of neighboring 
countries to turn back the spread of communicable diseases. Such an effort requires both 
public health measures and providing citizens with increased access to both formal and 
informal education. Schools are places not only for teaching traditional academic 
subjects, but also for disseminating information about measures that can be taken to halt 
the spread of infectious diseases. Military expenditures should be reallocated to support 
health and education. Burma is not at war with its neighbors, and its security is more 
profoundly threatened by the rise of drug-resistant malaria and tuberculosis, and 
emerging communicable diseases such as avian influenza and recrudescent polio 
myelitis, than from external military threats. 
 
Donors and International Aid Organizations 
 
• Donors and international aid organizations operating in Burma have a duty to uphold 
and promote internationally accepted standards of human rights and international 
humanitarian law. Donors and international aid organizations should put into practice 
the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations” drafted 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2005. 
Principle 6 states:  “Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and 
conflict, and leads to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile 
states17 should consistently promote gender equality, social inclusion and human rights. 
These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, 
and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice 
and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be 
included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the onset.”18 
 
• The Government of Burma should immediately rescind the “Guidelines for UN 
Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs/INGOs on Cooperation Programme in 
                                                           
17 States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. 
18 The full set of principles can be accessed through the OECD web site at http://www.oecd.org 
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Myanmar” (See Appendix). These Guidelines, issued by the Ministry of National Planning 
and Economic Development in February 2006, directly contravene several formal 
agreements established between international organizations and the Burmese government 
since the early 1990s. They also contravene several international agreements on effective 
aid delivery, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was endorsed by 
the European Union, 27 regional and international institutions, including the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, and over 90 countries in Paris in 2005. The Guidelines 
have restricted the work of international organizations, especially ICRC, operating in 
Burma. While aid to Burma should not be considered optional given the dire need, the 
“exigencies of need” should never override the ability of organizations to access project 
sites on a regular and unhindered basis to ensure that aid is being delivered in a manner that 
is transparent, accountable, efficient, and equitable. The Guidelines are antithetical to this 
fundamental principle. 
 
• The Government of Burma should allow the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to resume visits to prisoners without the requirement that ICRC doctors be 
accompanied by members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA) or other organizations. As mandated by the Geneva Conventions, to which 
Burma has been a party since 1992, the ICRC conducts confidential, one-on-one visits 
with prisoners and has done so in dozens of countries since the Franco-Prussian war 
of 1870. In addition, the Government of Burma should allow ICRC to reopen field 
offices that have been closed since late 2006 due to government restrictions. Since 
1999, ICRC has played an essential role by visiting and providing health care to prisoners 
in Burma and developing water and sanitation projects in war-torn communities where 
weakened infrastructure, isolation, and the security situation make the population 
particularly vulnerable.19 ICRC staff have convened surgical training seminars for scores 
of Burmese health workers stationed in conflict areas, built water and sanitation facilities 
reaching more than 70,000 beneficiaries, provided over 7,000 landmine victims and other 
physically disabled people with prosthetic services, and supported the local manufacture 
of 19,600 prostheses. Between 1999 and late 2005, ICRC made 453 visits to dozens of 
prisons and labor camps throughout the country and provided training to Burmese doctors 
on prison health care. ICRC has used information gleaned from these visits to persuade 
health authorities to improve prison conditions. Yet, due to government restrictions, 
ICRC has been forced to suspend its prison visits and close most of its field offices. 
 
• Donors and foreign aid organizations should monitor and evaluate how international 
aid to combat infectious diseases in Burma is affecting domestic expenditures on 
health and education. Large infusions of foreign aid directed at the health sector can 
potentially lessen the burden of infectious diseases in Burma, but it can also have 
unintended consequences. Foreign aid can create dependency and divert health 
professionals and their institutions from addressing other serious health problems. 
Foreign aid can provide national authorities with a ready excuse for decreasing even 
further their already paltry expenditures in health. Donors and foreign aid organizations 
                                                           
19 Although a private humanitarian organization, the ICRC is not a nongovernmental organization. It has a widely 
recognized role to play due to its permanent and universal mandate granted by the 192 States signatory to the 
Geneva Conventions. This role distinguishes the ICRC from other humanitarian organizations. 
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have a responsibility to monitor domestic expenditures in health and education and, if 
problems arise, raise their concerns with the appropriate authorities. 
 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
 
• Relevant UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local 
NGOs should establish a regional Narcotics Working Group. Since 1999 the Burmese 
government and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have been engaged in an 
aggressive campaign to eradicate poppy cultivation and heroin production in Burma. 
UNODC has attempted to develop crop-replacement initiatives for poppy farmers. 
However, these initiatives have often faltered, leaving farmers and their families with few 
alternatives to feed their families. Tens of thousands of people have been forcibly 
relocated to villages along the Thai border where they have no sustainable income and 
are exposed to infectious diseases, especially malaria. At the same time, the region is 
experiencing a significant increase in the production and use of methamphetamines. At 
least three cease-fire organizations in Burma continue to manufacture and sell 
methamphetamines inside the country and across the border. Methamphetamine use 
increases sexual risk-taking and greater exposure to communicable diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS. Markedly increased rates of sexually transmitted infections have been found 
in northern Thai women who use methamphetamines. Finally, large profits from the sale 
of methamphetamines are fueling the “Casino Economy” along Burma’s border with 
China. These casinos and other entertainment venues are magnets for prostitution and 
trafficking of Burmese women and girls.  
 
Given this situation, the Narcotics Working Group should develop a sophisticated list of 
indicators to measure the use and trafficking of drugs in the region. Distinct from 
traditional indicators, these indicators would capture detailed information about types of 
drug, how much is being used, and by whom. Access to hard-to-reach populations and 
regions would require fieldwork and cross-border approaches that value trust-building 
and cultural appropriateness. The working group could also monitor the human and 
environmental impact of poppy eradication programs and their effects on farmers and 
their families.  
 
Three Diseases Fund 
 
• The Three Diseases Fund (3D Fund) should play an active role in promoting the 
growth and capacity of local nongovernmental and community-based health 
organizations to respond to infectious diseases in Burma and the border regions. Only 
a few local nongovernmental and community-based organizations operate in the health 
sector in Burma. Yet these organizations could potentially play a key role in the effort to 
lessen the burden of communicable diseases in the region. These groups are well situated 
to provide the community services required for the implementation of treatment and 
prevention programs. They can also work in areas that may be inaccessible to UN 
agencies and international organizations.  
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The 3D Fund, which is now the largest aid donor to combat infectious diseases in Burma, 
deserves good marks for establishing an oversight board that includes independent 
experts and for posting regular updates and reports of quarterly meetings of its board on 
its web site. Yet the 3D Fund faces several challenges that must be overcome to conduct 
its work effectively. First and foremost, it must contend with the military regime’s 
restrictions on the travel of foreign aid organizations. ICRC’s closure of several field 
offices operating in or near combat zones suggests that access to these areas will continue 
to be heavily restricted and prevent aid from reaching those most in need. Second, while 
the 3D Fund’s commitment to bypass the central government and fund civilian 
administrations and local nongovernmental organizations at the state and township level 
is admirable, it may be difficult to implement. The term “civilian administrations” is a 
highly ambiguous concept in Burma, especially in rural areas where the military and 
police hold unquestioned authority and influence.20 This situation has been further 
complicated by reports that the Burmese authorities are establishing government-run 
“coordination committees” at the district and township level to coordinate with the 3D 
Fund and other relief efforts. According to the February 2006 Guidelines, members of 
these new coordination committees would be drawn from junta-backed social 
organizations such as the USDA, founded by junta leader Senior General Than Shwe.21 
The involvement of representatives of these organizations could easily politicize and 
complicate the dispersal of funds at the district and township level. To overcome these 
obstacles, donors to the 3D Fund must be prepared to withhold funds until proper 
conditions prevail.  
 
Such challenges notwithstanding, the 3D Fund’s pledge to ensure its programs are 
accountable, transparent, equitable, and reach those most in need is highly commendable 
and deserves the support of governments and international health institutions. 
 
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
 
• The Government of Burma must stop engaging in violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law and must hold accountable government and military 
officials who are responsible for these abuses. Burma’s policies of forcibly relocating 
civilian populations and requiring them to engage in forced labor have caused widespread 
migration, food insecurity, disruption in livelihoods, and lack of access to regular medical 
care. In conflict zones, the Burmese military is committing violations of the laws of war 
including intentional and wanton destruction of civilian homes and food supplies; killing, 
sexually assaulting, and torturing civilians; destroying medical supplies intended for 
civilian populations; and arresting, detaining, and killing medical workers. These abuses 
have left civilians, particularly young children, vulnerable to death and illness from 
malnutrition, malaria, TB, night blindness (vitamin A deficiency), and diarrheal diseases. 
 
                                                           
20 The National League for Democracy (NLD) raised this issue in a letter dated June 12, 2006, to the First Secretary, 
British Embassy, Rangoon. The letter is in the files at HRC. 
21 Htet Aung, “Government to keep tight rein on aid in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, March 13, 2007.  
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In the first six months of 2007, the Burmese authorities detained over a dozen HIV/AIDS 
activists, most of whom have since been released. Of particular concern is Phyu Phyu 
Thin, a National League for Democracy youth member and a leader in the group’s 
HIV/AIDS section, who was arrested on May 21, 2007, by authorities from the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Police Special Branch. According to relatives, she has since 
disappeared. Since 2002, Phyu Phyu Thin and her group have provided hundreds of 
HIV/AIDS patients with counseling, medicines, education, and housing.22 
 
Internally Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Migrants 
 
• The Governments of Burma, India, Thailand, and Bangladesh should ratify the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. These governments should also stop violating the human rights of 
migrants. Refugee status for migrants fleeing their home country due to fear of 
persecution prohibits routine deportation and increases the availability of services and 
assistance, including medical care, to limit the spread of infectious diseases among highly 
mobile populations. Moreover, state-sponsored discriminatory policies and practices, as 
well as state-condoned vigilantism by private groups, only serve to drive migrants further 
underground and prevent them from seeking medical care when they are ill or injured. 
Recent trans-border cooperation between India and Burma to capture ethnic insurgents 
has resulted in increased abuses against migrants including arrest, mistreatment, torture, 
and execution. 
 
• The Government of Burma should take steps to halt the internal armed conflict and 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that are creating an 
unprecedented number of internally displaced persons and migrants. Internal armed 
conflict and abuses of rights, including forced displacement and forced labor, are creating 
major social upheavals leading to thousands of people fleeing their homes and living in 
internally displaced persons camps within Burma or in migrant camps on the border 
regions. These camps lack adequate food, sanitation, clean water, shelter, and medical 
care. Large mobile populations living under such poor conditions may be a conduit for 
the introduction of infectious diseases such as TB, malaria, HIV/AIDS, lymphatic 
filariasis, and avian influenza to new and unprepared communities. 
 
• The Government of Burma should recognize citizenship for the Rohingya in Arakan 
State by repealing or amending the 1982 Citizenship Law. Until that time, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must provide adequate resources 
to the Rohingya who are languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Under the 1982 
Citizenship Law, the members of the Muslim minority in North Rakhine State, generally 
known as the Rohingyas, have been denied Burmese citizenship, which has seriously 
curtailed the full exercise of their human rights and led to various discriminatory 
practices, including restricted access to medical care, food, and adequate housing. These 
oppressive practices have caused waves of Rohingya migration out of Burma into 
Bangladesh where they currently live in refugee camps administered by UNHCR. These 
                                                           
22 “Relatives of missing HIV activist threaten to sue authorities,” The Irrawaddy, June 21, 2007. 
  Executive Summary 
 9 
camps are sorely inadequate, leaving the Rohingya in fetid, overcrowded living 
conditions where health care is lacking and the TB infection rate is soaring.  
 
Responses to Infectious Diseases in Burma’s Border Regions 
 
• UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local NGOs must 
cooperate closely to develop health care programs along Burma’s borders. Some of the 
highest rates of TB, malaria, and HIV/AIDS in Burma are found along its frontiers. Yet 
the Burmese government provides little or no public services, including health care, to 
people living in the border regions and limits the travel of international organizations to 
conflicted areas of the border. Some ethnic-based organizations provide health care in 
these areas, but their resources are extremely limited. These organizations need to receive 
greater support. In addition, health care programs must be initiated across the border and 
brought to the Burmese frontier. The Back Pack Health Worker Team operates out of 
western Thailand and sends supplied health care workers on foot into eastern Burma to 
gather medical data and provide medical treatment and preventative care. It represents 
one successful cross-border model that should be expanded and replicated on Burma’s 
borders with China, India, and Bangladesh.  
 
• The governments of Burma and its neighbors must stop obstructing the passage of 
medical supplies and health care workers across the borders and develop national 
policies that promote cross-border health care. The Burmese frontier appears to be 
permeable to almost everything—people, timber, gems, natural gas, and infectious 
diseases—except public health programming. In order for cross-border health programs 
to reach people living in Burmese conflict and cease-fire zones, the governments of 
Burma and its neighbors must stop obstructing the passage of medical supplies and health 
workers and develop national policies to support these efforts. 
 
Regional Coordination and Response 
 
• UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local NGOs must 
cooperate closely to facilitate greater information-sharing and collaboration among 
agencies and organizations working to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in 
Burma and its border regions. These institutions should also work together to develop 
a regional response to the growing problem of counterfeit antimalarial drugs. In 
January 2007, our two centers, in collaboration with the Global Health Access Program, 
convened a regional conference on “Responding to Infectious Diseases in the Border 
Regions of South and Southeast Asia” in Bangkok, Thailand. The conference brought 
together 190 participants, representing 95 institutions from nine countries—Australia, 
Bangladesh, Burma, China, India, Thailand, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam—to 
discuss the efforts of governments, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and 
health clinics to combat infectious diseases in Burma and its border regions. Conference 
speakers highlighted some of the key challenges health professionals face as they 
confront the spread of communicable diseases in the region. These include limited 
disease surveillance and data collection; divergence of “official” statistics with data from 
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conflict zones; the paucity of data from narcotics surveillance, including drug availability 
and use and data on infectious disease prevalence and incidence among drug users; lack 
of prevention and treatment programs; and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law and medical neutrality in some border regions that restrict the ability of 
health professionals to access vulnerable communities.  
 
Conference participants, especially from the NGO sector, stressed the need to: (1) 
implement a mapping process, utilizing global-positioning technologies, to record the 
location, activities, and service-range of health-based organizations working to combat 
infectious diseases in Burma and the border regions; (2) convene a series of border-
specific training workshops to standardize procedures for surveillance, data collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information about infectious diseases in the region; (3) 
convene a second regional conference to report on the progress in implementing 
standardized procedures for data collection and analysis and to meet with colleagues and 
donors from the region; and (4) promote the development and capacity of community-






Decades of repressive military rule, civil war, corruption, bad governance, isolation, and 
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have rendered 
Burma’s health care system incapable of responding effectively to endemic and emerging 
infectious diseases. Burma’s major infectious diseases—malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis 
(TB)—are severe health problems in many areas of the country. Malaria is the leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality due to infectious disease in Burma. Eighty-nine percent of the estimated 
population of 52 million lived in malarial risk areas in 1994, with about 80 percent of reported 
infections due to Plasmodium falciparum, the most dangerous form of the disease.1 Burma has 
one of the highest TB rates in the world, with nearly 97,000 new cases detected each year.2 Drug 
resistance to both TB and malaria is rising, and HIV/AIDS, once contained to high-risk groups, 
has spread to the general population, which is defined as a prevalence of 1 percent among 
reproductive-age adults.3 
 
Meanwhile, the Burmese government spends less than 3 percent of national expenditures on health, 
while the military, with a standing army of over 400,000 troops, consumes 40 percent.4 By 
comparison, many of Burma’s neighbors spend considerably more on health:  Thailand (6.1%5), 
China (5.6 %6), India (6.1%7), Laos (3.2%8), Bangladesh (3.4%9), and Cambodia (12%10). 
 
Against this background, our two centers—the Human Rights Center, University of California, 
Berkley and the Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health—launched a research project in July 2005 to understand the factors that have 
contributed to Burma’s dire health situation and to the spread of infectious diseases in Burma and 
across its borders. We also wanted to see if it was possible to deliver international aid to combat 
infectious diseases in Burma in a manner that would be transparent and accountable, reach those 
most in need, and promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.  
 
                                                           
1 See Frank Smithuis, Treating and Preventing Malaria in Myanmar, Amsterdam:  Médecins Sans Frontières–
Holland, 2006 at 9. 
2 See Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2005 at 63. 
3 See Jon Cohen, “The Next Frontier for HIV/AIDS:  Myanmar,” Science, 301:5640, September 19, 2003, 1650–55.  
4 Budget data from the Burmese military authorities varies considerably. Many sources quote official health 
expenditures of 3 percent per annum. See, for example, World Food Programme, “Myanmar must do more to help 
its hungry millions,” press release, August 5, 2005. However, foreign diplomats in Rangoon have reported that the 
official 2006/2007 budget for health is 2.4 percent. Moreover, it is unclear how much of the official health budget 
represents foreign aid dollars, which has been placed at 13 percent. 
5 This is the figure for 2000. See Ministry of Public Health, Royal Thai Government at 
www.moph.go.th/ops/thealth. 
6 This figure is for 2003. See China Statistical Yearbook, 2003 and 2004, National Bureau of Statistics (China 
Statistical Press). 
7 This figure is for 2002. See National Health Accounts, World Health Organization, 2005. 
8 This figure is for 2003. See http://www.who.int/countries/laos. 
9 This figure is for 2003. See http://www.who.int/countries/bangladesh. 
10 This figure is for 2002. See National Health Accounts, World Health Organization, 2005. 
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We began our research by dispatching teams of researchers to Rangoon and the border regions of 
China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. During these missions, researchers gathered data about 
infectious diseases—primarily HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and lymphatic filariasis—from 
health clinics operated by local governments and nongovernmental organizations. The teams also 
interviewed health professionals, government officials, and representatives of nongovernmental 
and community-based organizations that operate preventative programs and provide therapeutic 
care to patients. After the initial trip, researchers made repeat visits to Burma and the border 
regions of Thailand and India to collect further information. In addition, one of our researchers 
interviewed staff members of the Global Fund in Geneva and representatives of the European 
Union in Bangkok charged with drafting the strategic plan for the Three Diseases Fund (3D 
Fund). All interviews were conducted in accordance with procedures established by the Office 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of the University of California, Berkeley and Johns 
Hopkins University.11 
 
Following the research missions, we hosted a regional conference on “Responding to Infectious 
Diseases in the Border Regions of South and Southeast Asia” in Bangkok on January 24–25, 
2007. The conference brought together 190 participants, representing 95 institutions from nine 
countries to discuss the efforts of governments, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, 
and health clinics to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in Burma and its border regions.12 
Our researchers had previously interviewed many of the conference participants for this report.  
Limitations 
 
While the study was conducted as rigorously as possible, some limitations need to be 
acknowledged. First, while we had good access to clinics and health-related organizations in the 
border areas of China, Thailand, India, and Bangladesh, we were unable to visit health facilities 
or conduct interviews in Burma outside of Rangoon due to government restrictions on travel and 
our own fear of placing respondents at risk of government reprisals. Burmese citizens who speak 
with foreigners are required to report such encounters to the authorities or face possible arrest 
and imprisonment. Despite these limitations, we managed to interview Burmese physicians and 
other health professionals, journalists, and human rights activists, as well as foreign aid workers 
and embassy officials in Rangoon. One of the Burmese health professionals we interviewed was 
a medical scientist working with the Ministry of Health. Second, data on infectious diseases 
collected by the Burmese authorities is generally unreliable due to methodological weaknesses, 
gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies. As a result, our interpretation of that data may reflect 
these shortcomings. Finally, in some cases, the responses we received in our interviews may 
have reflected some level of “social desirability.” Social desirability occurs when a respondent 
answers in a manner he or she thinks will please the interviewer.
                                                           
11 Given the sensitivity of the topic, we have erred on the side of caution and chosen not to provide the names of 
most of those we interviewed. 
12 It should be noted that the conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are those of the authors and 
sponsoring institutions and not necessarily those of conference participants. 
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Governance, Human Rights, and Infectious Diseases  
 
This report is based on four precepts. First, successful public health infrastructures, programs, 
and outcomes are usually a result of good governance and a respect for human rights. A number 
of authors13 argue that “government behavior (sometimes captured by the term ‘governance’) … 
plays a significant role in health outcomes—a role independent of … host genetics, insect 
vectors, or individual behaviors.”14 Governance can be measured by indicators such as 
accountability, stability, rule of law, respect for human rights, and the existence of an 
independent civil society. 
 
This precept is supported by recent studies that examine the relationship between the extent of 
freedom allowed by governments and its effect on a nation’s health.15 In a 2004 study published in 
the British Medical Journal, Alvaro Franco and his colleagues plotted life expectancy and maternal 
and infant mortality in 170 countries against the “freedom index”—a measure of political rights 
and civil liberties produced by Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization that publishes a 
yearly rating for most countries, classifying them as free, partially free, or not free.16 Franco and his 
colleagues found a significant relationship between high freedom ratings and good health 
indicators, even controlling for wealth and the size of the public sector. In their conclusion they 
speculate that democracies produce better health outcomes because they “allow for more space for 
social capital [such as social networks and pressure groups], opportunities for empowerment, better 
access to information, and better recognition by government of people’s needs.”17  
 
In a similar study, again using life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality as health 
indicators, Alvarez-Dardet and Franco-Giraldo analyzed data collected in the 1990s from 23 
post-communist countries.18 They found a significant correlation between the level of 
democratization and health. A third study by Daniel Reidpath and Pascale Allotey examined 176 
countries using World Bank data and found that “[h]ealthy populations tend to have better 
governance, better physical infrastructure, and greater wealth.”19  
 
Commenting on the mixed results of quantitative efforts to link governance factors to more 
narrow measures of infectious disease prevalence, Jonathan Cohen and Joseph Amon note that: 
 
infectious disease risk is not spread evenly across populations, and comparisons 
between countries of the prevalence of a specific disease miss the overburdening 
                                                           
13 Jonathan Cohen and Joseph J. Amon, “Governance, Human Rights and Infectious Diseases:  Theoretical, 
Empirical and Practical Perspectives,” in Ken Mayer and Hank Pizer (eds.), Social Ecology of Infectious Diseases 
(forthcoming). See also Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1999; J. 
Dreze and Amartya Sen, India:  Development and Participation, New York:  Oxford University Press, 2002; and 
Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequities:  The Modern Plagues, Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1999. 
14 Jonathan Cohen and Joseph J. Amon, supra note 13. 
15 Alvaro Franco, Carlos Alvarez-Dardet, Maria Teresa Ruiz, “Effect of Democracy on Health: Ecological Study,” 
British Medical Journal 329, 2004 at 1421–23. 
16 Information about Freedom House can be obtained at http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
17 Alvaro Franco et al., supra note 15.  
18 Carlos Alvarez-Dardet and Alvaro Franco-Giraldo, “Democratisation and health after the fall of the Wall,” 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 60, 2006 at 669–71. 
19 Daniel D. Reidpath and Pascale Allotey, “Structure (governance) and Health: an Unsolicited Response,” BMC 
International Health and Human Rights 6:12, 2006 at 6. 
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of some communities or subgroups within a country. In addition, governance 
influences different infectious disease risks in different ways and present distinct 
challenges to governments—compelling different types of government policies 
and approaches. For example, the risks posed by mosquito-borne diseases such as 
malaria or dengue fever present different possibilities for spread and control than, 
for example, Hepatitis B or C, transmitted through sex or blood contact.20 
 
That said, it is clear that the way a government speaks about and responds to a particular 
infectious disease—and those communities and subgroups most affected by it—will influence its 
success in lessening the burden of the disease.21 Indeed, it is important for governments to 
address the spread of infectious diseases by working closely and “respectfully with at-risk 
populations, rather than adopting top-down approaches (such as criminalizing disease 
transmission, instituting mandatory testing, and quarantining people living with infectious 
diseases) that risk driving these populations even further to the margins of society where they 
cannot be reached with prevention services.”22 
 
Second, a respect for human rights and international humanitarian law helps to ensure 
accountability, transparency, responsible use of health expenditures, and rapid and equitable 
delivery of relief in areas of armed conflict. Inversely, serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that affect the movement of large population groups can cause 
or exacerbate the spread of infectious diseases.23 This is particularly true among migrant or 
internally displaced populations who generally lack access to appropriate health services. 
 
Paula Brentlinger, in her article on the inter-relationship between health, human rights, and 
malaria control,24 notes that violations of international humanitarian law can cause or affect 
malaria-related morbidity and mortality during armed conflict. Violations of the laws of war, 25 
including attacks on health facilities and medical personnel, the use of forced labor, forced 
displacement, the failure to protect civilians and resources necessary for their survival, and the 
failure to provide adequate relief can contribute to  
                                                           
20 Jonathan Cohen and Joseph J. Amon, supra note 13. 
21 See Jonathan Mann, “Human Rights and AIDS:  The Future of the Pandemic,” in J. Mann, S. Gruskin, M. A. 
Grodin, G. J. Annas (eds.), Health and Human Rights: A Reader, New York:  Routledge. 
22 Jonathan Cohen and Joseph J. Amon, supra note 13. 
23 Id. Cohen and Amon note that “infectious pathogens can be stubbornly indifferent or even contrary to theories of 
health and human rights. HIV transmission can be limited in civil war settings, for example, even when human 
rights abuses are widespread and governments collapse. In Angola, for example, a protracted civil war which 
reduced cross-border travel and trade is thought to have left the country somewhat protected from the early 
introduction and spread of diseases compared to its neighbors. However, the war also impeded the ability of the 
government to conduct surveillance and education around the disease, and destroyed the health services needed to 
respond to AIDS. The war also curtailed the formation of a vibrant civil society, such as the development of NGOs 
and AIDS service organizations, which have been highly effective in both prevention and care elsewhere.” 
24 Paula E. Brentlinger, “Health, Human Rights, and Malarial Control:  Historical Background and Current 
Challenges,” Health and Human Rights 9:2, 2006 at 11–38. 
25 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1). Article 12 provides for the protection of medical units. Articles 15 
and 16 provide for the protection of medical and religious personnel and the general protection of medical duties. 
Articles 51, 54, and 70 provide for the protection of the civilian population, the protection of objects indispensable 
to the civilian population, and relief actions. See Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1994. 
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forced migration of non-immune persons (or deployment of non-immune troops) 
to malaria-endemic areas (or, conversely, displacement or deployment of infected 
persons to a region where malaria is not endemic but hospitable Anopheles 
vectors exist); breakdown or destruction of health services; provision of poor-
quality housing to displaced persons (for example, in refugee camps); and 
alteration of local vegetation in ways that favor the breeding of vectors. 
Discrimination against specific population groups, acute malnutrition related to 
reductions in food production or interference with food distribution, and diversion 
of human and material resources away from the health sector to military activities 
may also contribute to worsening malaria-related morbidity and mortality. 
 
Moreover, human rights abuses can fuel the spread of HIV/AIDS. Such violations include 
discrimination against those living with HIV or believed to be at risk of infection; sexual 
violence and coercion faced by women and girls; abuses against commercial sex workers, 
injecting drug users, and men who have sex with men; and violations of the right to information 
on HIV transmission. In some war-torn countries, rape has been used systematically as a weapon 
of war, potentially exposing tens of thousands of women and girls to HIV. In addition, persons 
living with HIV/AIDS may be subjected to stigmatization and discrimination in the workplace 
and denied government services.26  
 
Third, as the World Health Organization affirmed in 2001, public health interventions for 
vulnerable groups are most effective if they also succeed in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling 
the rights of people marginalized by society.27 Indeed, it is now considered a standard of best 
practice to include vulnerable and marginalized populations in the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of health programs that directly affect their well-being. At the same time, health 
professionals employed in both the public and private sectors must be mindful that their actions 
do not further harm vulnerable populations. “If services providing HIV-related prevention and 
care to commercial sex workers or injecting drug users do not protect the dignity and 
confidentiality of their clients,” writes Susannah Mayhew and her colleagues at the London 
School of Hygiene and Medicine, “they risk driving these already hard-to-reach groups 
underground. In addition, services that do not pay attention to rights may result in future 
violations of the rights of clients. For example, unintentionally contributing to their identification 
may result in police harassment and incarcerations. Once in prison, vulnerability to HIV 
infection is increased if, as is usually the case, there are no condoms and no clean syringes.”28 
 
Finally, donors and nongovernmental organizations working in the health sector, especially in 
countries with highly repressive regimes, have a responsibility to respect and promote the human 
rights of those they serve. While in the classic understanding of human rights, the state is 
considered to be the primary duty-bearer of human rights and provider of public health services, 
a shift has occurred in recent years whereby governments in some developing countries have 
                                                           
26 Numerous reports on human rights abuses and HIV/AIDS have been published since the virus emerged in the 
1980s. See, for example, reports by Human Rights Watch at http://www.hrw.org and Physicians for Human Rights 
at http://www.healthactionaids.org.  
27 World Health Organization, Transforming Health Systems:  Gender and Rights in Reproductive Health—A 
Training Curriculum for Health Programme Managers, WHO/RHR/01.29, Geneva, 2001. 
28 Susannah Mayhew, Megan Douthwaite, and Michael Hammer, “Balancing Protection and Pragmatism:  A 
Framework for NGO Accountability in Rights-Based Approaches,” Health and Human Rights 9:2, 2006 at 183. 
Introduction 
 16 
begun handing over their function of delivering health services to non-state actors, including 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).29 In the early 2000s, in South Africa, for example, the 
provision of antiretroviral drugs to AIDS patients through NGOs and private-sector employers 
was critical in the face of a government that routinely blocked their introduction to the public 
sector. However, the lack of accountability of these sectors meant that certain life-or-death 
questions, such as eligibility criteria for antiretroviral treatment, were rarely examined.30  
 
In some countries, national expenditures on health have been so paltry international and local 
NGOs have had to step in to fill the breach, often with little or no oversight. This is the case in 
Burma where national health expenditures for 2006/2007 will be $19.2 million,31 while foreign 
aid for health programs will be nearly double that amount.32 The Three Diseases Fund, or 3D 
Fund, a major European-funded health initiative that has taken over from the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, will provide most of these funds. The 3D Fund has declared 
that it will circumvent central government and provide funds directly to UN agencies, 
international and local NGOs, and civilian administrations at the district level. This situation 
poses a challenge for recipients of 3D Fund aid, especially nongovernmental organizations, as 
many—if not most—of these groups will be working with marginalized populations, including 
injecting drug users, commercial sex workers, ethnic minorities, and, should access be obtained, 
war-affected populations.  
 
This shift from state to non-state institutions raises several questions. Will these organizations be 
able to uphold the human rights of their clients—especially if this means challenging repressive 
policies and practices of the state? If the situation becomes too untenable, should these groups 
suspend services? And, most importantly, who will come to the defense of nongovernmental 






                                                           
29 Id. 
30 See, for example, a letter from Human Rights Watch to President Thabo M. Mbeki, dated November 21, 2001, at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/11/21/safric3377_txt.htm. 
31 This figure is the equivalent of 24,183 million kyat and is based on the exchange rate effective April 2007. All 
dollar figures in this report refer to U.S. currency. 
32 To date, the Burmese government has not made its 2006/2007 budget publicly available. However, we were able 
to obtain budget figures from foreign diplomats in Rangoon.  
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3. Background 
Burma is a Buddhist nation of about 52 million people, two-thirds of whom belong to the ethnic 
group known as the Burmans. The other third of the population comprises over one hundred 
ethnic groups including the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Mon, and Kachin. The majority of Burmese 
are farmers. Hundreds of thousands of Burmese live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as 
legal refugees in other countries, most of them in Thailand and Bangladesh. Two million are 
thought to live as undocumented workers in Thailand.  
 
Burma today is a land of stark contrasts. Although abundant in natural resources, including land, 
water, forests, natural gas, coal, petroleum, gems, and other mineral resources, Burma is a UN 
Least Developed Nation, and among the poorest in the world. It is the world’s second-largest 
producer of illegal opium (behind Afghanistan), and by far the region’s largest supplier of 
methamphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).  
 
The two key political issues in Burma today are “the restoration of democracy and the resolution 
of the political rights of ethnic nationalities.” Yet both aspirations seem forever ephemeral. While 
the military junta claims it is committed to building a future democracy, it insists that change 
must come gradually and on its own terms. And while the military junta asserts that it must 
prevent what it calls “the disintegration of the union” by concentrating political power at the 
center, “it achieves this objective through a brutal counter-insurgency campaign and the forced 
relocation of ethnic groups.”1 
 
In the pre-colonial days, Burman kings routinely conquered other ethnic groups, frequently 
extending their rule over neighboring kingdoms and principalities. Under British colonial rule, 
ethnic differences and tensions were exacerbated when certain minority groups were favored 
politically and economically. Tensions increased during World War II, when most Burmans 
favored Japan and the Axis Powers while some ethnic groups such as the Karen remained 
staunchly loyal to the British. Abuses by the predominantly Burman national army against ethnic 
minorities following World War II further stoked fears of ethnic Burman domination, fanning 
desires for increased local autonomy. By the time of the military coup in 1962, most of the ethnic 
groups that had suffered at the hands of the Burmese army were in open rebellion. 
Militarization 
 
The years leading up to the coup of 1962 marked the beginning of the militarization of Burma. 
Not unlike military regimes in South America in the 1970s and '80s, the Burmese armed forces, 
or Tatmadaw, believed they had the professional and organizational capacity to unite and 
manage the country. The Tatmadaw established its own profit-making corporation to supply its 
battalions with goods and materials. The corporation originally ran shops selling bulk goods, but 
it soon expanded into the import-export business and became a major player in the domestic 
economy. Boosted by its military and economic successes, the Tatmadaw increasingly identified 
                                                           
1 Christina Fink, Living Silence:  Burma under Military Rule, London:  Zed Books, 2001 at 13. 
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itself as playing an essential role in the country’s internal affairs. Today, the Tatmadaw is a self-
perpetuating elite that operates its own health care system, its own educational system, its own 
housing, and even its own private banks. 
 
General Ne Win, who led the 1962 coup, sought to remake Burmese politics and society by 
promulgating a series of institutional reforms under the slogan of the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” 
He established a Revolutionary Council, which replaced approximately 2,000 civilian members of 
the country’s administration with military personnel. From then on, all opportunities for social 
mobility were dependent on joining the military. New military-guided councils at the township and 
village levels were established to manage the redistribution of land and wealth largely to the favor 
of local military commanders. In March 1964, the Revolutionary Council demonetized 50-kyat and 
100-kyat notes with the intention of removing wealth from foreign hands. Hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic Indian and Chinese business owners had no choice but to leave the country.  
 
Businesses that did not collapse were given to military officers who had little education or 
relevant experience and found it difficult to handle their new jobs. “In cases where skilled 
civilians remained on staff,” writes anthropologist Christina Fink, “the new bosses often felt 
threatened by them. With no other opportunities available, many experienced professionals and 
bright young people emigrated, starting the brain drain which has continued ever since. The 
Revolutionary Council appeared to be unconcerned by the departure of so many of its most 
talented people, but the effect on the industry was devastating.”2 
 
The “Burmese Way to Socialism” led to economic ruin from which Burma’s economy has never 
fully recovered. In the 1950s, Burma had outpaced Malaysia and Thailand in industrial 
production but from 1964 onwards it declined steadily. Agricultural production foundered in a 
country once known as the “rice basket of Asia.” While the regime gave agricultural plots to 
many landless farmers, they were expected to sell all their rice to the government at below-
market prices. Farmers resisted the new system by hoarding rice and selling it surreptitiously on 
the black market. Rice exports fell dramatically and, since rice exports were one of Burma’s 
primary sources of foreign exchange, the government was unable to pay for necessary imports. 
This, in turn, helped create a thriving black market with goods coming from Thailand and other 
neighboring countries.3 
 
By 1987 Burma’s economy was in shambles, and the United Nations designated Burma a “Least 
Developed Country,” grouping it together with the poorest African nations for debt relief. 
Quietly at first, university students and intellectuals began organizing massive protests against 
the military government. When the marches began in earnest in the spring of 1988, the 
government closed the universities and imposed a ban on public gatherings.  
 
A nationwide uprising led by student activists briefly drove the military from power in early 
August 1988, but it was short-lived. On the afternoon of September 18, 1988, troops appeared in 
the streets, attacking strike centers and killing at will. Thousands of people were killed, and 
many thousands more fled the cities and headed to the borderlands. Within two days, the military 
had re-established control.  
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Under international and domestic pressure to democratize, the junta held elections, widely 
regarded as free and fair, on May 27, 1990. Despite a program of intimidation, the opposition, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD), let by the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi, swept to 
victory in nationwide elections, winning 392 of 485 contested seats (over 80%). Ethnic parties 
took another 65 seats, while the military’s party, the National Unity Party (NUP), secured only 
10 seats out of the 413 candidates it fielded. But the military refused to accept the results and 
intermittently placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, where she has remained for most of 
the last 17 years. Today she is the sole Nobel Peace Laureate still in custody.4  
The Union Solidarity and Development Association 
 
In the aftermath of their electoral defeat, the military regime further entrenched their rule by 
quickly expanding their ranks, filling administrative offices with loyal servicemen and creating 
the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Established on September 15, 1993, 
the USDA, though purportedly a benign social organization, maintained direct ties with high-
ranking military officers, including the current junta leader, Senior General Than Shwe, who 
became the association’s first chairman.  
 
Today the USDA boasts a membership of 22.8 million people, nearly half the population of 
Burma, and its presence can be felt in almost every aspect of civil society.5 The USDA uses 
aggressive and often coercive means to recruit new members. Incentives are offered to join with 
the explicit understanding that failing to do so could result in harassment and decreased 
opportunities for education and professional advancement. In some districts, people’s names 
have been added to membership rolls without their ever being consulted. In some high schools, 
teachers have been ordered to give the names of their students to the USDA for automatic 
membership. Joining the USDA is presented to students as compulsory and, as a result, many of 
them are members, as are many—if not most—government employees.6  
 
The USDA, in an effort to attract young people into its ranks, offers courses in computers and 
English to its members. Student membership also brings certain benefits, including access to 
sport leagues and other extra-curricular activities. The USDA encourages student members to 
monitor the activities of their classmates and to report any suspicious behavior. Some student 
members have reported receiving passing marks regardless of merit.7 
 
Beginning in 1996, the military regime sought to turn the USDA into a counterforce against 
student activists in the NLD. This was reflected in a speech given by General Than Shwe to a 
USDA management course at the time of student demonstrations on December 11, 1996. In the 
speech, he warned the trainees to be vigilant of destructive forces both “inside and outside the 
country … Parents, teachers and students must all keep vigil and prevent those with negative 
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views, destructive elements and those subservient to colonialists from intruding into the 
education world and using students in their bids to gain political power.”8 
 
USDA members have been linked to attacks on opposition leaders and human rights activists. In 
November 1996, USDA members attacked Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s motorcade and, in May 2003, 
attempted to assassinate the NLD leader. Aung San Suu Kyi escaped with minor injuries, but 
dozens of her supporters were killed. More recently, in April 2007, USDA members assaulted 
two members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters organization as they were leaving a 
village in Hinthada Township in Irrawaddy division. The two activists, Maung Maung Lay and 
Myint Niang, were hospitalized with head injuries.9 
Counter-Insurgency and the “Four Cuts” Policy 
 
Since 1989, the military junta has used a combination of military campaigns and deal-brokering 
with insurgent leaders to quash rebellions and solidify its control of the country. So far, 17 armed 
ethnic groups have agreed to cease-fires with the junta. Several groups, however, continue active 
resistance, particularly along the eastern frontier bordering Thailand. These include the Shan 
State Army-South (SSA-S); the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP); and the Karen 
National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).  
 
The Tatmadaw employs a counter-insurgency strategy known as the Four Cuts policy to 
undermine local support for these groups, cutting off their access to food, money, intelligence, 
and recruits. “The human and social costs are incalculable,” writes Fink. “Villagers living in 
distant hamlets are forcibly relocated to strategic villages along roads, usually with a battalion of 
Tatmadaw soldiers based nearby. They are given no compensation and often no new land to 
farm. In the most extreme cases, they are put into fenced relocation sites that are more like 
concentration camps. Food is insufficient, water often unclean, and medicine completely 
lacking.”10 
 
International human rights organizations estimate that the Four Cuts policy has resulted in the 
destruction of over 3,000 villages and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in 
eastern Burma since 1966.11 Rarely disciplined for their actions, military troops often kill, 
torture, and rape civilians found outside of the relocation camps or permitted zones. Thousands 
of displaced villagers hide in the jungles, usually in small, fragmented communities where they 
are exposed to malaria and other diseases. The Tatmadaw prohibits foreigners from accessing 
these communities. Families seeking medical care often have to travel long distances, braving 
land mines, bandits, and military patrols, to reach township clinics and hospitals.12 
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Armed Conflict and Health 
 
In 2006, the Back Pack Health Worker Team, based on the eastern frontier of Burma, concluded 
that the poor health status of IDP communities in the eastern conflict zones was “intricately and 
inexorably linked to the human rights context in which health outcomes are observed.” The 
organization reached that conclusion after conducting a series of cluster-sample surveys designed 
to capture household data on demographics, morbidity, public health needs, mortality, and 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in these IDP communities.13 
 
The survey focused on five factors in the preceding 12 months that could have potentially 
influenced health outcomes:  forced labor of household members, injury or abuse by soldiers, 
theft or destruction of food/livestock by military forces, landmine injuries, and forced relocation 
due to security issues. The survey found that over half of the participating households had 
experienced at least one of the aforementioned abuses in the preceding year, a third had suffered 
from forced labor, and a quarter had experienced food seizure or destruction. Moreover, these 
abuses were linked to adverse health outcomes:  
 
• Families who had been forced to flee were 2.4 times more likely to have a child under 
age 5 die than those who had not been forcibly displaced. 
 
• Households who had been forced to flee were 3.1 times as likely to have malnourished 
children than those living in more stable conditions.  
  
• Families that had suffered food destruction and theft, both violations of international 
humanitarian law, in the preceding 12 months were almost 50 percent more likely to 
suffer a death in the household. Children of these households were 4.4 times as likely to 
suffer from malnutrition compared to households whose food supply had not been 
compromised. 
  
• Families that had been subjected to forced labor in the past year were at significantly 




Forced labor is a pervasive problem in Burma. In recent years, the military has compelled tens of 
thousands of civilians to work on infrastructure projects, including roads, bridges, and airports, 
and in support of the military. Those unable or unwilling to comply with military demands for 
forced labor are fined or must send replacements, including their children, to work in their 
stead.15 In at least two cases, the Tatmadaw is accused of using forced labor to construct gas 
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pipelines, a lucrative source of revenue for the regime:  the Yadana gas pipeline, built by Total 
and Unocal, and the Yetagun pipeline, in which Premier Oil had a significant interest.  
 
In 1999, the International Labor Organization (ILO) concluded that the practice of forced labor 
in Burma constituted “a contemporary form of slavery.” The ILO later banned the military 
regime from attending any of its meetings or receiving funding until it stopped using forced 
labor.16 The military junta reacted angrily to the expulsion, saying that in Burma villagers were 
happy to work for the military or to speed up development projects.17 In late 2006, exasperated 
by the lack of tangible progress in stopping this practice, the ILO was considering referring 
Burma to the International Court of Justice for its continued extensive use of forced labor. ILO 
representatives also briefed the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the use 
of forced labor in Burma and made relevant documents available to him.18 In February 2007, the 
ILO announced that it had reached an understanding with the Burmese government that allows 
“victims of forced labor to have full freedom to submit complaints to the ILO liaison office” in 
Rangoon with a guarantee that “no retaliatory action will be taken.”19 
Political Prisoners and Child Soldiers 
 
Human rights organizations estimate that there are more than 1,150 political prisoners in 
Burma.20 No independent body is currently monitoring detention conditions in Burma, and 
Amnesty International reports that prison deaths, including those of political prisoners, increased 
in 2006.21 
 
The Burmese military has long been accused of forcibly recruiting children into its armed forces 
and, in 2004, the London-based Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reported that the 
junta had conscripted children as young as 11 into the army. The Coalition estimated that up to 
20 percent of the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic insurgents were under 18—the current legal age of 
conscription—which would have put the total number of child soldiers in Burma at nearly 
90,000, the highest of any country in the world.22  
Censorship and Freedom of Association 
 
The military junta sharply restricts freedom of the press, owning or tightly controlling all daily 
newspapers and broadcast media in Burma. According to Reporters Without Borders, Burma 
ranked 164th out of 169 nations on the topic of press freedom for 2006. During the year, the 
Burmese authorities detained 11 journalists, seven of whom were given jail terms. The Press 
Scrutiny Board of the Ministry of Information examines publications and prohibits “any 
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incorrect ideas and opinions which do not accord with the times.” Media are ostensibly allowed 
to offer criticism of government projects as long as it is deemed “constructive” and are allowed 
to report on natural disasters and poverty as long as it does not affect the national interest.  
 
Among the topics that have been forbidden are human rights in Burma, the detention under 
house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and the activities of the Tatmadaw, 
especially its current offensives in Eastern Burma that have forcibly displaced over 27,000 
people since December 2005. Certain Internet email servers and search engines, including 
Google and Yahoo, are also banned.23 Regulations issued to Internet café owners prohibit 
customers from downloading websites and visiting politically affiliated sites. Every two weeks 
Internet cafes are required to submit the personal details of their customers, records of their 
Internet use, and random photo shots of computer screens.24 
 
In May 2006, the junta banned 24 business and professional associations including one catering 
to Chinese entrepreneurs and another offering free funeral services to the poor. In Burma, local 
and international nongovernmental organizations must register with the home ministry and 
relevant government ministries to operate officially in the country. Groups are often banned 
because they are perceived as being too political, too independent or because they do a better job 
than the government at providing services. Among the organizations the government refused to 
register were the Free Funeral Service Society, the Myanmar Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
the Engineer Association, and the Construction Association.25 
Education 
 
Since the early 1960s, successive military regimes have sought to contain student activism rather 
than improve the quality of public education and, over the years, universities have been shut down 
for extended periods of time whenever political unrest occurred. Between 1962 and 1999, the 
military closed down universities 13 times for periods ranging from a month to more than three 
years.26 Between 1988 and 2000, the universities were closed more than they were open. Classes 
were canceled from June 1988 to May 1991, from December 1991 to May 1992, and from 
December 1996 to July 2000. Medical institutes reopened in February 1999. To make up for the 
closures, one-year courses were shortened to four months in order to maintain graduation rates. 
 
Today, primary school enrollment rates are high and more schools are being constructed in 
Burma. Even so, UNICEF reports that “less than half of all children … complete primary school. 
Many school expenses must be borne by students’ families, presenting an insurmountable 
financial obstacle for many impoverished households. Classroom facilities are often poor and 
under-equipped, and attrition rates among teachers are high due to low pay, poor working 
conditions and long separations from their families.”27  
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Other factors have contributed to the demise of the education system. Students are required to 
spend time taking political ideology courses. They are not allowed to choose their own course of 
study but are assigned a particular track based on their secondary school matriculation exam 
scores. The military also decides how many students are permitted to enroll in each subject. The 
military must approve of university curricula and limits the scope of what may be taught, 
particularly in the humanities and social sciences. Many of the best educators and professionals 
have gone abroad, where they can earn a decent income and teach more freely. Educational 
exchange programs have also been limited. In March 2006 the Ministry of Education issued an 
order requiring postgraduate Burmese students studying overseas to obtain permission for any 
Burma-related research.28 In response, a statement released by the International Association of 
University Presidents said that such an order would restrict the education of Burmese students 
and would hinder their abilities. 
 
The poor state of Burma’s universities has prompted many young people to enroll in non-degree 
education programs offered by the American Center and the British Council in Rangoon. The 
state-run New Light of Myanmar has often targeted the American Center for “inciting unrest” 
through its English-language courses, debate classes, films, and library, which contains books 
and other publications banned by the government.29  
The Courts and Political Reform 
 
The judiciary is not independent. Justices are appointed or approved by the junta and adjudicate 
cases according to the junta’s decrees. Administrative detention laws allow people to be held 
without being charged or tried, and deny them access to legal counsel for up to five years if the 
junta feels they have threatened the state’s security or sovereignty. 
 
In 2004, the Burmese military regime launched a seven-step “roadmap” it said would move the 
country toward constitutional and political reform. The following year the first step was launched 
with the re-convening of a national convention to deliberate on a new constitution. However, 
most of the delegates were hand-picked by the military and the process was boycotted by the 
NLD and major pro-democracy ethnic groups. The meetings were held outside Rangoon, ringed 
by army bases, and the junta prohibited free debate on the drafting of the constitution, warning 
delegates that discussing the process off-site or criticizing the process would be considered an 
offense carrying a prison term of up to 20 years. As a result, many have dismissed the process as 
another tool to legitimize and perpetuate military rule.30 
 
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi has stated multiple times that she harbors no rancor towards the 
military and that she would like to reach an agreement with the Tatmadaw that would allow the 
generals to withdraw from power without fear of retribution.31 However, the military junta has 
continued to spurn such offers, responding instead with increasing repression and further 
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harassment of NLD members and leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi and Vice Chairman U 
Tin Oo, who remain under indefinite house arrest without charge. In late 2006, Burmese 
authorities re-arrested five leading democracy activists and sentenced Win Ko, a leading NLD 
member, to three years in prison after he staged a petition drive to free political prisoners.  
 
The Burmese government remains unresponsive to outside pressure, and recent signs indicate 
that it is becoming even more reclusive. On November 6, 2005, at 6:37 am, an hour apparently 
chosen for astrological reasons, the junta began an abrupt relocation of the government, 
including its civil servants, to the remote jungle town of Pyinmana (Naypyidaw), some 250 miles 
north of the former capital, Rangoon. The junta claims it is financing the building of the new city 
by selling old ministries that it deserted in the former capital. The Agence France-Presse (AFP) 
reports that the International Monetary Fund estimates that “about 1–2 percent of GDP has been 
spent in the last few years by the government on the move” to Pyinmana. “The chances of it 
becoming a black hole are very good,” a western diplomat in Rangoon told the AFP in April 
2007. “It is a continuous investment for 15 to 30 years before it becomes viable. That’s money 
that will not be channeled into health and education.”32 
 
The move to Pyinmana prompted protests from foreign governments and diplomatic missions and 
UN agencies in Rangoon. In interviews conducted in August 2006, several representatives of 
international humanitarian organizations in Burma roundly criticized the government’s relocation 
and some characterized it as evidence of the junta’s deepening isolation and paranoia. The 
informants said the move had greatly hindered their access to government officials and caused 
significant delays in acquiring approvals to launch new projects and travel outside of Rangoon. 
The Economy 
 
Today the military dominates nearly all aspects of Burma’s economy. It controls two of the 
country’s major companies, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), whose 
principal stockholders are military officers, and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC).33 
An annual report leaked by UMEH in 1995–96 stated that the two main objectives of UMEH are 
“to support military personnel and their families” and “to try and become the main logistics and 
support organization for the military.”34 MEC’s purpose is to shift defense funds from the public 
to the private sector, and MEC is authorized to conduct business in almost any of field of 
commerce. Meanwhile, the Myanmar Investment Commission, which includes many members 
of the military cabinet and is controlled by the SPDC, approves all foreign investments in 
Burma. This arrangement enables the junta to direct resources toward the military companies that 
dominate the economy, such as UMEH. 
 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted Burma into its ranks in July 
1997. There are several theories on the reasons for Burma’s admittance. One suggests that 
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Burma’s entry into ASEAN made its coveted natural resources, including timber, natural gas, 
and minerals, more accessible to member nations. Another posits that Burma’s inclusion, along 
with Cambodia and Laos, was part of ASEAN’s attempt to gain global power through 
membership enlargement.35 
 
Traditionally, ASEAN has maintained a strict principle of noninterference with the domestic 
policies of its members. While the United States and Europe have implemented economic 
sanctions against Burma’s successive military regimes, ASEAN has pursued a policy of 
“constructive engagement” towards Burma. However, in 2003, ASEAN, in response to an 
attempted assassination of Aung San Su Kyi by USDA members and paramilitary forces aligned 
with the military junta, began making gestures towards expelling Burma and calling for the 
release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.36 In July 2006, the foreign ministers 
of Malaysia and Indonesia, both ASEAN-member countries, issued harsh rebukes against the 
Burmese military regime’s foot-dragging on promised political reforms.37 In a direct reference to 
Burma, the Malaysian foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, said, “Any action the [Burmese] 
military takes, like closing down the NLD or not releasing Aung San Suu Kyi are all 
impediments and obstacles to their credibility in terms of the progress towards democracy.”38 
 
The attempted assassination of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003 prompted the United States to stiffen 
sanctions already imposed against Burma in 1997. The new measures included bans on imports 
of Burmese products and the provision of financial services by U.S. citizens. It also placed visa 
restrictions on officials from the military junta. “The import ban has had a substantial impact on 
the military junta,” according to Jared Genser of the National Endowment for Democracy. “Over 
a ten-year period, U.S. imports from Burma had grown at an average annual rate of 28 percent a 
year from $38 million in 1992 to $470 million in 2001. As a result of the import ban, all of those 
imports were immediately cut off.”39 
 
If there is any country capable of influencing the Burmese junta’s behavior, it is China. Since the 
early 1990s, China has served as the principal lifeline for the Burmese regime. China’s 
objectives in Burma are twofold. First, China seeks natural resources, such as oil, timber, and 
gas, to maintain its economic growth. Second, China “wants to secure its security capabilities by 
expanding its access to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea thus allowing for greater 
protection of its ‘southwest silk road’ trade routes and the development of a modern maritime 
reconnaissance system.”40 China is also the principal arms exporter to Burma. Without China’s 
$1.6 billion in military assistance and naval modernization, Burma would not have been able to 
create the second largest military, behind Vietnam, in Southeast Asia.41  
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China continues to be one of Burma’s major trading partners. In 2005, Burmese trade with China 
reached $1.21 billion, equivalent to 20 percent of Burma’s foreign trade volume and matching 
Thai expenditures for roughly the same amount of access to Burma’s natural gas. Both countries 
have announced a target of $1.5 billion in bilateral trade in the future. Burma has also opened six 
trade points along the border with China to facilitate further transactions.  
 
In April 2006, China’s National Development Reform Commission approved plans to build a 
pipeline that would carry China’s Middle East oil from a deep-water port off Sittwe across 
Burma to Yunnan, China’s southern province. This would provide China with an alternative to 
the Strait of Malacca, on which it now depends for delivering its oil from the Middle East. To 
date, China has built 190 miles of Burmese highways, and was planning a 67-mile railroad, the 
final link in a pan-Asian network.42 Today, trucks loaded with Burmese gems, jade, teak, and 
food, as well as heroin and methamphetamines, pour across the Chinese border. In the opposite 
direction come trucks carrying Chinese goods such as fuel, housewares, clothes, electrical 
hardware, and auto parts. Burma is utterly dependent on its powerful neighbor for even the most 
basic products. “When China spits,” a local saying goes, “Burma swims.” 
 
The Burmese authorities claim that the economy has been growing more than 10 percent 
annually in recent years, but, as the International Crisis Group pointed out in 2007, “independent 
surveys and observations show steadily deteriorating living standards for the large majority of 
the population, driven by high inflation, weakening health and education systems, and a 
generally depressed economic environment caused by decades of government 
mismanagement.”43  
The Drug Trade 
 
The 1990s were known as the boom days of the drug trade in Burma. By 1993, Burma was 
cultivating an estimated 165,800 hectares of opium, representing a potential yield of 1,791 tons.44 
In a 1996 report, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon placed the value of opiate drug profits at $922 
million.45 
 
The drug trade plays a pivotal role in the Burmese economy, both in the public and private 
sectors and at the national and local level. Some speculate that the ruling regime used profits 
from the drug trade to finance weapons purchases and expand dramatically the military ranks 
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from 180,000 to over 400,000.46 Others believe that the Burmese building industry, expanded 
tourist infrastructure, and shipping and air transport were funded, in part, by narcotics profits.47 
 
In poppy-cultivation areas, regional and local military commanders rely on “kickbacks,” 
procured by protecting labs engaged in heroin processing and through taxes levied on farmers 
who grow poppies, to supplement their meager wages. It is not uncommon for local military 
units to coerce farmers to grow poppies, pay a tax on the poppy fields, and then sell the harvest 
to either the military or merchants of their choosing.48 This system has become even more 
entrenched as the junta has found it increasingly difficult to pay its expanding rank and file 
soldiers adequately.49 In the border regions, military units have been instructed to “live off the 
land”—either grow their own food or take it from local communities.50  
 
At the local level, poppy cultivation and participation in the drug trade help local Burmese 
provide food for their families, compensate for the lack of public services, and maintain an 
uneasy relationship with the local military. In 2002, an estimated 440,000 families in Shan State 
alone relied upon opium cultivation as a primary source of income.51 By 2006 that number had 
declined to 126,500 families, representing an estimated 632,500 people.52 
 
In 1999, under international pressure, the junta promulgated its 15-year plan for narcotics 
eradication, an ambitious plan to render 52 townships drug free by 2014 with investment in 
roads, bridges, agricultural projects, and law enforcement.53 The SPDC began to extract “drug-
free” pledges from militia and ethnic leaders in cease-fire zones where most of the prime poppy-
cultivation land lies. In 2001, the UN estimated the gross annual income generated by the drug 
trade in Burma at $540 million and, by 2006, that estimate had dropped to $58 million.54 
 
Between 1998 and 2006, the UNODC claims there was an 83 percent decrease in opium 
cultivation, from 130,000 hectares to 21,000 hectares. The majority of the decline comes from 
the Northern Shan State, including the Kokang region, with a reported decline in cultivation from 
19,600 hectares in 2003 to 6,000 hectares in the 2004 season, and the Wa Region, which the 
UNODC claims had no opium cultivation in 2006. Nevertheless, in its 2006 survey, the UNODC 
claimed that opium production increased from 312 metric tons in 2005 to 315 metric tons in 
                                                           
46 See A. Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002. 
47 A. Davis and B. Hawke,  “Burma. The Country that Won’t Kick the Habit,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10:3, 
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49 “Burmese Troops ‘Live off the Land,’” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 18, 2000, at 10; Karen Human Rights 
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2006, reflecting an increase in yield from opium poppies from 9.5 kg per hectare to 14.7 kg per 
hectare in 2006.55  
 
Some experts, however, claim that the eradication programs have not been that effective and 
have resulted in abuses of local farmers and their families. (See box:  Opium Eradication and 
Human Rights.) They believe that the reduction in opium cultivation is the result of many 
factors, including multiple poor rainy seasons, drought, and the rise in manufacture of 
amphetamine-type stimulants or ATS. (ATS does not bear the stigma of “drug addiction” that 
opium or heroin consumption carry, and is seen as a “work drug” and more sociable, leading to 
increased use among rural communities in Burma, Thailand, and Laos.) Others claim that the 
reduction of poppy cultivation is not sustainable and will result in raising the price of opium, 
providing a market incentive for farmers to return to opium cultivation. 
 
Despite these reductions, Burma remains Southeast Asia’s largest source of drugs. Addiction to 
Burmese heroin has expanded rapidly on both sides of the China border, particularly in Yunnan 
Province, and in the Indian border state of Manipur, which has one of the highest rates of HIV 
infection in India. These epidemics are fueled by injection drug use. Thailand has also felt 
significant impact from Burmese drugs:  in 1999, the Thai Development Research Institute noted 
that the Burmese drug trade played a significant role in the growing addiction of Thais to heroin 
and amphetamines. Thai officials estimated that 600 million amphetamine pills produced in 
Burma entered Thailand in 2000 alone.56 
 
Some Chinese officials have expressed concern about drug trafficking and the spread of 
HIV/AIDS on the China-Burma border. During a visit of Burmese Prime Minister Soe Win in 
February 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the spread of narcotics along China’s border 
with Burma had “severely damaged the local society” and that the drug trade “must be controlled 
through severe measures.”57 Five months later, Chen Cunyi, the deputy secretary-general of 
China’s National Narcotics Control Commission, said that the northern region of Burma is the 
main source of drugs coming into China and presents the biggest nuisance to his nation.58 
 
                                                           
55 UNODC, supra note 52.  
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58 See BBC Monitoring International Reports, “China Faces ‘Pincer Attack’ of Narcotics from Burma, Afghanistan,” 
Financial Times, July 4, 2006. 
Background 
30 
Opium Eradication and Human Rights 
 
Since 1999 the Burmese government and UNODC have been engaged in an aggressive 
campaign to eradicate poppy cultivation and heroin production in eastern Burma. While 
successfully reducing heroin production, the campaign has resulted in widespread 
violations of human rights, including forced relocation, food insecurity, and destruction 
of property without compensation, affecting thousands of families who once relied on 
poppy growing for their livelihood.  
 
Although UNODC has attempted to develop crop replacement initiatives including 
fruit, lychee, tea and rubber plantations and basic manufacturing such as liquor and 
tobacco factories, mining and limited construction, these initiatives have often faltered, 
leaving poor farmers with few alternatives to feed their families. Former UNODC 
country head Jean-Luc Lemahieu believes that approximately two million farmers were 
affected by the eradication in 2005 alone.  
 
The World Food Program (WFP) has stepped in to provide emergency assistance where 
failing crop replacement projects in Shan State have left farmers and their families 
without food. In late 2003, the WFP staged an emergency feeding program for 50,000 
farmers in the Kokang area of Shan State and, in March 2004, began a one-year project 
to feed 180,000 more farmers.  
 
In the Kokang area of Shan State, thousands of villagers have left their homes in search 
of food and employment after the Burmese military and Kokang authorities destroyed 
their opium fields. Clinics were closed and schools experienced a sharp decline in 
attendance as people were forced to travel in search of food and employment. 
  
Between 1999–2001, the United Wa State Army, an ethnic cease-fire group, forcibly 
relocated up to 120,000 people from the Northern Wa State, a popular poppy 
cultivation region, to locations in the Southern Wa Area and to villages along the Thai 
border. Thousands of people died during the relocation as conditions in the new 
settlements led to massive outbreaks of malaria and anthrax. Furthermore, many of the 
settlement sites were already occupied, and existing Shan, Akha and Lahu villages, 
with an estimated 48,100 people, were also displaced.  
 
 David Scott Mathieson 
 Human Rights Watch 
 
Sources: L. Jagan, “End of the Road for Burma’s Drug Barons,” Bangkok Post (Perspective), October 17, 
2004 at 1 and Lahu National Development Organisation, Unsettling Moves:  The Wa Forced 





The United Nations 
 
The United Nations has largely failed in its efforts to persuade the Burmese regime to improve 
its human rights performance. So far, the military regime has ignored 28 consecutive non-
binding UN resolutions, as well as appeals from four special envoys from the now defunct UN 
Commission for Human Rights, and two special envoys from former Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan.59 In January 2007, China and Russia blocked the Security Council from demanding an 
end to political repression and human rights abuses in Burma by rejecting a resolution proposed 
by the United States. The vote was 9-3 in favor of the resolution, with South Africa joining 
China and Russia in the opposition. Indonesia, Qatar, and the Republic of Congo abstained. 
While they were in the minority, China and Russia were able to halt the resolution because they 
have veto power as permanent members of the council.60 
The Future 
 
Burma’s military regime continues to refuse to share power, decentralize decision-making, 
introduce measures to reform the economy, and respect basic human rights and international 
humanitarian law. This situation is further compounded by the deep-seated intransigence of the 
more conservative elements of the junta who hold absolute power over their ministries. The 
military regime’s recent actions—the flawed National Convention with no seat at the table for 
the main lawful political parties and the lack of progress on the so-called roadmap to democracy; 
the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi (extended by the junta for another year on May 25, 
2007, despite international calls for her release from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 
ASEAN, the European Union, and 59 former presidents and prime ministers); 61 widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law in eastern Burma; the continued detention of over 
1,000 political prisoners; restrictions on the travel and activities of international organizations; 
and finally, the regime’s growing inscrutability and unpredictability, as demonstrated by the 
manner of the shifting of the seat of government from Rangoon to Pyinmana in November 
2005—hardly bode well for the future. 
 
Indeed, without fundamental changes, the welfare of the majority of Burmese people will likely 
continue to decline. Of the many threats the Burmese people face, the possibility of sickness and 
death due to malaria, TB, and HIV/AIDS looms as one of the greatest. 
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4. The Politics of Foreign Aid 
 
 
There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.1 
 Sadako Ogata, Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
By necessity we practice “the art of adaptability.” The Burmese 
authorities will grant travel permits for a few months at a time, then 
suddenly for some reason it all comes to a halt. So we wait, essentially 
under ‘city arrest’ in Yangon [Rangoon]. We submit travel requests and 
ask ministry officials to expedite our paperwork. Then one day, suddenly, 
without explanation, conditions improve and things begin moving again.2 
 Foreign aid worker, Rangoon 
 
 
In a major shift in the mid-1990s, Burma’s military junta began allowing international aid 
organizations to set up programs, particularly in the fields of health, education, and economic 
development, in Burma. But it was an uncomfortable relationship.3 The military authorities 
remained suspicious of Westerners, often referred to them in speeches as “neo-colonialists” 
impinging on Burma’s sovereignty, and tried to funnel assistance through government-affiliated 
groups, such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Writes Christina 
Fink: 
 
The regime often sought to channel assistance towards [local] organizations working to 
support its own political objectives. For instance, a UNDP [United Nations Development 
Programme] household survey which was given to the government’s statistical office was 
then farmed out to members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association to 
administer. In 1996, two international organizations financed a health-related publication 
put out by the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA). Besides 
health news, the funded issues also ended up including MMCWA speeches criticizing 
‘internal destructionists,’ in other words, the National League for Democracy. Such 
actions made it difficult for international [aid organizations] that wanted to continue to 
help ordinary citizens but could not stop the authorities from interfering or politicizing 
their assistance.4 
 
Foreign aid workers, meanwhile, had to be circumspect to avoid angering the generals who could 
easily terminate their programs or deny them access to project sites. In a few cases, Fink writes, 
military commanders forced aid workers “to hand over vehicles … in return for being able to 
                                                           
1 Quoted in David Rieff, A Bed for the Night:  Humanitarianism in Crisis, New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2002 at 22. 
2 Interview with a foreign aid worker in Rangoon in August 2006. 
3 In 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross returned to Burma after a four-year absence because of the 
regime’s refusal to allow ICRC visits to political prisoners. 
4 Christina Fink, Living Silence:  Burma under Military Rule, London:  Zed Books, 2001 at 247–48. 
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continue their programmes.”5 Despite these problems, some foreign aid organizations, by 
identifying and working with progressive and dedicated people within the government ministries, 
managed to launch a number of beneficial activities. 
 
Not everyone supported the presence of foreign aid organizations in Burma. Some of the most 
vocal critics were Burmese pro-democracy representatives living abroad who argued that 
international aid only lent legitimacy to an illegitimate regime. Foreign assistance, they argued, 
allowed the military junta to divert monies slated for health care and education into the coffers of 
the armed forces. In response, international organizations argued that withholding intervention 
would be immoral given Burma’s dire health situation. Having an international presence in the 
country, they said, “was important in and of itself, because of the witnessing role [they] could 
play and the dialogues they could initiate with people in and out of government.”6 
 
The debate over whether or not to provide Burma’s repressive regime with humanitarian aid was 
by no means unique to Burma. By the 1990s, the world was experiencing outbreaks of intrastate 
violence that forced governments and international aid groups to grapple with the value and 
pitfalls of providing aid in less-than-ideal circumstances. Among the concerns were whether or 
not emergency aid only serves to support existing military and political structures, whether it 
creates dependence on the part of recipient states, and whether it fails to address root causes of 
the violence. To understand how this debate has unfolded in Burma, it is worth examining the 
concept of “humanitarianism” and some of the ways it has evolved in theory and practice in 
recent years. 
Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights 
 
“Humanitarianism,” writes David Rieff, “is by definition an emblem of failure, not success. The 
disaster has already happened:  the famine has started; the cholera is raging; or the refugees are 
already on the move.” When a natural or man-made disaster occurs, UN agencies and international 
and national nongovernmental organizations rush to the scene in an effort to save lives by 
providing “five essential” types of aid:  protection/rescue, health, food, water, and shelter.7  
 
Over the last century the organization that has most epitomized the values of humanitarianism 
has been the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC adheres to the 
principles and modalities of humanity (saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it 
is found); impartiality (implementing actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination 
between or within affected populations); neutrality (neither favoring any side in an armed 
conflict or other dispute, nor engaging in controversies of a political, ethnic, religious, or 
ideological nature); independence (acting solely in the interests of victims); proximity (retaining 
close proximity to people in need of protection and assistance); confidentiality (keeping findings 
and recommendations confidential, sharing them only with the authorities concerned); and 
transparency (keeping the modalities of its work always the same, thus rendering it highly 
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6 Id. at 248. 
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predictable).8 These seven principles are predicated on ICRC’s belief that humanitarian activities 
must not be influenced by political considerations. 
 
While ICRC steadfastly abides by these principles, it has been criticized for failing to expose 
mass atrocities because of its strict adherence to the principle of neutrality. After the Second 
World War, ICRC was denounced for having knowledge of the Nazi concentration camps but 
being unwilling to make this information public for fear of forfeiting its access to prisoners of 
war and civilians.9 During the civil war in Biafra in the late 1960s, 10 the British aid organization 
Oxfam broke ranks with ICRC because the latter was unwilling to speak out against war crimes 
being committed by the Nigerian military.11 Later, Bernard Kouchner, a French doctor serving 
with the ICRC in Biafra, resigned from the organization because, in his words, ICRC workers 
had become “accomplices in the systemic massacre of a population.”12 
 
Kouchner went on in 1971 to establish Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), a humanitarian aid 
organization that embraced the “right of criticism” or “denunciation” of governments or rebel 
groups that violated human rights.13 Twenty-eight years later, upon receiving the Nobel Peace 
Prize, then-MSF president James Orbinski questioned the principle of neutrality:  “[S]ilence has 
long been confused with neutrality and has been presented as a necessary condition for 
humanitarian action. From its beginning, MSF was created in opposition to this assumption. We 
are not sure that words can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly kill.”14 
 
By the 1990s, a growing number of relief organizations and donor governments had begun to 
embrace MSF’s “rights-based approach” to humanitarian assistance.15 “When considered through 
the justice/human rights lens,” Catholic Relief Services (CRS) said in 1999, “the mere provision 
of foodstuffs or medical supplies is an insufficient response to a humanitarian crisis.”16 Relief 
assistance, CRS argued, should address the root causes of armed conflict and societal dislocation, 
not merely tend to its symptoms. In a radical departure from the founding principles of 
humanitarianism, some organizations maintained that aid should be withheld if governments 
failed to comply with their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.  
 
                                                           
8 See http://www.icrc.org. See also David Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism:  How the Human 
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13 Id. at 685. 
14 Id.  
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(many of whom were responsible for mass killings in Rwanda) in the camps of Zaire. White and Cliffe, supra note 7 
at 319. 
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275–89 at 278. 
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Rights-based humanitarianism also had its critics. Opponents contended that such an approach 
placed the political behavior of governments over the basic needs of victims and therefore 
contradicted the very principles of humanity and universality. Critics argued that a human rights 
approach to humanitarian aid would divide vulnerable populations into “deserving” and 
“undeserving” victims. They pointed to the suffering of the Afghans (under the Taliban 
government) and Serbs (under Milosevic)—both groups that had been singled out as “undeserving” 
victims because their governments failed to comply with human rights or political mandates.17 
 
Further compounding the human rights debate was the growing trend by donor governments to 
combine humanitarian assistance with development aid. Traditionally, the two forms of 
assistance had been viewed as distinct and often unrelated responses to different sets of human 
needs and conditions.18 Unlike the urgent lifesaving objectives of humanitarianism, development 
aid implied a process of moving a developing country “forward in the direction of peace, justice, 
social equity, and an absence of, or at least a declining trend in ignorance, disease, and 
poverty.”19 To be effective, development aid was usually conditioned on the existence of an 
internationally accepted state that was willing to adopt anti-corruption measures and comply with 
its human rights obligations.20 Viewed as a continuum, humanitarian relief was the “first 
responder” to man-made and natural disasters, providing assistance, largely through 
nongovernmental organizations, to save lives and alleviate suffering. As the emergency 
stabilized, humanitarian assistance would give way to rehabilitation work and eventually to long-
term development projects.  
 
However, the “humanitarian aid–development continuum” failed to address the emergence of 
intrastate wars in the 1990s and the resultant increase in refugees and internally displaced 
persons.21 These so-called “complex political emergencies,” or CPEs,22 were characterized by (a) 
ongoing and protracted violence and widespread violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law; (b) the presence of a parallel economy that included the export of drugs, 
timber, precious stones, and other natural resources; (c) the manipulation of social and cultural 
identities; and (d) the aim of belligerents to control and, in extreme cases, persecute or destroy 
specific civilian populations.23 Burma’s eastern regions, mired in conflict for decades, easily met 
this definition, as did zones of conflict in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan throughout the 1990s. 
                                                           
17 Much of this was spurred on the by the growing influence that donor governments were having on the activities of 
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Complex political emergencies challenged the theoretical division separating humanitarian aid 
from long-term development programs and called for interventions of a different nature. CPEs 
are protracted crises, often lasting for years and even decades, where the “emergency” is seldom 
“over.” Fighting between belligerents tends to ebb and flow and migrate geographically 
depending on the conditions on the ground. The lack of a finite endpoint to the violence, a 
traditional precondition for humanitarian aid to evolve into development aid, makes it difficult to 
progress beyond saving lives or, when fighting abates, to implement short-term livelihood 
rehabilitation programs.24 These stopgap measures may include support to improve livelihoods 
through the provision of seed, tools, fertilizers, livestock, veterinary supplies, and fishing gear.25 
The Challenges and Obstacles of Humanitarian Aid 
 
Foreign aid workers arriving in Burma in the 1990s faced formidable challenges and obstacles. 
Indeed all of Burma was in need of either long-term infrastructure development or emergency 
aid. Development programs were needed in the government-controlled “white zones,” which 
constituted most of the country, to combat poverty and the spread of infectious diseases, while 
emergency aid and short-term rehabilitation programs were urgently needed to support displaced 
communities in the conflicted “black zones” along the Thai-Burma border, and in the “brown 
zones,” or cease-fire areas, in which an uneasy truce existed between government troops and 
ethnic rebel forces. Responding to these needs bedeviled foreign aid organizations, which had to 
learn to adapt to the whims of the Burmese authorities.  
 
By the early 2000s, Burma’s military rulers had begun to show a new willingness to work with 
the international community, and pro-democracy groups modified their call for isolating the 
regime. At the same time, international organizations, including the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and ICRC, 
launched new initiatives on forced labor, prison visits, and aid programs for conflict-affected 
populations. From 2001 to 2004, the number of international nongovernmental organizations 
working in Burma grew from 30 organizations with a total budget of $15 million to 41 
organizations with double that amount. Meanwhile, foreign aid for Burma doubled from around 
$75 million in 2000 to $150 million in 2005. In the health sector, international funding to combat 
HIV/AIDS, which the government had denied existed only a few years earlier, rose from less 
than $1 million in 2000 to $21.5 million in 2005.26 
 
Many observers credited General Khin Nyunt, then serving as both military intelligence chief, 
prime minister, and chair of the junta’s health committee, for facilitating the ability of aid 
organizations to deliver services in central Burma and some border areas in the early 2000s. Aid 
organizations welcomed the increased humanitarian space, which allowed them to move about 
                                                           
24 It appears that short-term livelihood rehabilitation is sometimes broadly defined as “relief” and sometimes not. In 
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New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing No. 58, Yangon/Brussels, December 8, 2006, at 4–5. 
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the country more freely. When problems arose, they were often able to use contacts in military 
intelligence to resolve them.27 
 
However, the halcyon days of relief assistance in Burma were short-lived. On October 11, 2004, 
the military junta deposed Khin Nyunt, and the situation for aid organizations began to 
deteriorate rapidly. Within weeks, contacts between foreign relief workers and regime officials 
dropped off precipitously, and aid workers stationed in sensitive parts of the country found it 
increasingly difficult to access project sites.28 In July 2005, new rules on travel were issued, and 
the authorities began encouraging international agencies to work more closely with government-
affiliated organizations, such as the regime’s main civilian-front organization, the Union 
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). As the noose tightened, some donor agencies 
and humanitarian groups found ways of circumnavigating these new requirements, while others 
began to downsize their programs. 
The Global Fund  
 
In August 2005, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) 
became the first foreign aid agency to withdraw funding from Burma. A year earlier, the Global 
Fund had signed a contract with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to 
disperse $98.4 million over a five-year period to WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF and seven 
international humanitarian organizations29 to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in 
Burma. UNDP and its “implementing partners or sub-recipients” would be assisted by four 
national nongovernmental organizations:  Myanmar Council of Churches, Myanmar Anti-
Narcotics Association, Myanmar Medical Association, and Myanmar Nurses Association.30 
Among other things, the UNDP would fund programs to provide DOTS therapy for people 
suffering from tuberculosis and provide HIV testing and antiretroviral drugs (ARV) through a 
network of community-based health clinics.31 
 
Before issuing grants, the Global Fund had instituted an “Additional Safeguards Policy” to be 
applied to funding in Burma and four other countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan) 
where conditions suggested that funds could be placed in jeopardy without the use of additional 
measures. These conditions included: 
                                                           
27 Id. at 5. 
28 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
International Organizations:  Assistance Programs Constrained in Burma, April 2007, GAO-07-457 at 17. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, General Khin Nyunt initiated a number of moves to test the environment for change. 
These moves included the resumption of activity in Burma of the ICRC in 1999, the acceptance of a new Special 
Envoy of the UN Secretary-General in 2000, the acceptance of a new UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in 
2001, the commencement of a dialogue on forced labor with the International Labor Organization in 2000, and the 
acceptance of a Japanese-proposed program on structural adjustment of the economy in 2000. 
29 These consisted of Population Services International, Burnet Institute (Center for Harm Reduction), CARE 
Myanmar, CESVI Cooperation and Development, World Vision Myanmar, Marie Stopes International, and 
Médecins du Monde. 
30 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, supra note 27 at 1–5. 
31 By the time of the pull out, the Global Fund had disbursed $6.1 million of $54.3 million for HIV/AIDS, $3.0 
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1. significant concerns about governance 
2. lack of process of identifying a broad range of implementing partners 
3. major concerns about corruption 
4. widespread lack of public accountability 
5. recent or ongoing conflict in the grant environment 
6. poorly developed civil society/lack of civil society participation 
7. lack of a proven track record in managing donor funds in the health sector32  
 
The Global Fund instituted several specific safeguards to protect its assets in Burma. First, it 
sought and received the approval of the National League for Democracy. Second, it placed all 
entities receiving Global Fund grants under the continuous scrutiny of KPMG, an auditing firm 
with offices in Rangoon. Third, it received written assurances from the Burmese government that 
“the staff from UNDP, KPMG, and the Global Fund would have unhindered access to program 
sites.”33 Fourth, it required that the UNDP and other grant recipients ensure that the Burmese 
government “did not benefit from, or take credit for, actions conducted with Global Fund 
funding.” Finally, it established a “zero cash policy,” which meant that no national entities were 
to receive any funds from the grants. UNDP would undertake all procurement of assets and 
payment of incidental expenses for food and transport of individuals (e.g., health, technical, and 
community workers). The UN agency would also implement all contracts and maintain 
ownership of all assets. In effect, this meant UNDP would serve as a shadow ministry of health 
in the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in Burma. 
 
In announcing its withdrawal, the Global Fund said the regime’s new travel restrictions had 
limited the ability of its implementing partners and staff to access implementation areas. 
According to the Global Fund,  
 
the government also imposed additional procedures for review of procurement of 
medical and other supplies (a vital aspect of Global Fund project implementation). 
As a result, the Global Fund concluded that these measures would effectively 
prevent the implementation of performance-based and time-bound programs in 
the country, breach the government’s commitment to provide unencumbered 
access, and frustrate the ability of the Principal Recipient to carry out its 
obligations. The travel restrictions appear to be the most recent manifestation of a 
gradual change in the government’s attitude towards international and national 
humanitarian efforts in Myanmar over the past few weeks.34 
 
The Global Fund’s withdrawal from Burma immediately became a bone of contention both 
inside and outside of the agency.35 Many foreign aid workers in Rangoon rejected the Global 
Fund’s explanation for its withdrawal and characterized it as papering over the truth. The Global 
Fund’s withdrawal, they said, had less to do with the actual conditions on the ground and more 
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33 Id. at 4. 
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with pressures from three U.S. Senators,36 Burmese human rights advocates in Washington, D.C., 
and the Open Society Institute (OSI),37 a New York–based foundation that funded the research 
for and publication of this report.38 Other foreign aid workers were unsure about the politics 
surrounding the withdrawal of the Global Fund but believed the agency had acted too hastily. 
They argued that before leaving Burma the Global Fund should have given the Burmese 
authorities an ultimatum:  either lift the travel restrictions or lose the funding. 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG), in a briefing paper on Burma published in December 
2006, gave voice to the views of many foreign aid workers about the withdrawal of the Global 
Fund. While critical of the Burmese government’s “aggressively nationalistic line” and “new 
restrictions on international agencies, including aid organizations,”39 ICG argued that “political 
figures and activists in the United States,”40 through their pressure on the Global Fund and 
UNDP headquarters in New York, (1) undermined the UNDP’s ability to disperse funds 
efficiently to its partnering organizations in Burma, (2) contributed to further straining of 
relations between foreign aid groups and the Burmese regime, and (3) hastened the withdrawal 
of the Global Fund from Burma.  
 
In making these charges, ICG pointed to letters sent by three U.S. Senators to the executive 
director of the Global Fund in September 2004 criticizing the organization and the UNDP for 
                                                           
36 The senators alleged to have been involved in the Global Fund pullout were Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman, 
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Senator Judd Gregg, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; and Senator Mitch McConnell, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations. 
37 Interviews with foreign aid workers in Rangoon in August 2006. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), supra 
note 25 at 12. The ICG briefing stated that “U.S.-based advocacy groups led by the Open Society Institute put strong 
pressure on the Global Fund to institute additional safeguards on its Myanmar programs.” The ICG briefing went on 
to cite a memorandum sent by OSI president Aryeh Neier to Brad Herbert of the Global Fund on September 24, 
2004, in which OSI insisted that “none of [the Global Fund’s] programs should be conducted by or with financial 
assistance to the ruling military junta or government-organized NGOS (GONGOS).” The ICG report concluded that 
as a result of this memo “the Global Fund introduced tighter restrictions on use of its funds [in Burma], to the point 
that compromised program effectiveness, and seemed in breach of its own regulations.” In a response to the ICG 
briefing, Neier wrote that his memo to the Global Fund stated that OSI was in favor of the Global Fund grants 
moving forward, but with one condition:  no funding for the military or GONGOS. The memo to the Global Fund 
also stated that “[t]his condition should not impede progress in the short term. There are legitimate NGOs that are in 
a position to undertake this work. Population Services International, for example, is already a sub-recipient of the 
Global Fund grant. Other NGOS can be engaged, among them Catholic Relief Services, Care International, Save the 
Children (U.S.), MSF Holland, World Vision and World Concern.” Aryeh Neier’s memorandum, “Critique of ICG 
Briefing on Burma,” January 17, 2007, was written in response to the ICG briefing, supra note 25, and is in the files 
of the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley. 
38 OSI also provided funds to the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley and the Center for Public 
Health and Human Rights, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University to convene a regional 
conference on “Responding to Infectious Diseases in the Border Regions of South and Southeast Asia,” which was 
held in Bangkok on January 24–25, 2007. The conference brought together 190 participants, representing 95 
institutions from nine countries—Australia, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, China, India, Thailand, Singapore, 
United States, and Vietnam—to discuss the efforts of governments, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, 
and health clinics to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in Burma/Myanmar and the border regions. UC 
Berkeley and JHU have solicited further funding from OSI to provide training to nongovernmental organizations 
working to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in Burma and the border regions. 
39 International Crisis Group, supra note 25.  
40 International Crisis Group, Crisis Group Response to OSI Critique of Asia Briefing No. 58, Myanmar:  New 
Threats to Humanitarian Aid, signed by ICG president Gareth Evans, January 20, 2007. 
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“failing to recognize that the SPDC [military regime] is solely responsible for creating the 
myriad humanitarian crises faced by Burma today,” and requesting that the Global Fund 
“withhold the disbursement of additional funds to Burma.”41 According to ICG, when the Global 
Fund refused to adhere to these conditions, 
 
the Congress went after UNDP. In early 2005, Senator Mitch McConnell 
introduced an amendment to the 2006–2007 Foreign Appropriations Bill, which 
threatened to withdraw about $50 million—roughly half—of U.S. core funding 
for the agency if it failed to certify that all its programs in Myanmar, including 
those it administered for others such as the Global Fund, provided “no financial, 
political, or military benefit, including the provisions of goods, services, or per 
diems, to the SPDC or any agency or entity of, or affiliated with, the SPDC.” 
Although the bill did not specifically mention the Global Fund, it was a thinly 
veiled attempt to force the UNDP to withdraw as the principal recipient of its 
money, a step which likely would have led to termination of the programs.42 
 
ICG was critical of both the Burmese military junta for its imposition of restrictions on the work 
of relief workers and foreign politicians and others who might wish to stop foreign aid altogether 
or place onerous conditions on it because of Burma’s terrible human rights record. “Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia all illustrate the many risks of allowing states to fail,” ICG argued. 
“Humanitarian aid is not a solution to [Burma’s] fundamental political and human rights 
problems:  it is an emergency response in a situation with no good options.”43  
 
Two Global Fund executives who were at the agency at the time of the Burma pullout—Sir 
Richard G. A. Feachem, former Executive Director, and Brad Herbert, former Chief of 
Operations—reject any implication that the U.S. Congress or others influenced the agency’s 
decision to withdraw from Burma. Feachem says he made the decision on the advice of his then-
Chief of Operations and other relevant senior staff. According to Herbert, neither Senator 
McConnell nor anyone associated with him had any part in the decision to cancel the grant.44 
 
Another high-level official in the Global Fund’s headquarters in Geneva acknowledged in an 
interview in November 2006 that “members of the U.S. Senate had at one point caused ‘a lot of 
noise’ over the Global Fund’s grant to Burma,” but ultimately the agency made its decision to 
withdraw based solely on the agency’s “hands off, performance-based approach” to grantmaking. 
This process, he said, “was simply not suited to a closed society like Burma.”45 He said the Global 
Fund was designed to hold its principal recipients, such as the UNDP, to high standards of 
transparency and accountability. He referred to a Global Fund report that states:  “Grant funding is 
not ‘owned’ by the people and organizations managing and implementing programs, and it can be 
lost if it is not efficiently managed and used to reach people in need of services.”46  
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42 Id. 
43 International Crisis Group, supra note 37. 
44 Aryeh Neier, supra note 35.  
45 Interview with Global Fund staff member in October 2006 in Geneva. 
46 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Investing in Impact:  Mid-Year Results Report, 2006, 
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“Our withdrawal from Burma was clear cut,” the Global Fund official said, “the UNDP and its 
implementing partners were unable to uphold their oversight role because of conditions set by 
the government. And when we looked closer, we found that our funds were having only a 
marginal benefit to those most in need. Taken together, those two factors prompted us to 
terminate the program.” But another Global Fund staff member who closely observed the 
agency’s withdrawal from Burma saw it differently. He said that the “political agenda” set by the 
U.S. senators and Burmese advocacy groups in the United States played a major role in 
“strangling the Fund’s program in Myanmar.”47  
 
Whatever the reason (or reasons) for the Global Fund’s withdrawal from Burma, the incident 
underscored the difficulties donors face when they try to provide aid, especially “performance-
based aid,” to nongovernmental institutions in a highly repressive military state. It also 
demonstrated why humanitarian assistance, as much as we might wish it to be, cannot be isolated 
from political realities on the ground. Indeed, humanitarianism and humanitarian aid reside not 
above the political world but in its very midst.  
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF-France) 
 
In December 2005, four months after the Global Fund departed from Burma, MSF-France 
became the first international relief organization to pull out of the country. Citing government 
restrictions on staff travel to project areas as the primary cause for the withdrawal, the group’s 
in-country representative, Herve Isambert, said it had been very difficult “to provide equal access 
to health care. So by virtue of the poor performances of last year, we have decided to pull out.”48 
Once outside of the country, Isambert suggested that the military junta wanted “to get rid of all 
humanitarian workers in … politically sensitive regions. The restrictions imposed on us reduced 
us to the role of specialist contractors subjected to the political will of the military junta. In 
reality, the Myanmar authorities do not want anyone to witness the acts of violence they are 
committing against their own people.”49 
Government Restrictions on International Organizations  
 
In February 2006, the Burmese Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development 
formalized the kind of travel restrictions that had led to the departure of the Global Fund and 
MSF-France the year before. The Guidelines for UN Agencies, International Organizations and 
NGOS/INGOS on Cooperation Programme in Myanmar (hereafter referred to as the 
“Guidelines”) set out in detail the steps foreign aid organizations had to follow to develop 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), open and register field offices, vet new staff members, 
acquire approval for internal travel, manage equipment purchases, and coordinate with state and 
division authorities. A senior official of the ministry told representatives from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2006 that, among other things, the guidelines 
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would help address the tendency of some international humanitarian entities to become involved 
in what the official referred to as “political matters.”50 
 
The English version of the Guidelines is highly restrictive (see Appendix). But the Burmese 
language version, which has not been distributed formally to the international community, is 
even more restrictive. A senior UN official familiar with the full range of UN programs in 
Burma told GAO representatives that three of the new government restrictions “were not 
acceptable to the United Nations.” These restrictions would require international organizations to 
 
• agree that their programs will “enhance and safeguard the national interest,” 
“prevent infringement of the sovereignty of the State,” and “be on the right track 
… to contributing to the socio-economic development of the Nation” 
• coordinate their work with local and state coordinating committees that include 
representatives of the Union Solidarity and Development Association and similar 
government-backed groups 
• select their Burmese national staff from government-prepared lists of individuals 
 
Representatives of UN agencies and foreign aid organizations interviewed in Rangoon in August 
2006 offered varying views about why the Burmese government had issued the new guidelines. 
Some speculated that the sheer number of MOUs between international organizations and 
multiple government ministries had become too cumbersome and needed to be centralized in a 
coherent manner. Others felt the government was reacting to the increase in the number of 
international organizations working in the country, many of which were not properly registered. 
But all agreed that the Guidelines, if vigorously enforced, could severely curtail the 
organizations’ ability to provide aid equitably and efficiently. They also said they would not 
agree to allow the regime to select their Burmese staff members. One foreign aid worker reported 
that some district government officials feared renewing contracts with her organization because 
they were unclear about the status of the Guidelines.51 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
Since its return to Burma in 1999, ICRC has played an essential role by visiting and providing 
health care to prisoners and developing water and sanitation projects in war-torn communities 
where weakened infrastructure, isolation, and the security situation make the population 
particularly vulnerable.52 ICRC staff have convened surgical training seminars for scores of 
Burmese health workers stationed in conflict areas, built water and sanitation facilities reaching 
more than 70,000 beneficiaries, provided over 7,000 landmine victims and other physically 
disabled people with prosthetic services, and supported the local manufacture of 19,600 
prostheses. 
 
                                                           
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 27 at 18. 
51 Interview with a foreign aid worker in Rangoon in August 2006. 
52 Although a private humanitarian organization, the ICRC is not a nongovernmental organization. It has a widely 
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Between 1999 and late 2005, ICRC made 453 visits to dozens of prisons and labor camps 
throughout the country and provided training to Burmese doctors on prison health care. ICRC 
has used information gleaned from these visits to push authorities to improve prison conditions. 
A Burmese doctor and former political prisoner recalled his first encounter with an ICRC doctor 
in Shwebo prison, which is located in Sagaing division and holds a number of political prisoners. 
“I don’t remember the exact date, but it must have been sometime during the rainy season in 
2000,” the former prisoner said. “Before then, we never saw the ICRC. But I can tell you there 
was great relief in our cellblock when the ICRC arrived. Many prisoners were suffering from 
severe dysentery, and I had developed TB. The ICRC doctor arranged for me to have a chest X-
ray, and I was finally given medications. As I recall, the doctor returned two or three more times 
and conditions in our block gradually improved.” After spending six years in Shwebo and a year 
in Rangoon prison, the Burmese doctor was released in 2004. He stayed a year in Rangoon and 
was later forced to flee to Thailand.53 
 
Beginning in 2004, ICRC field staff began sending reports to the organization’s headquarters in 
Rangoon complaining that local Burmese army commanders were placing restrictions on their 
access to towns and villages. Within a year, the Burmese authorities were also placing new 
restrictions on the organization’s access to prisons. “Basically, the situation is not good,” ICRC 
spokesperson Fiona Terry told the press in February 2006. “The government has not authorized 
us to visit [prisoners] since the end of last year.”54 
 
One of the government’s most contentious conditions, Terry said, was insisting that ICRC staff 
take representatives of the government-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA) on their visits to political prisoners. Such a condition violates ICRC’s strict practice of 
visiting and interviewing prisoners unaccompanied by representatives of governments or other 
entities. “We were happy if some Myanmar groups got involved in the welfare of detainees,” 
Terry said. “But, obviously, we are not able to visit with them. We have to have an independent 
view of what’s going on and to talk with detainees without any witness.”55 
 
ICRC’s relations with the Burmese government deteriorated even further during 2006 and, on 
November 27, the ICRC issued a press release stating that the Burmese government had ordered 
the organization to close its five field offices in Mandalay, Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, Taunggyi, and 
Kyaing Tong, effectively making it impossible for the organization to carry out assistance and 
protection work in border areas. The Burmese authorities also announced that ICRC visits to 
detainees would not be allowed to resume. Pierre Krähenbühl, the organization’s director of 
operations, said at the time “the ICRC is seriously worried that those most in need … will bear 
the brunt of this standoff.” Krähenbühl said the organization was significantly reducing its 
programs in Burma and transferring aid workers to ICRC missions in other countries.56 By late 
2006, the regime’s actions had reduced the scope of ICRC’s assistance and protection effort in 
Burma by 90 percent.57 
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Criticism of the ICRC closure was swift and widespread. British MP and Foreign Office 
Minister, Ian McCartney, condemned in “the strongest terms” the Burmese junta’s decision. 
“This action … illustrates yet again its complete disregard for international human rights 
standards, and its unwillingness to engage constructively with the international community.”58 
The Economist wrote:  “The junta’s rejection of the ICRC is bad news for hopes that it can be 
engaged in any serious dialogue about reform. If it cannot tolerate the scrupulously apolitical 
ICRC, it seems improbable that it will accept any form of international intervention, advice or 
mediation.”59 Closer to home, the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the move “does not 
augur well for the Myanmar government and its relations with the international community.”60 
 
By March 2007, relations between the ICRC and the Burmese regime had reached a breaking 
point. “The ICRC’s humanitarian work in Myanmar (Burma) has now reached near-paralysis,” 
said Krähenbühl, the director of operations. Speaking in Geneva, Krähenbühl said that ICRC staff 
were still unable to resume visits to detainees anywhere in Burma or conduct independent field 
operations in sensitive border areas. “Living and security conditions for civilians in sensitive 
border areas remain a real concern for ICRC,” he said. “There are also strong indications of a 
deterioration in conditions of detention and treatment at several places of detention.”61 
 
Krähenbühl went on to say that the military regime’s restrictions were “jeopardizing the ICRC’s 
ability to discharge its internationally recognized mandate since they are incompatible with its 
independent and neutral approach to assessing the need for humanitarian action and to assisting 
vulnerable people.” As a result, ICRC closed two of its offices, one in Mawalmyine (Moulmein, 
Mon State) and the other in Kyaing Tong (Kengtung, Eastern Shan State), and left open the 
option of closing its remaining field offices in the future.62 
 
ICRC’s travails pose serious implications for the future of relief work in Burma. As an ICRC 
doctor in Rangoon said in an interview in August 2006, “The ICRC has been the organization 
most affected by the regime’s restrictions. Why? Because we work in the most sensitive areas of 
the country.”63 
Other International Relief Organizations 
 
Since 2004, Burma’s military regime has impeded the work of the World Food Program (WFP) 
and UNHCR by restricting their ability to (1) move food and international personnel freely within 
Burma and (2) gather data needed to understand the scope and nature of Burma’s problems.  
 
WFP has reported that it was unable to deliver 20 to 30 percent of its planned food shipments 
during 2005 because of government restrictions on travel. Meanwhile, UNHCR has said the 
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regime’s policies have affected the organization’s efforts to assist displaced persons in the Thai-
Burma border region. The U.S. GAO reported in April 2007: 
 
While UNHCR has been allowed to implement certain “quick impact” projects 
(such as building of schools and bridges) in some 300 villages, UNHCR considers 
these projects to be only a first step toward fulfilling its protection objectives. 
Because regime officials closely monitor these projects, UNHCR staff cannot 
easily meet with villagers to improve UNHCR’s understanding of the problems 
facing internally displaced persons. … UNHCR does not want to jeopardize its 
already limited access to the region or to put the local population at risk by 
holding public meetings on protection issues.64 
 
In addition, the regime has often rejected proposals that use the terms “research” or “data 
collection.” Indeed, the Guidelines for international organizations contain the regime’s first 
formal restriction on research. WFP has reported that while it has not encountered any problems 
carrying out surveys and assessments in the regions where it operates, it has encountered 
difficulty in conducting national surveys on food needs. At the same time, UNDP has said it 
completed two major research projects without encountering significant difficulties with the 
government.65 
The Three Diseases Fund 
 
On October 12, 2006, six weeks before the Burmese authorities ordered ICRC to close its field 
offices, the UN Offices for Project Services (UNOP) and the Ministry of Health signed an MOU to 
launch the “Three Diseases Fund” (3D Fund) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in 
Burma. The fund, worth $99.5 million over five years, will be financed by the European Union, 
Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Over the next three years, the 3D Fund is 
expected to provide funding to some 40 international and local relief organizations in Burma.  
 
According to the 3D Fund’s strategic plan, the aid will bypass central government and go 
directly to “UN Agencies (as Implementing and Technical Support Agents), international 
nongovernmental organizations, and local civilian administrators” at the district level “to 
resource a programme of activities to reduce transmission and enhance provision of treatment 
and care for HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria for the most in need populations [emphasis added].” 
The strategic plan also states that “the Fund will only support activities of the Ministry of Health 
and other line Ministries through decentralized cooperation with local civil administrations.”  
 
The 3D Fund strategic plan notes that “access to affordable quality health services is a key issue 
[in Burma] and many of the most vulnerable communities, especially those in border and conflict 
areas, have to rely on substandard health care” [emphasis added]. Alluding to but not naming 
the Global Fund, the strategic plan acknowledges that there were “structural weaknesses” in 
previous funding mechanisms. It also vows to ensure that its “resources will be used effectively, 
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efficiently, transparently, accountably and equitably in support of key components of national 
disease programmes and beyond, with an emphasis on achievement of programme outputs.”66 
 
The 3D Fund will be managed by three entities:  The Donor Consortium, the Fund Board, and 
the Fund Manager. The Donor Consortium will act on behalf of the donors by reaching 
consensus regarding the development and operational aspects of the fund. It will also appoint a 
Fund Board to act as a managing committee on behalf of the donors, and this committee will 
have oversight of the Fund Manager. In effect, the Fund Board will serve as the watchdog for the 
donors by monitoring risk assessment and reviewing fund performance through field assessments 
and reporting from fund recipients. The Fund Board will appoint and oversee a Fund Manager. 
The Fund Board will comprise three donor representatives and three independent experts, and the 
CEO of the Fund Manager will act as its nonvoting secretary. The Fund Manager, which is the 
UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), is responsible for “holding, disbursing, and 
monitoring the financial, technical and ethical performance of the Three Diseases Fund.” 
 
The strategic plan states that the decision to select UNOPS as a Fund Manager “was based on 
UNOPS’s comparative advantage as an ‘independent’ UN organization with the mandate to 
provide financial and project management services for other organizations. The agency does not 
receive core funding from UN Member States and is therefore free from the constraints affecting 
UNDP that contributed to the withdrawal of the [Global Fund] from Myanmar.”  
 
The 3D Fund strategic plan states that it will demand accountability, transparency, and equity of 
access from its “implementing partners, particularly the UN, international NGOs and local level 
officials from the Ministry of Health and other civilian authorities.” The strategic plan notes that 
the key features of a supportive operating environment for humanitarian assistance will include: 
 
• Timely and reliable access for project implementation and monitoring … through (i) 
prompt clearance of experts and other persons performing services on behalf of the Fund, 
or one of its implementing partners; (ii) prompt issuance, without cost, of necessary visas, 
licenses or permits; (iii) access to sites of work and all necessary rights of way; and (iv) 
free movement, within or to or from the country.67 
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• Fund Management—technical and administrative modalities … Management of all 3D 
Fund resources will follow transparent, independent, open competitive processes. 
Specifically, staff of all implementing partners should be recruited on the basis of 
suitability and qualifications for the job alone … 3D Fund implementing partners will need 
to be able to rely on prompt issuance, without cost, of licenses and permits need for tax free 
importation of commodities and equipment which are essential for project implementation. 
 
• Respect for international humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality. The Fund’s success will depend on all stakeholders acting in accordance 
with recognized international humanitarian principles [see box]. … It will be particularly 
important to ensure that assistance provided through the 3D Fund benefits people who are 
most in need, irrespective of their ethnic origin, social status, gender, nationality, political 
opinions, race or religion. 
 
Friedrich Hamburger, head of the European Commission’s diplomatic delegation to Burma, said 
in October 2006 that the donors to the 3D Fund had “been assured by the relevant [Burmese] 
authorities that conditions will be in place to allow for vital resources both to reach those who 
need them most and to be delivered effectively.”68  
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Guiding Principles for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
1. Human suffering should be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most 
vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and elderly. The dignity and rights of all 
must be respected and protected. 
 
2. Humanitarian assistance is to be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in 
controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. There will be no weapons or armed 
personnel on the premises or transport facilities of humanitarian organizations. 
 
3. Humanitarian assistance is to be provided without discriminating on grounds of ethnic origin, 
social status, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of suffering must be 
guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress. 
 
4. Humanitarian assistance aims to help reduce poverty, meet basic needs and enable communities 
to become more self-sufficient. 
 
5. Humanitarian activities are guided by international humanitarian law and human rights and by 
the mandates given by international instruments to the various humanitarian organizations. 
 
6. Humanitarian actors respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities where 
humanitarian programmes are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways shall 
be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel 
in the design, management and implementation of assistance programmes. 
 
7. Humanitarian agencies hold themselves accountable to those they seek to assist and will be 
accountable for their actions to the government, and for their use of resources, to those who 
provide them. Humanitarian actors retain responsibility to manage human, financial and 
material resources for their activities. Management of these resources follows transparent, 
independent, open, competitive processes. Specifically, staff are recruited on the basis of 
suitability and qualifications for the job. 
 
8. Equipment, supplies and facilities of humanitarian actors are not to be used for purposes other 
than those stated in programme objectives. Vehicles of humanitarian agencies are not to be used 
to transport persons or goods that have no direct connection with assistance programmes. 
 
9. Humanitarian assistance is only of value if delivered in a timely fashion. Effective humanitarian 
operations require unhindered, sustained access for humanitarian personnel participating in 
relief activities to deliver, monitor, and assess humanitarian aid, enabling them to reach targeted 
members of the population in need of assistance. 
 
Note: Charles Petrie, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, presented these principles in 
a letter to the Minister of National Planning and Economic Development (with copies to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Minister of Home Affairs), dated March 7, 2006. The same principles were later included in an annex 








The 3D Fund faces many challenges in Burma. First and foremost, it must contend with the 
military regime’s restrictions on the travel of foreign aid organizations. The ICRC’s closure of 
several field offices operating in or near combat zones suggests that access to these areas will 
continue to be heavily restricted and prevent aid from reaching those in need. It is unclear how 
the 3D Fund representatives will be able to travel freely throughout the country without a formal 
retraction of the military junta’s Guidelines of February 2006. 
 
Second, while the 3D Fund’s commitment to bypass the central government and fund civilian 
administrations and local nongovernmental organizations at the state and district level is 
admirable, it may be difficult to implement. The term “civilian administrations” is a highly 
ambiguous concept in Burma, especially in rural areas where the military and police hold 
unquestioned authority and influence.69 Since the 1962 coup d’etat of General Ne Win, there has 
been no functioning “civilian authority” in Burma that has not been controlled by the military in 
some form or another.  
 
This situation has been further complicated by reports that the Burmese authorities are 
establishing government-run “coordination committees” at the state and township level to 
coordinate with the 3D Fund and other relief efforts.70 According to the February 2006 
Guidelines, members of these new coordination committees would be drawn from junta-backed 
social organizations such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association, the Myanmar 
National Working Committee for Women Affairs, and, on the township level, from the Auxiliary 
Fire Brigades and the Veterans Association. The involvement of representatives of these 
organizations could easily politicize and complicate the dispersal of 3D Funds at the state and 
township level—a situation the agency wishes to avoid.71 Moreover, if the United Nations, which 
is one of the 3D Fund’s implementing partners, is unwilling to work with coordination 
committees composed of members of the USDA and other junta-backed organizations, it stands 
to reason that the Fund will need to follow suit.  
 
Third, many—if not most—Burmese pro-democracy organizations support the efforts of the 3D 
Fund and foreign aid organizations to lessen the burden of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
other infectious diseases in Burma. But they insist that aid delivery should be transparent and 
accountable, reach those most in need, and not directly benefit the Burmese military—all 
conditions the 3D Fund has pledged to uphold. These organizations argue that donor governments 
and foreign aid agencies must acknowledge that the primary cause of the current crisis in Burma is 
the lack of an accountable government, and that foreign aid must complement but not replace or 
undermine political pressure for democratic change. In July 2006, the Burma Campaign UK and 19 
other Burmese organizations in Europe and the United States called on foreign aid organizations to 
recognize that both aid and pressure for democratic change in Burma were  
 
                                                           
69 The National League for Democracy (NLD) raised this issue in a letter dated June 12, 2006, to the First Secretary, 
British Embassy, Rangoon. The letter is in the files of the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley. 
70 Htet Aung, “Government to keep tight rein on aid in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, March 13, 2007.  
71 Interview with a member of the board of the 3D Fund on January 25, 2007, in Bangkok. 
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essential and must be pursued simultaneously. Although not always appropriate 
for the same actors to pursue both strategies ([though] for the UN and Donor 
Governments this is imperative), it is vital that all agencies recognise the political 
roots of the humanitarian crisis. We ask agencies to be vigilant in avoiding 
indirect and inadvertent contribution to the root of the problem and to be 
respectful of the perspectives of those working towards political solutions. Mutual 
respect for and support of both strategies is of paramount importance. We 
encourage all agencies to creatively explore opportunities for supporting the 
promotion of democracy both directly and across their projects. A democratic 
society in Burma is vital to ensuring truly effective humanitarian assistance that 
directly benefits all Burmese people.72 
 
In this regard, one of the 3D Fund’s greatest challenges may be fulfilling its mandate to help 
local health-related nongovernmental and community-based organizations develop their capacity 
to provide effective and equitable services. Capacity-building of organizations dedicated to 
health care delivery involves many fundamental activities (e.g., board development, evaluation, 
financial management, leadership development, peer learning, program design, strategic 
planning, team building) but at its core must be the development of an organizational culture that 
upholds medical ethics and human rights. This entails (1) applying a human rights framework to 
the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of programmatic activities; (2) 
actively promoting the participation of affected communities in program development and 
implementation; (3) carrying out policies and programs in a nondiscriminatory manner; (4) 
maintaining transparency on how priorities are set and decisions made; (5) upholding 
accountability for the results.73 
 
Finally, it remains to be seen if the 3D Fund can find or develop local health-provider 
organizations in Burma that will have the capacity to respond meaningfully to the spread of 
infectious diseases and that are not part of the military government or its affiliated organizations, 
such as the USDA. Moreover, since the 3D Fund will not provide funds to ethnic health 
departments, such as the Karen Health Department, or to organizations based in neighboring 
countries that work cross-border, it is unclear if the Fund will be able to reach the underserved in 
the highly militarized border regions of the country. Service provision from within Burma is 
minimal or absent in the border regions, and it is along the borders, as the 3D fund has 
acknowledged, that the public health problems are greatest and the resources least. 
 
Such challenges notwithstanding, the 3D Fund’s pledge to ensure its programs are accountable, 
transparent, equitable, and reach those most in need is highly commendable and deserves the 
support of governments and international health institutions.  
                                                           
72 See The Burma Campaign UK, “Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions, Pro-Engagement:  Position Paper on Humanitarian Aid 
to Burma,” London, July 2006 at 4. 
73 See Sofia Gruskin, “Rights-Based Approaches to Health:  Something for Everyone,” Health and Human Rights, 
vol. 9, no. 2, 2006 at 8. 
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5. Burma 
Decades of repressive military rule, civil war, corruption, bad governance, isolation, and 
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have rendered 
Burma’s health care system incapable of responding effectively to endemic and emerging 
infectious diseases. Malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis (TB), are major health problems in 
most areas of the country. Malaria is the most common cause of death due to infectious disease. 
Burma has one of the highest TB rates in the world, with nearly 97,000 new cases detected each 
year.1 HIV/AIDS, once contained to high-risk groups, has spread to the general population, 
which is defined as a prevalence of 1 percent among reproductive-age adults. However the 
spread of the HIV infection across the country is heterogeneous, varying widely by geographical 
location and by population sub-group.2 
 
Today Burma’s health sector ranks as 190th of 191 nations, outperforming only war-torn Sierra 
Leone.3 One in three children in Burma is chronically malnourished, and 15 percent of the 
population is food-insecure. The country’s under-five child mortality rate is 106 per 1,000 live 
births, compared to 21 per 1,000 live births in Thailand.4 Only 57 percent of births in Burma are 
supervised by a skilled medical practitioner, compared to 99.3 percent in Thailand and 85 
percent in Vietnam. Despite Burma’s extensive energy reserves in natural gas and abundant other 
natural resources including gems, timber, and fisheries, a quarter of Burmese live on less than $1 
a day.5  
 
Burma’s national expenditures in health and education, once the envy of Asia, are 3 percent and 
10 percent, respectively, which means each year the government spends less than $1 per person 
on health and education. Meanwhile the military, with a standing army of over 450,000 troops, 
consumes 40 percent of the budget.6 And Burma has been at peace with her neighbor states for 
several decades. In the meantime, most public hospitals and health clinics in Burma operate at 
rudimentary levels, lack skilled staff, and are in need of equipment and medical supplies.7 
 
Burma has a shortage of physicians and other health professionals. In 2004, an estimated 17,000 
physicians, 16,000 nurses, and 15,000 midwives were working in the country. 8 Over 6,300 
physicians were practicing in the public sector, but many of them supplement their low salaries 
by also working in the private sector. Most health professionals in the public sector, like other 
                                                           
1 See Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2005 at 63. 
2 See Jon Cohen, “The Next Frontier for HIV/AIDS:  Myanmar,” Science, 301:5640, September 19, 2003, 1650–55. 
3 World Health Organization, World Report 2000:  Health Systems Improving Performance. 
4 In a community health assessment survey conducted among 2,694 Palaung villagers in northern Shan State in 
November 2004, the under-five mortality rate was found to be 28.5 percent and the malnutrition rate was 31.2 
percent. See The Paluang Women’s Organization, Poisoned Flowers:  The Impacts of Spiraling Drug Addiciton on 
Palaung Women in Burma, 2006 at 19.  
5 Clive Parker, “Burma ‘Falling Further Behind’ on Development Goals,” The Irrawaddy, October 17, 2006. 
6 World Food Programme, “Myanmar must do more to help its hungry millions,” press release, August 5, 2005.  
7 Center for Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 
Responding to AIDS, TB, Malaria, and Emerging Infectious Diseases in Burma:  Dilemmas of Policy and Practice, 
March 2006 at 14. 
8 Ministry of Health, supra note 1 at 60. 
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government employees, have no or limited access to the Internet, which the military monitors 
and tightly controls. The ratio of doctors to nurses/midwives is troubling, especially as nurses 
and midwives are critical to frontline health services at the township level. 
 
Despite these pressing health problems, Burma’s military government has at times thwarted its 
own health ministry’s efforts to launch vaccination campaigns to stop the spread of infectious 
diseases. The most recent case took place in October 2006 when the military junta prevented 
UNICEF from launching a national measles campaign aimed at vaccinating 13 million Burmese 
children, at a cost of $11 million. According to a UN official speaking on condition of 
anonymity, the Burmese authorities cancelled the vaccination program because they feared the 
“potential political fallout” from deaths caused by adverse reactions to the vaccine.  
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) acknowledges that a tiny percentage of children can 
potentially go into shock as a result of the vaccination, especially if adrenaline is not 
administered quickly, but believes “the benefits of protection afforded by a vaccine always far 
exceed the small risk of a true reaction.” Measles is one of the main causes of death for the 11 
percent of Burmese children who currently die before their fifth birthday.9 A full course of 
immunization in Burma costs hundreds of U.S. dollars. Without free vaccines supplied by 
organizations such as UNICEF, most parents in Burma could not afford to immunize their 
children. In early 2007, the military junta finally allowed the health ministry and WHO to launch 
the measles campaign.  
 
Burma’s health care system has been undermined by the systemic weaknesses of a foundering 
national economy. These economic factors include little to no access to foreign markets; weak 
state finances; a rudimentary banking system; chronic high inflation, officially calculated at 26 
percent for 2006–0710 but unofficially said to be between 50 and 60 percent; and widespread un- 
and under-employment.11 A strategy paper for 2007–13 prepared for the European Commission 
paints a gloomy picture of Burma’s economy: 
 
Corruption, ignorance of economic correlations and international isolation have led to 
economic stagnation. … There is a significant illegal economy that is based on smuggling of 
drugs, gemstones, and timber. This illicit trade sustains armed groups, among them both 
ethnic cease-fire and non-cease-fire groups, as well as the Burma/Myanmar military, 
making it difficult to address this problem which both fuels conflict and spurs unsustainable 
resource exploitation. Moreover, profits derived from such illegal trade are not “trickling 
down” and do not contribute to poverty eradication or livelihood opportunities. 
 
Corruption is systematic at the political and economic level. The military regime 
intentionally pursues a policy of corporate cronyism and allots privileges such as car 
import and telephone licenses to favored companies and family members. The 
unpredictable regulatory environment breeds rent-seeking behavior across all levels of 
                                                           
9 The Burmese military government reportedly suspended immunization programs in November 2005 and again 
between April and June 2006—the latter for diphtheria, whooping cough, and tetanus. See Clive Parker and Ko Latt, 
“SPDC Fears Undermine Immunization in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, October 11, 2006. 
10 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Food prices spark open dissidence,” Inter Press News Service, February 28, 2007. 
11 See Robert Taylor and Morten Pedersen, Supporting Burma/Myanmar’s National Reconciliation Process:  
Challenges and Opportunities, An Independent Report for the European Commission, January 2005 at 3–4. 
  Burma 
 55 
the economy. At a smaller scale, corruption is part of a coping strategy of public sector 
employees given their inadequate salaries. 
 
Burma/Myanmar has one of the world’s lowest levels of public sector expenditure 
(approximately 4 percent of GDP). In spite of these low levels, expenditures exceed 
revenues, thereby resulting in a fiscal deficit. The pressure on government to reduce 
spending even further prevents public investment in basic human and social infrastructure 
in spite of the desperate needs. Inflation is currently running at around 30 percent.12  
 
In its 1999 annual report, the World Bank, while agreeing that sanctions imposed on Burma by 
the U.S. Congress two years earlier had played a role in limiting investment, also blamed the 
regime for not carrying out necessary reforms and asserted that the regime’s economic policies 
had disproportionately affected Burma’s poor.13 A recent BBC survey of 6,048 Burmese citizens, 
aged 15 to 59, found “the most important issues facing respondents focused on making a living.” 
Eight-five percent of respondents said their strongest personal aspiration was getting a well-
paying job. Other primary concerns were poor economic development (91%), poverty (75%), 
and unemployment (72%).14  
 
But the real source of Burma’s underfinanced health care system—and the failure to remedy it—
is not poverty and a weak economy. It is the result of policies and priorities adopted by the 
succession of military regimes that have ruled Burma since the early 1960s. The latest top rule-
making executive body, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), comprises a group of 
a dozen high-ranking military officers headed by General Than Shwe. Active-duty or retired 
military officers occupy 33 of 38 ministerial-level positions in the government including those of 
the prime minister and the mayors of Burma’s two major cities Rangoon and Mandalay. The 
SPDC directly controls the Ministry of Health with Secretary-One of the ruling council, Lt. Gen. 
Thein Sein, directly chairing the National Health Committee.  
 
In 2006, Transparency International ranked Burma as one of the four most corrupt countries in 
the world based on its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI found a strong 
correlation between “rampant corruption” and poverty in Burma and in other countries ranking 
in the lower half of the index.15  
 
                                                           
12 The European Commission-Burma/Myanmar Country Strategy Paper (2007–2013) at 7. 
13 Thomas Campton, “Burma’s Dept is Pushing Economy to the Brink – The World Bank Warns,” International 
Herald Tribune, November 15, 1999. 
14 BBC World Service Trust, Voices of Burma:  National Survey for Media & Development, A Report of Findings, 
London, February 2006 at 7. The BBC conducted the survey in June and July 2005. 
15 See Transparency International, “2006 Corruption Perceptions Index reinforces link between poverty and 
corruption,” Berlin, November 6, 2006. The 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite index that 
draws on multiple expert-opinion surveys that pool perceptions of public sector corruption in 163 countries around 
the world. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption 
and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Seventy-one countries—nearly half—scored below three, 
indicating that corruption was perceived as rampant. Haiti had the lowest score at 1.8; Burma, Guinea, and Iraq 
shared the penultimate slot, each with a score of 1.9. 
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The military junta is known for its secrecy, censorship, and sharp limitations on criticism of the 
government.16 As a result, many health professionals have fled Burma over the past 20 years.17 
Scientists and health professionals remaining in Burma face tight controls over what they can say 
or publish about the government and its health care system. Like all Burmese citizens, scientists 
and health professionals can face years of imprisonment for openly criticizing their government 
and its policies. These restrictive conditions run counter to fundamental principles of scientific 
freedom and responsibility.18 
 
Official health data in Burma is, at best, fragmentary and often unreliable. Burma has not held a 
reliable national census since the results of colonial-era surveys were destroyed in 1942.19 
“Unlike other war-affected countries, it has been years since we have been able to send UN 
specialists into conflict zones to make comprehensive health assessments,” a Rangoon-based UN 
official said in August 2006.20 In March 2006, in a move welcomed by foreign aid agencies in 
Burma, the National AIDS Programme, with support from WHO, dispatched an external 
assessment team, the first in 15 years, to review Burma’s health response to HIV/AIDS 
countrywide. Over ten days the assessment team collected AIDS data in eight states and 
divisions. However, the team was unable to access conflict zones or mining areas where HIV 
prevalence rates are high.  
 
The Back Pack Health Worker Team, a humanitarian group based in Mae Sot, Thailand, is one of 
the few organizations that collects health data and provides basic health care to internally displaced 
communities in combat zones in eastern Burma. But they do so at considerable risk. Since 1998, 
when the team was formed, landmines or Burmese soldiers have killed seven backpack medics and 
one traditional birth attendant. Data gathering, the group notes, is “particularly risky, and even 
carrying a pen and paper can arouse the suspicion of SPDC soldiers.”21 
 
Burma’s neglected health care system is incapable of responding to the country’s most serious 
infectious diseases and must be supplemented with foreign assistance. Even with substantial 
amounts of foreign aid, Burma’s capacity to curb these diseases is hindered by its military leaders. 
So far, the military junta has failed to recognize that the protection and promotion of human rights, 
international humanitarian law, and basic scientific freedoms form the bedrock for the development 
of effective and comprehensive prevention and treatment therapies. This situation is further 
exacerbated by the military junta’s restrictions on UN agencies and foreign aid organizations, whose 
mission is to prevent and treat these diseases, to move freely about the country.  
                                                           
16 Burma is not party to a raft of international human rights agreements, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; or the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
17 Jon Cohen, supra note 2 at 1651. 
18 Richard P. Claude, in his book Science in the Service of Human Rights, characterizes these principles as (1) a 
reverence for truth that leads its practitioners to robust query and dissent; (2) avoidance of surmise based on 
ideological presuppositions in favor of reliance on empirically verifiable facts and measurable data; (3) a process of 
verification that requires open dissemination, communication, and the need for replication; and (4) a universality of 
discourse and goals whose common language and pursuits go beyond national borders. See Richard P. Claude, 
Science in the Service of Human Rights, Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002 at 16.  
19 See David Fullbrook, “Myanmar’s HIV/AIDS security threat,” Asia Times, December 2, 2006. 
20 Unless noted otherwise, all interviews inside Burma were conducted in July and August 2006. Interviews were 
conducted anonymously.  
21 Back Pack Health Worker Team, Chronic Emergency:  Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, May 2006 at 22. 
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Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria have reached epidemic proportions in Burma and pose a 
serious threat to the region. Two other diseases—avian influenza and filariasis—also have the 
potential to do great harm if not properly checked. 
HIV/AIDS 
 
The Burmese Ministry of Health reported in November 2006 that HIV infections in Burma had 
dropped from 1.5 percent in 2000 to 1.3 percent in 2005.22 Meanwhile, the UN’s HIV/AIDS survey 
for 2006 states that the 1.3 infection rate applies only to adults (those over 24 years old), compared 
to a rate of 1.4 percent in 2003. However, for young Burmese aged 15 to 24 years old, which 
comprises the country’s future doctors, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and parents, the UN estimates 
an HIV prevalence rate of 2.2 percent, which it describes as “a cause for serious concern.” 
 
Forty-three percent of injecting drug users and 32 percent of sex workers were found to be HIV 
positive in 2005, “proportions that have changed little since 2000,” the UN report says. The UN 
does point to some notable successes in tackling the disease in Burma. HIV infection levels 
among pregnant women have reportedly declined from 2.2 percent in 2000 to 1.3 percent in 
2005. Similarly, among men seeking treatment for other sexually transmitted diseases 8 percent 
were HIV positive in a 2001 study, compared to 4 percent in 2005. 
 
Other AIDS researchers argue that Burma’s surveillance methods are unreliable and thus the 
infection rates may be higher. Researchers at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
placed the HIV prevalence rate in mid-2000 at 3.4 percent—some 687,000 people—based on a 
national household survey in Burma and data from the national HIV sentinel surveillance of the 
National AIDS Programme of the Burmese Ministry of Health.23 Officials with the Chinese 
Ministry of Health said in November 2006 that Burma’s infections are probably four or five 
times what their data indicate. Similarly, Taiwanese health officials believe Burma’s infection 
rates are three times as high as the military junta admits.24 Moreover, despite the seriousness of 
the epidemic, the Ministry of Health expenditure on HIV is low. No official figures exist, but the 
UNAIDS Country Office estimates that in 2005 the Ministry of Health spent $137,000 on HIV, 
equivalent to less than half of $0.01 per person. This compares with $1.43 per capita in Thailand 
and $0.07 per capita in Cambodia, the other two high-prevalence countries in Southeast Asia.25  
 
Active surveillance of HIV/AIDS in Burma began in 1985, and the first HIV infection was 
diagnosed in 1988. The Ministry of Health established a National AIDS Committee in 1989, and 
a short-term plan for the prevention of HIV transmission was launched that same year. The first 
                                                           
22 See Clive Parker, “Burma says it’s winning HIV/AIDS fight,” The Irrawaddy, November 30, 2006. See also 
United Nations Expanded Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS, Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS:  Myanmar 
2003–2005, revised April 2004, and AIDS, TB, Malaria & Avian Influenza – The UN Country Team’s Experience, 
Rangoon, June 26, 2006, at 1. 
23 C. Beyrer, M. H. Razak, A. Labrique, R. Brookmeyer, “Assessing the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Burma,” J Acquire Immune Defic Synd 32:3, March 2003, 311–17; see also Center for Public Health and Human 
Rights, Department of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, supra note 7 at 19–20. 
24 See David Fullbrook, supra note 19.  
25 See UNAIDS at http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/myanmar.asp. 
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AIDS case was diagnosed in 1991. Biannual HIV sentinel surveillance began in 1992, along with 
the monthly reporting of HIV infection detected in blood donors and patients clinically 
diagnosed in health facilities. HIV sentinel surveillance has expanded to include 33 sites across 
all states and divisions. 
 
HIV/AIDS laboratory activities are based at the National Health Laboratory in Rangoon and the 
Mandalay Public Health Laboratory. These facilities are responsible for distributing HIV test kits to 
medical facilities; training laboratory personnel; and providing laboratory services, including 
confirmation of HIV infection, HIV testing for samples collected from all sentinel sites, testing for 
CD4 enumeration (CD4 cells are the main immune warriors that HIV selectively targets and 
destroys), testing for opportunistic diseases, and quality assurance. Donors supply all the HIV test 
kits. The government provides buildings, personnel, and facilities for routine laboratory procedures. 
 
As of August 2006, Burma had five flow cytometers in the public sector:  two in laboratories run 
by the government and three in clinics operated by Médecins Sans Frontières. A few private 
clinics reportedly have flow cytometers as well. A flow cytometer is a machine that 
automatically counts CD4 cells and is critical for developing treatment therapies. None of the 
four Thai border-district hospitals that provide antiretroviral therapy (ART) have access to CD4 
counting machines unless patients pay for private testing in Thailand.  
 
By April 2006, HIV viral load measurement was still not available in the public sector. The 
National Health Laboratory has a machine that can perform the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
assay, a molecular copier of DNA that has become as ubiquitous in modern biology labs as 
microscopes, but it is used for research purposes only. A PCR machine measures the amount of 
HIV in an affected person’s sera, a key test for evaluating health status and responses to 
treatment. UNICEF has recently acquired a new PCR machine for HIV viral load to help support 
the national program to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
 
In June 2006, the UN country team in Burma reported that “while the operating environment in 
Myanmar for international actors is very challenging, over recent years an increasing number of 
Myanmar people have received HIV-related services in most regions of the country.” Among the 
improvements the UN country team cited: 
 
• condom use has more than tripled since 1999 
• the number of community-based programmes reaching out to injecting drug users has 
grown from none in 2002 to more than 15 in 2005, and methadone maintenance therapy 
has been launched in detoxifying centres (part of the formal sector) 
• more than 2 million children are learning about HIV in age-appropriate curriculum 
• during 2005, more than 10,000 HIV-affected households received medical or social-
economic care and support, more than two and a half times the number of households 
assisted in 2004 
• the number of pregnant women being offered counseling and testing as part of a 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission package has gone from close to none in 2001 
to 140,000 in 2005 
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Such progress notwithstanding, the UN country team noted that these services “are still 
insufficient to yield a sustainable impact on the epidemic.”26 
 
AIDS is a reportable disease in Burma. Hospitals and clinics are required to report AIDS cases to 
the central office of the National AIDS Programme. Yet the number of actual reported cases is 
low. Of the 39,230 new AIDS cases estimated for 2004,27 1,747 cases (4.5%), were reported to 
the public health system. AIDS case reporting is name-based and includes demographic data, 
race, address, and assumed mode of infection in relation to behavioral characteristics. Burmese 
health workers and foreign aid workers interviewed in August 2006 said the name-based manner 
of reporting raised serious concern for the protection of confidentiality. None of the informants 
knew if the reporting system had resulted in the public disclosure of the names of people with 
AIDS, but they were concerned that it could easily happen should this information fall into the 
wrong hands. Changing the name-based system to an anonymous code-based system with a 
single identifier would reduce the risk of breaches of confidentiality. Such a change would 
require investment in information-management infrastructure and human resources.  
 
While there have been no reliable studies on the nature and extent of stigma and discrimination 
in Burma, anecdotal evidence suggests that it does exist and can lead to the loss of job and 
income and to difficulties in gaining employment. Burmese health professionals interviewed in 
August 2006 and January 2007 in Rangoon reported that people living with HIV harbored strong 
fears of disclosing their sero status to people in their communities and at their places of 
employment. The 2005 BBC survey confirmed this perception:  65 percent of respondents said 
they would not buy food from a food seller infected with HIV/AIDS. Forty-five percent said they 
would not visit the home of someone who had the HIV virus, while 42 percent said their 
community should not allow HIV-positive individuals to stay in their village or township.28 
 
Injecting drug users (IDU) comprise one of the largest groups of adults living with HIV infection 
in Burma. The IDU prevalence rate is estimated at 43.2 percent,29 and in some areas, especially 
in mining camps and towns, it can reach as high as 60 to 90 percent.30 “If you start injecting in 
Burma,” a Rangoon-based aid worker said, “you could easily be HIV positive in six to eight 
weeks.” By March 2009, the National AIDS Programme (NAP) hopes to reduce the number of 
HIV infections among IDUs by 6.74 percent.31 
 
Men working in mining camps are particularly susceptible to intravenous drug addiction and 
HIV exposure. One foreign aid worker compared the camps to the American Wild West:  
“Imagine there is gambling and prostitution and thousands of young men with no or little 
education. The work is hellish, but the pay is enough to keep you supplied with heroin. Needles 
get exchanged. There is unprotected sex … and before you know it you have hundreds of HIV 
carriers—both men and women—traveling back and forth from the camps to their home 
                                                           
26 AIDS, TB, Malaria & Avian Influenza – the UN Country Team’s Experience, supra note 22 at 1–2.  
27 See Report from the Technical Working Group on HIV/AIDS Projection and Demographic Impact Analysis in 
Myanmar, Rangoon, September 28–30, 2005. 
28 BBC World Service Trust supra note 14 at 77. 
29 Myanmar National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS:  Operational Plan, April 2006–March 2009, August 3, 
2006, at 7. 
30 Interview with foreign aid worker in Rangoon, August 2006. 
31 Myanmar National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS, supra note 29 at 5. 
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communities.”32 Foreign aid workers (and journalists) are generally barred from entering mining 
areas, while some Burmese health workers have access but not always on a regular basis.  
 
Until recently, the military junta had a schizophrenic view of IDUs that ignored most of the 
tenets of harm reduction, a growing movement that treats addiction as a disease rather than a 
crime and strives to find practical ways to help addicts avoid dangers such as HIV. Since 2003, 
thanks to the persistence of Burmese physicians and foreign aid workers, IDU harm reduction 
strategies have been introduced in some regions of Burma, but their reach remains limited. By 
August 2006, there were 15 drop-in centers in 12 of the 29 townships where injecting drug use is 
a serious problem. All of these clinics offer education programs on safer injection and sex and 
operate needle- and syringe-exchange programs.  
 
Despite these advances, only the clinic in Lashio township has achieved more than 50 percent 
coverage. UNAIDS reported in 2005 that more than one million needles and syringes were 
distributed through the drop-in centers with a return rate of 80 percent. Since March 2006, 
methadone maintenance therapy programs have been launched in the townships of Yangon, 
Lashio, Myitkyina, and Mogaung. Approximately 80 people had begun methadone treatment 
within a month of the program’s launch, but this number represents only a fraction of the 
targeted population.33 Baseline data on injecting drug use in the targeted townships is greatly 
lacking and, until it is obtained, will limit the ability of the public sector and nongovernmental 
organizations to evaluate the coverage of their programs. Police in some townships have eased 
off on arresting or harassing people with syringes in their possession, but this trend is hardly 
uniform. Finally, access to antiretroviral therapy for injecting drug users appears to be very 
limited, even when they are stable on methadone.34  
 
Seventy percent of HIV transmissions in Burma are a result of sexual encounters, according to 
the National AIDS Programme. Commercial sex work, though illegal, persists in many 
townships in brothels or indirectly through massage parlors, karaoke bars, and guesthouses. 
Many prostitutes also work independently on the streets. AIDS outreach workers often find that 
these casual sex workers are difficult to recruit into condom-promotion programs because they 
are highly mobile and wish to keep their work hidden. The HIV prevalence rate among sex 
workers in 2005 was estimated at 32 percent.35  
 
Police often inhibit HIV-prevention efforts. Drop-in centers report that police officers, in an 
effort to meet their monthly quotas, tend to arrest more sex workers toward the end of the month. 
This, in turn, creates a “vicious circle”:  sex workers, trying to avoid arrest, will move to the 
streets and, as a result, have less access to condoms and educational programs. At the same time, 
fewer sex workers visit the drop-in centers. 
 
Of all the vulnerable groups, little is know about HIV infection among incarcerated and 
institutionalized populations and members of the armed forces largely because the military junta 
closely guards such information from the public. There are reportedly 41 prisons in Burma. In 
                                                           
32 Interview with foreign aid worker in Rangoon, August 2006. 
33 Interviews with foreign aid workers in Rangoon, August 2006. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
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2001, the total prison population was estimated at 62,300, of which 70 percent were drug 
offenders and 14 percent were women. No public information exists on other closed institutions. 
Moreover, the suspension of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross has 
reportedly reduced the level and quality of medicines reaching prisoners.36  
 
Foreign aid workers interviewed in August 2006 said they knew very little about how the 
military health services responded to HIV within their ranks. What little they did know was 
largely anecdotal. An external review by the National AIDS Programme in 2006 states:  “There 
is a strong commitment on the part of the military to expand and scale [up] their [HIV] 
prevention, treatment and care efforts with servicemen and their families.”37 The review also 
notes:  “The military medical services in each division and state provide a basic HIV education 
to recruits and servicemen as well as promotion and provision of condoms, although the supply 
was reported not sufficient to meet demand.” 
 
This observation stands in stark contrast to press reports and observations provided by Burmese 
health workers and foreign aid workers. Orlando de Guzman, a journalist with U.S.-based Public 
Radio International’s “The World” program, interviewed a former Burmese army doctor in 2006 
whose job was to discharge dozens of HIV-positive soldiers. They received “no antiretroviral 
drug, no care [or] support at all,” said the doctor, and their beds in a large military HIV ward 
were immediately occupied by new arrivals. A UNAIDS worker said that to the best of his 
knowledge the military did not operate a service-wide condom distribution program. Indeed, the 
external review by the National AIDS Programme offers no concrete examples of what the 
standard operating procedure is for soldiers of any rank who are diagnosed as HIV positive. 
Several informants interviewed for this report said in August 2006 that HIV-positive soldiers 
were often discharged from the military without follow-up medical care of any kind. Informants 
said that a great deal of prejudice still exists in the armed services toward soldiers diagnosed as 
HIV positive. 
  
So far, the most successful HIV prevention initiatives in Burma have been two condom-
distribution projects. These programs also include health education sessions and services for 
sexually transmitted infections (STI). The National AIDS Programme operates one of the 
programs, known as the 100% Targeted Condom Promotion campaign (TCP). The other is a 
social marketing program run by the nonprofit Population Services International (PSI), whose 
headquarters are in Washington, D.C. The National AIDS Programme reported in 2004 that the 
condom-use rate was around 62 percent in Rangoon, 90 percent in Mawlamyaing Township of 
Mon State, and 50 percent in Hpa-an Township of Kayin State. UNAIDS estimates that at least 
half of Burma’s 40,000 to 60,000 commercial sex workers have access to condoms and HIV 
education.38 
 
The TCP program was initiated in 2001 at four sites and has expanded to 154 sites across the 
country. The main implementers are AIDS/STI teams, local medical officers, and representatives 
                                                           
36 See United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, International Organizations:  Assistance Programs Constrained in Burma, April 2007, GAO-07-
457 at 22. 
37 National AIDS Programme Review (27 March–6 April 2006), April 6, 2006 at 45–46. 
38 Interview with UNAIDS staff member in Rangoon, August 2006. 
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of local agencies, including the police, NGOs, and entertainment-establishment owners. TCP 
distributes condoms during public festivals and directly to guesthouses, military units, taxi 
drivers, truck drivers, and factory workers.  
 
Since 1996, PSI has worked in Burma staging safe-sex education sessions and selling condoms 
at a steep discount to grocery stores, street vendors, and other distributors, who then sell them for 
a few cents each. PSI believes that by constantly targeting teenagers and young adults with 
advertisements for a variety of new prophylactic products they can eventually change behaviors 
that lead to unsafe sex. Until recently, political and cultural factors made it difficult for PSI to 
educate members of high-risk groups such IDUs and commercial sex workers. For example, a 
woman carrying a condom could be arrested as a prostitute. In recent years, the organization has 
been allowed to advertise condoms in magazines and on billboards. During the 2006 World Cup, 
PSI scored a resounding victory when it was permitted to run a series of amusing advertisements 
promoting condom use on Burmese television. Since 1996, PSI’s annual condom sales have risen 
from 400,000 to 31.2 million in 2005. By 2006, PSI condoms were available at approximately 
15,000 retail outlets nationwide.39  
 
Such progress notwithstanding, a BBC survey conducted in 2005 suggests that condom use in 
Burma is still low and that greater condom-use campaigns are needed, particularly in rural areas. 
Only 8 percent of respondents in the BBC survey had used condoms, while their use among 
urbanites was twice as high as rural residents. Of the men reporting condom usage, 36 percent 
were between 15 and 24 years old while 40 percent were between 25 and 34 years old.40 
 
AIDS treatment programs are still in their infancy in Burma. In March 2003, Artsen Zonder 
Grenzen (AZG or Médecins Sans Frontières–Holland) launched Burma’s first specific 
antiretroviral combination treatment for people with AIDS in cooperation with the National 
AIDS Programme, Waibargyi hospital in Rangoon, and the General Hospital in Lashio. Within a 
year, the program had provided antiretroviral therapy to 1,523 patients (1,433 adults and 90 
children) in Rangoon.41 Overall, 117 patients died. Of these, four were children. Most of the 
patients died within six months due to opportunistic infections and immune reconstitution 
syndrome. Patients at clinical stage 4 have a much higher death rate than stage-3 patients. 
Twenty-one percent of deaths were due to meningitis, with more than half identified as 
cryptococcal meningitis. Most patients improved dramatically within six months and could even 
return to work. Those previously prescribed incorrect treatment (mono or duo therapy) and 
patients selling their own antiretroviral therapy drugs due to poverty were rare but growing 
threats to the success of antiretroviral treatment. For prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
203 HIV-positive mothers received antiretroviral drugs. In 82 percent of the cases, both the 
mother and the child received the appropriate drugs in time. AZG aimed to provide antiretroviral 
                                                           
39 Interview with PSI/Myanmar staff member in Rangoon, August 2006. 
40 BBC World Service Trust, supra note 14 at 76. 
41 First-line treatment for adults and children, with some modifications for infants, consists of Stavudine (d4T), 
Lamivudine (3TC), and Nevirapine (NVP) in a fixed-dose combination tablet. Efavirenz is used as an alternative 
treatment to Nevirapine when the patient has severe adverse effects from the latter. The standard second-line regime 
consists of Zidovudine (AZT), Didanosine (ddI), Lamivudine (3TC), and Lopinavir boosted by Ritonavir (LOP/r). 
(3TC is continued because it is proven to contribute to the suppression of HIV replication despite 3TC resistance.) 
Alternative regimes are indicated for pregnant women, those with previous treatment experience, and those with side 
effects from the standard regimes. 
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therapy to 4,000 AIDS patients in Rangoon and other townships by the end of 2006, and may 
have surpassed that amount by the time of writing.42 
 
AZG has faced a number of challenges during the nascent period of the antiretroviral therapy 
program. A patient’s proximity to a clinic is a determinant of long-term follow-up and 
adherence. To ensure that patients regularly attend the clinic for drug collection and medical 
review, the program has extended its service to a total of 11 townships in Rangoon. 
Antiretroviral therapy is a highly marketable commodity. HIV-positive patients without access to 
treatment are desperate to obtain it, while many of the patients who receive free treatment are 
tempted to sell it because of their own financial needs. So far, only a few cases of patients selling 
drugs have been reported, yet the concern remains as the program expands. Drug treatment 
adherence can also be a problem. Some patients stop therapy because they return to good health 
after an extended period on antiretroviral therapy or because of lifestyle changes due to working 
hours or the need to travel long distances to find work or because of addictions such as 
alcoholism. In response, AZG and its partners have created income-generating activities for 
patients and employed outreach workers, some of whom are AIDS patients, to undertake home 
visits to monitor compliance and the welfare of the patient’s family. 
 
Over the next three years (2007–09), the National AIDS Programme will give priority to (1) 
building capacity and enhancing resilience among populations at highest risk and vulnerability 
and to those severely affected by the HIV epidemic; (2) promoting community-based activities to 
reduce stigma and discrimination towards people living with HIV and whose behaviors are 
associated with infection; and (3) developing ‘sound public health policies and practices,’ and [a] 
monitoring and evaluation system … [that] will provide a framework for the design of focused 
approaches suited to specific populations.”43 
 
Burma has a growing AIDS awareness and advocacy movement that often runs afoul of the 
authorities. In August 2006, Burmese police in Thingangyun township arrested 11 members of 
the Friends of the Red Ribbon, an informal AIDS advocacy group, as they were about to hold a 
traditional merit-making service in a Buddhist temple for their friends who had died of the virus. 
“This is not a very helpful course of action on the part of the Myanmar government,” J. V. R. 
Prasada Rao, head of the Asia-Pacific office of UNAIDS, told a journalist the day following the 
arrests. “It sends a very negative message.” Police have dispersed similar ceremonies and 
arrested AIDS activists in Rangoon and other major cities. On April 4, 2007, the police arrested 
Maung Tin Ko, a 35-year-old HIV patient, as he staged a solo demonstration in Rangoon. Tin 
Ko, who is from Pokkoku Township in Magway Division, was protesting the fact that he could 
not receive antiretroviral therapy treatment in his hometown. Before his arrest, Tin Ko handed 
out a written pamphlet with the following declarations: 
 
1. Please give medication to AIDS patients like me in our hometown. 
2. There is an increase in AIDS patients like me in this country. 
                                                           
42 See Artsen Zonder Grenzen, Antiretroviral Treatment Project Report, Rangoon, April 2006. 
43 Myanmar National HIV and AIDS, supra note 29 at 3. In reference to stigma and discrimination, the report states:  
“In particular, initiatives will aim to reduce stigma and discrimination against sex workers, injecting drug users, and 
men who have sex with men, thereby ensuring that all these populations can play a central role in curbing the course 
of HIV and mitigating its impacts.” 
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3. HIV/AIDS is a threat to Burma and the whole world. 
4. HIV/AIDS is our national problem. 
5. I donate my whole body here today for the benefit of all the people in this world so 




Malaria is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Burma. Seventy percent of the 
population lives in malaria-risk areas, with 30 percent living in high-risk areas.44 High-risk 
groups include mobile populations in search of economic opportunities (e.g., forest-related 
workers, miners, workers in development projects, plantation workers) or ethnic groups that have 
been forcibly displaced by the military and have taken refuge in the forest; upland subsistence 
farmers; and ethnic groups living along Burma’s borders. 
 
In 2004, the Vector Borne Disease Control (VBDC) of the Ministry of Health estimated a 
national incidence rate of 11.1 per 1,000 and mortality at 3.65 per 100,000 due to malaria. 
Among the internally displaced of eastern Burma, Plasmodium falciparum, the dominant malaria 
species in this area, now accounts for 45 percent of all adult and child deaths.45 These figures 
place Burma at the top of the list of countries in the region for per capita malaria-related deaths, 
outstripping even India with its vastly larger population.46 Malaria accounts for 10 percent of 
outpatients and 15 percent of inpatients admitted to government hospitals in Burma. About 74 
percent of reported infections are due to Plasmodium falciparum and 20 percent are due to 
Plasmodium vivax. Over the period 1995–2004, an average of 632,000 malaria cases were 
reported (most—75 percent—were clinical cases of malaria without blood smear confirmation) 
and 3,000 deaths were estimated yearly. These figures are considerable underestimates, since 
only 25 to 40 percent of people infected with malaria report to public health facilities.47 Others 








                                                           
44 Union of Myanmar:  Malaria Prevention and Control National Operational Plan, Fiscal Years 2006/2007 to 
2008/2009, Rangoon, August 3, 2006 at 3. 
45 A. Ham, L. C. Mullany, A. Richard, C. Maung, and C. Beyrer, “Mortality Rates in Conflict Zones, Karen, 
Karenni, and Mon States in Eastern Burma,” Trop Medicine and Int Health 2005. 
46 C. Wongsrichanalai, A. L. Pickard, W. H. Wernsdorfer, S. R. Meshnick, “Epidemiology of Drug-resistant 
Malaria,” Lancet Infect Dis 2:4, April 2002, 209–18. 
47 This information was gathered from various WHO and VBDC reports and data collected by Dr. Frank Smithuis of 
AZG. See also Frank Smithuis, Treating and Preventing Malaria in Myanmar, Médecins Sans Frontières–Holland, 
2006. This study consists of a compilation of malaria studies conducted by Dr. Smithuis since the mid-1990s. 
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Map 1:  Malaria Risk Areas in Burma 
 
Source:  WHO, Regional Office for Southeast Asia, January 2006. Available at 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Malaria_in_the_SEAR_Malaria_Risk_Areas_in_Myanmar.pdf. 
Poor access to health care is also reflected in Burma’s malaria deaths-relative-to-cases ratio of 3 
percent, which is the highest in the region and outstrips the next highest, Bangladesh (0.8 
percent), by a significant margin.48 Studies have shown that border states, where access to health 
care services is poor or has been disrupted by armed conflict and forced displacement, have 
higher mortality rates for malaria. Chin and Karenni states have mortality rates four times the 
national rates, and Kachin state is almost five times higher than the national average.49 
 
In 2003 the Burmese government spent $134,000 on malaria, with an additional $800,000 from 
external funding. The following year, it reported having spent $23 million, with $622,000 from 
“other sources.” However, this figure may be misleading as the total health expenditure for the 
same year totaled about 20 billion kyat, some $18 million based on the unofficial exchange rate. 
This means the reported malaria budget alone was larger than the total national health care 
expenditure, suggesting that much of the reported budget was donor aid. Moreover, a rapid rise 
                                                           
48 WHO, Regional Office of Southeast Asia, Distribution of Reported Malaria Deaths in SEA Region, 2003; 
February 25, 2006, http://www.whosea.org/LinkFiles/Malaria_distr_mal_cases03.pdf. 
49 C. Wongsrichanalai, K. Lin, L. W. Pang, M. A. Faiz, H. Noedl, T. Wimonwattrawatee et al., “In vitro 
Susceptibility of Plasmodium falciparum Isolates from Myanmar to Antimalarial Drugs,” Am J Trop Med Hyg 65:5, 
November 2001, 450–55. 
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in domestic funding to this degree compared to the previous year is highly unlikely given 
Burma’s stagnate economy.50 
 
Not only is Burma highly endemic for malaria, it has also become an epicenter for drug-resistant 
Plasmodium falciparum, particularly along the frontiers of the country.51 Chloroquine (CQ) and 
sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP), two former mainstays of malaria treatment, are often 
ineffective if used alone, and have been abandoned in favor of combination therapies.52 In 
Burma, CQ resistance was suspected for years on clinical grounds before it was confirmed in 
1969 at the malaria institute of Burma.53 In 1984, SP was introduced in Burma as a second line 
for CQ failures but it, too, developed resistance. Mefloquine monotherapy followed in 1996 as 
the third-line treatment for treatment failure with CQ and SP.  
 
Despite the high failure rates for these drugs in Burma and elsewhere in south and Southeast 
Asia, WHO and UNICEF continued to provide CQ and SP for the treatment of falciparum 
malaria in Burma. According to Frank Smithuis of Médecins Sans Frontières–Holland, “the 
presence of multi-drug resistant strains of Plasmodium falciparum in the region, while the 
treatment regimen was not changed, has probably played an important role in the lack of control 
and probable increase of malaria infections.”54 
 
Multi-drug resistant falciparum malaria, defined as resistant to three or more drugs, is most 
problematic on the border with Thailand.55 As a result, the Burmese malaria treatment guidelines 
recommend the use of combination therapy, particularly with artesunate and high-dose 
mefloquine, to reduce the spread of multi-drug resistance. Drug resistance to malaria generally 
arises due to incomplete or inappropriate use of antimalarials, program failure, and the sale and 
use of counterfeit or expired antimalarials, all of which are present in Burma. The Burmese 
government has almost no regulatory oversight of the importation and sale of antimalarial drugs, 
and the proportion of fake drugs is high.56 While many antimalarial drugs sold in Burma contain 
no active ingredient, up to 70 percent contain substandard amounts, which is far worse from a 
public health standpoint:  exposing malaria parasites to substandard levels of active ingredient 
promotes the selection of drug resistance and thus threatens the effectiveness of the entire 
                                                           
50 See Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Department of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins School of Public 
Health, supra note 7 at 27–34. 
51 C. Wongsrichanalai, et al., supra note 48. 
52 See F. Smithuis, M. Shahmanesh, M. K. Kyaw, O. Savran, S. Lwin, “Comparison of Chloroquine, 
Sulfadoxine/Pyrimethamine/Sulfadoxine, Mefloquine and Mefloquine-artesunate for the Treatment of falciparum 
Malaria in Kachin State, North Myanmar,” Trop Med Int Health 9:11, November 2004, 1184–90; and F. Smithuis, 
F. Monti, M. Grundl, A. Z. Oo, T. T. Kyaw, O. Phe O et al., “Plasmodium falciparum:  Sensitivity in vivo to 
Chloroquine, Pyrimethamine/Sulfadoxine and Mefloquine in Western Myanmar,” Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg 91:4, 
July–August 1997, 468–72.  
53 D. F. Clyde, N. Hlaing, and F. Tin, “Resistance to Chloroquine of Plasmodium falciparum from Burma,” Trans R 
Soc Trop Med Hyg 66, 1972, 369–70. 
54 Frank Smithuis, unpublished PhD dissertation, August 2006 at 8. 
55 C. Wongsrichanalai, et al., supra note 48. 
56 United States Pharmacopeia, A Review of Drug Quality in Asia with a Focus on Anti-Infectives, February 2004.  
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combination.57 According to WHO, the Burmese ministry of health is very concerned about the 
emergence of fake antimalarial drugs but lacks the capacity to deal with the problem.58 
 
In July 2006, Wellcome Trust Oxford SE Asian Tropical Medicine Research Unit reported that 
at least 13 different types of counterfeit artesunate using the Guilin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. label 
have been found in Southeast Asia, including in Burma and along the western border of 
Thailand. The fake packets attempt to duplicate the blister-back stickers or holograms on the 
bonafide Guilin Pharaceutical packet. Other features of the fake artesunate that differ from the 
genuine product include poor printing of bar codes on packets and blister packs, codes on blister 
packs printed with the font made of numerous small dots, poor stamping of code “AS” and score 
lines on tablets, raised edges of tablets, very hard tablets, blister pack abbreviations in capital 
letters (“MFG” and “EXP”) and unusually late expiration date in relation to date of manufacture 
(>3 years). Counterfeits tend to be cheaper than the genuine product.59 
 
Mosquito control using insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) has been proven to reduce episodes of 
clinical malaria, particularly in children.60 However, the ecology of malaria in Burma poses 
multiple challenges to control. Transmission is seasonal, with cases in most areas clustering 
around the rainy season. This “unstable” transmission pattern, coupled with the high rate of 
falciparum malaria, increases the probability of severe infection and/or death. The effectiveness 
of prevention efforts, such as ITNs and residual house spraying, is diminished by the mosquito 
vectors (A. dirus and A. minimus) indigenous to forested areas that bite early in the evening and 
tend to rest outside the home.61 
 
The National Operational Plan for Prevention and Control of Malaria in Myanmar has set out 
the following objectives for the next three years (2007–09): 
 
(1) treating with insecticides the estimated 8 million nets already owned by the families 
in malaria-risk areas and promoting their regular use; (2) control of malaria among high-
risk groups such as the forest-related workers and ethnic groups; (3) ensuring early access 
to quality-assured malaria diagnosis and treatment especially in remote areas where 
malaria transmission is high; (4) improving malaria-related knowledge and practices of 
the population at risk and the health care providers; (5) improving malaria-control 
program management practices at all levels of the health system especially at township 
level; (6) further strengthening capacities of the [Vector Borne Disease Control] VBDC 
to efficiently and effectively provide support for malaria control at township level and 
below; (7) estimating the magnitude of [the] malaria problem, and (8) last but not least, 
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empowering communities at risk, including community-based organizations and NGOs, 
to actively participate in malaria prevention and control.62 
Tuberculosis 
 
Burma ranks as one of 22 countries that account for 80 percent of the world’s new TB cases, 
with 107, 991 cases reported in 2005.63 Of these, 12,337 were new sputum-smear-positive 
patients, of which one third were women. Those most affected are between 25 and 44 years of 
age, an age group that is socially and economically active and vital to the economy. Most TB 
patients are poor and have difficulties accessing health care and/or adhering to treatment because 
of a lack of health education or because of socioeconomic factors. Forty percent of Burma’s 
population is believed to be infected with TB, and WHO estimates 7.1 percent of TB patients 
have HIV.64 Sixty to 80 percent of people living with HIV also have TB, making this the most 
common AIDS-associated infection. Burma has the highest mortality rate (2.8 per 100,000) 
among TB patients co-infected with HIV in Southeast Asia. 
 
TB drugs are widely available on the black market without control in Burma, and many are taken 
with inadequate supervision. The diagnostic test used for TB notification is sputum exam. In 
many cases, particularly with HIV co-infection, TB is missed using only this test, and a culture 
or attempt to grow the bacterium is necessary. A February 2006 WHO report noted that there 
was a “shortage of qualified staff, especially junior laboratory technicians,” and that “a quarter of 
all sanctioned posts in the National TB Program are vacant.” 
 
Burma is experiencing rising rates of multi-drug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis. MDR 
tuberculosis is defined as resistance to two or more of the primary drugs used in the treatment of 
TB; it is difficult to treat, carries a high mortality, and is expensive to cure. Inpatient costs for 
treatment of MDR tuberculosis can average over $25,000 per patient, with outpatient costs 
averaging over $19,000.65 In 2005, researchers in Rangoon found that 33.9 percent of TB isolates 
collected from TB patients in the city were resistant to any one of the four standard first-line 
drugs (isoniazid, rifampicin, ethambutol, or streptomycin). They also found that the rate of MDR 
tuberculosis had more than doubled to 4.2 percent in the past four years.66 Moreover, the rate for 
patients who had received past treatment rose from 15.5 percent in 2002–03 to 18.4 percent in 
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2005.67 To put this into perspective, the average MDR rate among new patients in Southeast Asia 
is 2 percent,68 and the rate along the Thai-Burma border is an estimated 6.5 percent, compared to 
1 percent for the rest of Thailand.69 As the WHO and National Tuberculosis Program have 
themselves recognized:  “A new drug resistance survey is urgently needed [in Burma].”70 
 
The WHO strategy for controlling TB is directly observed treatment short course, or DOTS, 
whereby a community or health care worker directly observes the patient swallowing his/her 
anti-tuberculosis treatment, usually a combination of drugs taken over at least six months. The 
regimen costs approximately $11 per course.71 The optimal TB control strategy also entails case 
detection and monitoring systems, as well as an efficient laboratory infrastructure. According to 
the government, case detection rates “started to rise considerably since 1999 and continued to 
increase up to a level of 83 percent in 2004. An important caveat though is that the denominator 
of the case detection rate—the estimated smear-positive incidence rate—is based on disease 
prevalence survey carried in 1994.”72 The Ministry of Health and WHO claim to have 100 
percent coverage across its 324 townships and a treatment success rate of 81 percent, just below 
the goal of 85 percent set by WHO for 2005.73 
 
However, a review of the data suggests that TB programs in Burma are performing more poorly 
than the government has previously acknowledged. A 2005 WHO report noted that “a national 
TB prevalence survey would provide a more accurate estimation of incidence and a baseline for 
assessing the impact of DOTS services on the TB epidemic,” indicating that basic information to 
gauge the extent of the epidemic has not yet been collected.74 In August 2006, the National 
Tuberculosis Program (NTP) and WHO recognized that “the numbers of patients being 
registered by the NTP do not represent the total number of patients receiving anti-TB treatment 
since there continues to be incomplete reporting from large hospitals and general practitioner 
clinics; accurate data on numbers of patients seeking care at private health facilities, including 
traditional healers is not available.”75 Indeed, the Department of Medical Research, Lower 
Myanmar reported in 2006 that “about 75 percent of TB suspects seek health care at the private 
clinics as first entry point for TB care while TB case management practices from the private 
practitioners are sub-optimal and not always following NTP Guidelines.”76 
 
This situation is further compounded by the military junta’s lack of adequate funding to combat 
TB nationwide. Instead, the government has consistently relied on international donors to make 
up for budgetary shortfalls. In 2004, for example, the government supported only 6 percent of the 
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National Tuberculosis Program, while international donors provided the balance.77 Many foreign 
aid workers and Burmese health workers become uncomfortable when talking about the status of 
TB in Burma largely because the national surveillance data collected so far is outdated and 
unreliable and because the treatment program is underfunded and inadequate.  
 
“If you can’t do TB treatment properly because of government restrictions, then you shouldn’t 
do it at all given the real danger of promoting multi-drug resistant TB,” said a TB specialist with 
Médecins Sans Fontières–France who had left Burma when the organization pulled out of the 
country in December 2005.78 His words may seem somewhat extreme, but they underscore the 
frustration borne by many aid workers who believe TB could be brought under control in Burma 
if only the military junta would step aside and let them get on with the task at hand.  
 
The National Operational Plan TB, Myanmar (April 2006–March 2009) sets out the following 
four objectives and outputs for the next several years: 
 
1. To sustain and improve the quality of DOTS services to reach all TB patients. Output:  
Quality DOTS services provided to more than 90 percent of the total population 
including remote and underserved areas by the end of 2009. 
 
2. To improve the treatment success rate among all detected TB patients including those 
with TB-HIV and multi-drug resistant forms of TB. Output:  Treatment success rate 
among all TB patients at or above 80 percent (anticipating a lower treatment success rate 
among HIV/TB co-infected and MDR-TB patients). 
 
3. To increase the number of new smear-positive TB cases to reach a case detection rate at 
or above 70 percent in all States/Divisions. Output:  Case detection rate at or above 70 
percent in all States/Divisions. 
 
4. To measure both progress with progamme implementation and the impact of 
interventions towards more accurately determining progress towards the millennium 
development goals. Output:  Progress towards TB-related millennium development goals 




Lymphatic filariasis is endemic in many parts of Burma. Approximately 120 million people 
worldwide are infected with the disease and it is an important cause of morbidity, with over 40 
million people worldwide disfigured and disabled by its long-term outcome, elephantiasis. Most 
cases are caused by one species of parasite, Wuchereria bancrofti, transmitted by several 
                                                           
77 See World Health Organization, supra note 72.  
78 Interview with Médecins Sans Frontières–France aid worker in Mae Sot, Thailand, July 2006. 
79 National Operational Plan TB, Myanmar, supra note 68 at 13–14. 
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mosquito species. The disease disproportionately affects the very poor, reducing productivity and 
incurring treatment costs in those least able to bear it.80 
 
The cornerstone of controlling this disease is mass drug administration (MDA), whereby single 
dose anti-parasitic drugs (diethylcarbamazine with ivermectin) are administered as widely as 
possible (80 to 90 percent) in communities at risk, for about four to six years.81 It is simple and 
inexpensive, usually costing less than one dollar per person per year; there are few public health 
measures that are as cost-effective, particularly for the poor. In recognition of these realities the 
World Health Organization issued Resolution 50.29 in 1997, calling on all member states to 
eliminate lymphatic filariasis, after the International Task Force for Disease Eradication named it 
one of six potentially eradicable diseases.82 
 
Using MDA strategy in endemic areas, Thailand has been able to eliminate transmission in 
almost the entire country; lymphatic filariasis is now mainly confined to the three provinces of 
Tak, Mae Hong Son, and Kanchanaburi, along the western border with Burma.83 In contrast, 
Burma remains a highly endemic country for filariasis.84 Every year two million cases of 
filariasis are reported to WHO in Burma, and even this figure is likely a gross underestimate, 
given the largely unknown situation in the country’s border regions.85 Many of these frontier 
areas lack programs for MDA. In the face of these gaps, the Burmese government has actually 
divested its filariasis control program. The National Programme to Eliminate Lymphatic 
Filariasis (PELF) annual report for 2004, submitted to WHO, states:  “There is disease in budget 
source in 2004. WHO Biennium budget for PELF is only 6,000 US $. Except for US $9,000 
from Liverpool LF Support Centre, there was no other extra budgetary support from SEAR 
office in this year.”86 By comparison, Thailand’s annual budget for filariasis control stands closer 
                                                           
80 See World Health Organization, Lymphatic Filariasis:  The Disease and Its Epidemiology, January 24, 2006, 
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Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis,” Trop Med Int Health 5:9, September 2000, 591–94. 
82 See Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations of the International Task Force for Disease Eradication 42, 
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Wuchereria brancrofti Infection Myanmar Migrants in Thailand,” Ann Trop Med Parasitol 95:5, July 2001, 535–38; 
S. Triteeraprapab, K. Kanjanpas, S. Suwannadabba, S. Sangprakarn, Y. Poovorawan, A. L. Scott, “Transmission of 
the Nocturnal Periodic Strain of Wuchereria bancrofti by Culex quinquefasciatus:  Establishing the Potential for 
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to 20 million bhat, or $500,000; there are no uncertain areas of the country and, in 2002, only 
185 new patients were reported to the Ministry of Public Health.87 
 
Among Burmese migrant populations in Thailand, cross-sectional surveys have demonstrated 
filariasis prevalence rates of up to 10 percent; another 40 percent had evidence of previous 
exposure to Wuchereria brancrofti.88 Almost none had been treated at home in Burma.89 As most 
immigrants are undocumented, the numbers of individuals at risk for filariasis and thus eligible 
for Thai MDA is unknown, and treatment delays are common. Given that mosquito types 
common in urban Thailand are capable of transmitting the strains of W. bancrofti found in 
migrants from Burma, the possibility of re-emergent filariasis in urban Thailand was raised in 
1999–2000.90 In 2004, this had come to pass, and migrants suffering from lymphatic filariasis 




Avian influenza refers to a large group of different influenza viruses that primarily affect birds. 
Currently these viruses can infect other species, including pigs and humans, but it is rare. The vast 
majority of avian influenza viruses do not infect humans. However, due to changes in genomic 
structure of the avian influenza virus, some are capable of human transfer. The avian influenza A 
(H5N1) subtype first infected humans in Hong Kong in 1997, resulting in 18 cases, including six 
deaths. On that occasion, culling within three days of Hong Kong’s poultry population, estimated 
at 1.5 million birds, is thought to have averted a possible pandemic.92 In December 2003, infections 
in people exposed to sick birds were identified. By March 1, 2007, 277 laboratory-confirmed 
human cases had occurred in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, and Turkey, and 
167 persons, more than 60 percent of cases, have died. Asia accounts for 84 percent of all reported 
cases of avian influenza and 87 percent of all reported deaths.93  
 
Burma’s first outbreak of avian flu took place on a farm in the Kywesekan ward of Mandalay 
district, 430 miles north of Rangoon, on March 8, 2006, killing 112 birds.94 Die-offs of poultry 
are also reported in other townships. That same day, national health authorities gathered 
                                                           
87 See Division of Communicable Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, supra note 82.  
88 See S. Triteeraprapab, et al., supra note 82; S. Triteeraprapab and J. Songtrus, “High Prevalence of Bancroftian 
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94 “Myanmar calls for international help after first bird flu outbreak,” Agence France-Presse, March 14, 2006. 
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specimens from affected poultry for laboratory examination. The following day, a Mandalay 
laboratory confirmed through a PCR rapid test that the virus was the H5N1 influenza strain. 
(Five weeks earlier, the Ministry of Health had published the National Strategic Plan for 
Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza and Human Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response, a detailed step-by-step plan approved by the National Health Committee to respond to 
just such an outbreak.95) By March 12, a laboratory in Bangkok had confirmed the Mandalay test 
results. The following day, the government was informed of these results, and it then directed the 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries to control the outbreak through culling of poultry farms in 
the Kywesekan ward and other townships.96 On March 13, the Burmese authorities informed 
WHO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and submitted specimens for 
testing in Thailand and Australia. On March 15, Burmese authorities granted permission for 
FAO and USAID to send a team of experts to Burma. Meanwhile, the outbreak was reported to 
the public on Burmese-language television, and through a public awareness campaign launched 
via television, newspapers, and posters. In addition, affected areas were designated as “restricted 
zones” with movement of poultry and equipment banned. The virus left nine suspected cases of 
human transfer in its wake,97 and altogether 342,000 chickens, 320,000 quail, 180,000 eggs, and 
1.3 tons of feed were destroyed at 545 poultry farms. On April 26, the military junta lifted the 
ban on the movement of poultry throughout the country, and in September declared Burma a 
bird-flu-free country.98 
 
Nearly a year after the outbreak, John MacArthur, an Infectious Disease Advisor to USAID who 
participated on the international team of experts dispatched to Burma, said that despite some 
deficiencies, the Burmese authorities had been “open and transparent” in their response to the 
outbreak in March 2006. He said the national health authorities had engaged the international 
community early, submitted specimens to outside laboratories, allowed international teams to 
outbreak sites to assist, and informed the public upon confirmation of H5N1.99 But he also 
suggested that the Burmese authorities needed to undertake several additional measures to 
improve their response to future H5N1 outbreaks. These measures included improving the 
sensitivity of a surveillance system to detect outbreaks, especially in remote areas; establishing a 
compensation policy for poultry farmers affected by outbreaks; improving the political 
commitment of local military commanders to allow reporting and response to outbreaks; 
changing high-risk behaviors on poultry farms; improving surveillance and response in border 
regions; and increasing the capacity of the national health infrastructure to respond to potential 
human-to-human transmission.100 
 
By all accounts, the Burmese health authorities intend to work closely with the international 
community to detect and respond to potential avian influenza outbreaks. The Ministry of Health, 
with assistance from WHO, has requested international funding (1) to purchase PCR rapid tests 
as well as culling supplies and equipment; (2) to establish rapid-response teams in each state and 
district, with a goal of reaching 130 teams (one per state/division and two per district); and (3) to 
                                                           
95 Ministry of Health, National Strategic Plan for Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza and Human Influenza 
Pandemic Preparedness and Response, January 31, 2006. 
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strengthen a nationwide reporting system. In December 2006, UNICEF and the Livestock 
Breeding and Veterinary Department of Burma co-hosted a media training workshop attended by 
nearly 100 journalists from state and private media. UNICEF emphasized that communication 
was the first line of defense in the fight against avian influenza, and accurate information and 
informed reporting are vital in helping ordinary people understand the nature of the threat and 
the need for protective measures.1 
 
Burma was struck by another outbreak of avian influenza on March 21, 2007. This time the virus 
struck farms in five townships north of Rangoon, killing 1,863 poultry. Authorities monitored 
fowl within a one-kilometer radius of the farm where the virus was first detected and imposed a 
ban on the sale and transport of poultry within six kilometers of the outbreak. There were no 
reports of human-to-human transmissions.2 
 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization and other UN agencies have praised the Burmese 
Ministry of Health for its “quick and effective” response to outbreaks of avian flu since it first 
appeared in Burma in March 2006. Meanwhile, the United States, usually quick to criticize the 
military junta, has given the regime $600,000 to help fight the disease. Such positive 
developments notwithstanding, a human outbreak of avian influenza could potentially be a 
disaster in a country where the health system is in tatters after decades of underfunding and 
neglect. As a UN official in Burma put it:  “If you look at the infrastructure that exists, if human 
cases broke out, it would be more difficult than in many other countries in the region. It would be 
close to impossible to contain.”3 
Conclusion 
 
Recent studies of how health officials in 23 American cities responded to the Spanish flu 
pandemic of 1918 could be instructive for Burma and other countries facing a potential human 
outbreak of avian influenza. Using mathematical models, researchers Martin Bootsma and Neil 
Ferguson found that those American cities that instituted quarantine, school closings, bans on 
public gatherings, and other procedures early in the outbreak of the 1918 epidemic had peak 
death rates 30 percent to 50 percent lower than those that did not.4 According to Ferguson, the 
most successful interventions were in communities where the political and health authorities 
broadly agreed on what needed to be done and got significant cooperation from the public.5 
 
Beyond their implications for responding to human outbreaks of avian influenza, these studies 
underscore why Burma, if it is ever going to deal effectively with the burden of infectious 
diseases, must create a health care system that actively encourages communities to become 
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engaged participants in—and not merely auxiliaries to—the development and implementation of 
health programs and interventions.  
 
 
   
 77 
6. China-Burma Border Region 
The China-Burma border region is of major commercial and political importance to China, and it is 
likely that China, given its dominant relationship with Burma, will decide what happens there for 
the foreseeable future. Extracted natural resources, principally timber1 but also jade, gold, and 
natural gas, flow into China from Burma. The heroin trade also flows from Shan and Kachin States 
to the Burmese border towns of Ruili and on to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province. Because 
of the spread of injecting drug use, the China-Burma border region has one of the worst HIV 
problems in Asia. Some of China’s earliest HIV infections were reported in Ruili in 1989, in 
injecting drug users. Since then HIV infection has spread along the drug smuggling routes and has 
been seen in every county in Yunnan Province, as well as north to Xinjiang and east to Guangdong.2  
 
Although HIV is epidemic at the border, malaria may be an even greater problem. Drug-resistant 
Plasmodium falciparum malaria is prevalent on both sides of the border. Following decades of 
war, public health infrastructure in the border regions is minimal. Logging and mining operations 
in Kachin and Shan states have brought non-immune populations into the forest fringe, leading 
to many malaria outbreaks. Cholera outbreaks have also been reported on the border3 and 
Burma’s only admitted H5N1 avian influenza outbreak took place near Mandalay, a day’s drive 
from China. The chaos and lack of public health resources on the Burma side of the border are of 
serious concern to Chinese public health officials. 
 
Finally, the border is permeable. There are many crossings in Kachin and Shan States for both 
legal and illegal trade. The heroin, gambling, prostitution, and illegal logging industries are all 
cross-border. Labor crosses the border in both directions. The Dai and Jingpo ethnic groups in 
Yunnan are related to the Shan and Kachin in Burma, and local residents move back and forth 
for marriage, work, socialization, and trade. An estimated 10 million people a year cross the 
border in each direction. Like most borders, the Yunnan-Burma border presents few obstacles to 
the movement of infectious diseases.  
Background 
 
The border between Burma and China runs roughly north-south for about two thousand 
kilometers from Tibet to Laos. On the China side of the border is Yunnan Province and on the 
Burma side are Kachin State to the north and Shan State (divided into Northern, Southern and 
Eastern Shan State) to the south. 
 
The road from the Burmese city of Mandalay passes between Kachin State and Northern Shan 
State to enter China at the border town of Ruili. This is the ancient South Silk Road to India, and 
                                                           
1 See Global Witness, A Choice for China: Ending the Destruction of Burma’s Northern Frontier Forests, October 
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also the “Burma Road” of World War II, built with Anglo-American resources to supply the 
Kuomintang army against Japan. It is the artery of Chinese economic and geopolitical expansion 
into Burma, and on to the Indian Ocean. China is Burma’s principal trading partner and arms 
supplier and largest foreign investor,4 much of the business in Burma is Chinese-owned, and 
Mandalay is described as largely a Chinese city. Reportedly the road is now being extended to 
run all the way to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh. It will provide Chinese access to the Bay of 
Bengal, and, according to some sources, will supply Chinese military installations on the 
Burmese coast.5  
 
The status of the ethnic groups on the China-Burma border has major implications for infectious 
disease control. On the Burma side, the Kachin and Shan states are inhabited by many ethnic 
groups, most prominently the Kachin, Palaung, Shan, and Wa. Although population estimates 
vary widely, there are perhaps 500,000 Wa, 800,000 Palaung, 1.2 million Kachin, and some 6 
million Shan people living in these states.  
 
Former resistance groups inhabit a significant portion of Kachin and Shan states.6 On the China 
border most of these groups signed cease-fire agreements or surrendered to the Burmese military 
in the early 1990s. The largest and most organized of the cease-fire groups is the Kachin 
Independence Organization (the KIO, the political wing of the Kachin Independence Army), one 
of the few groups that still controls significant territory. Other ethnic organizations include the 
Shan State Peace Council, an alliance of the Shan cease-fire armies, and the Palaung State 
Liberation Party (PSLP), which signed a cease-fire in 1991. No major conflict has occurred on 
Burma’s northern border in the last ten years. The main efforts of these groups since the cease-
fires have been economic productivity, political advocacy, and improved health and education. 
(An exception is the United Wa State Army, which has primarily been involved in drug 
production.) 
 
Although the KIO initially controlled 15,000 of 34,000 square miles in Kachin state, containing a 
quarter of the population,7 its influence has eroded since the cease-fire in 1993, in part due to the 
loss of control of jade mining and other natural resources. It must now compete with Chinese 
businessmen to buy concessions for previously KIO-owned areas.8 Groups in the northern Shan 
State have also lost authority, culminating in the arrest of their leaders while attending the 
government-sponsored National Convention in 2005. The PSLP, finally forced to surrender last 
year, was obliged to stop all organized activity. 
 
The Burmese government’s strategy, which typically provides no domestic support and obstructs 
international support, extends to the health activities of international humanitarian organizations 
                                                           
4 Burmese trade with China was $1.21 billion in 2005, 20 percent of its foreign trade volume. See J. Genser, 
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7 Global Witness, supra note 1. 
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operating from Rangoon. No significant international health-related activities have been reported 
in KIO or former PSLP areas of influence. Much has been made recently of the Burma measles 
vaccination campaign, which has reportedly been carried out every year since 1987.9 However, 
the only vaccination in KIO areas was conducted by an international humanitarian organization 
operating from China.10 
 
Violations of human rights carried out by the Burmese government continue to plague local 
ethnic populations along the border. Although the violations are of a different nature than those 
in conflict zones in eastern Burma,11 they have important consequences for infectious disease 
and health. Infant and child mortality rates collected by a Palaung health organization suggest 
that mortality rates are comparable to conflicted Karen areas of eastern Burma.12 Forced 
displacement continues to be a problem. Militarization, mining and logging activities, and large-
scale agricultural projects have led to widespread forced labor, food insecurity, and lack of 
access to basic health and education services.13  
 
Community-based and nongovernmental organizations have gained a foothold in the post-cease-
fire era in the China-Burma border region, but have suffered from continued persecution. The 
Burmese authorities closed a Shan clinic in Hsipaw township in 2005 near the time of the arrest 
of northern Shan leaders at the National Convention, and a Shan health worker was arrested and 
jailed for six months.14 Similarly, army troops closed down a Palaung clinic in Namkham 
township in 2005, forcing the health workers to resort to mobile operations. Continued support 
for health and education projects trickles in from international donors, but access is extremely 
difficult. 
 
Since the ethnic organizations on the China border are not engaged in active conflict and no 
longer pose any real threat, the goal of these policies is not clear. Ethnic leaders claim that the 
regime’s activities are designed to keep their areas underdeveloped, and to undermine their 
standing within their communities.15 Regardless of the motivation, because these border 
populations have high rates of infectious disease and play a vital role in further spread, public 
health strategy in the region remains a critical issue.
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Kachin State and Shan State contain the principal opium-poppy growing areas in Burma, which 
was until recently the largest heroin exporter in the world.16 Most of the heroin passes across the 
Chinese border into Yunnan Province and then to Kunming and along trade routes either north to 
Xinjiang Province and central Asia, or east to Hong Kong and the United States.  
 
The northeastern part of Shan State contains the Kokang region (Special Region 1), an 
essentially autonomous warlord principality that was a major opium-growing region until 2003. 
South of Kokang, along the border with China’s Lincang Prefecture, is the Wa State (Special 
Region 2), controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and historically the principal 
opium-growing area in Burma. The border between the Wa State and China was not delineated 
until the 1960s. Under a cease-fire agreement between the UWSA and the Rangoon regime, the 
Wa Authority controls the region and the UWSA has kept its weapons.  
 
The Wa area is also the primary location of UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which 
attempts to control opium production in Burma—a large piece of social engineering involving 
complex negotiations between the UN, the Burmese government, and local power holders, and 
undoubtedly China as well. Both Kokang and the Wa fought against the Burmese government 
with the China-affiliated Burmese Communist Party (BCP) until 1989, and both are ethnically 
and historically close to China. 
 
Other ethnic political organizations, such as the KIO and PSLP, have had hardline anti-drug 
policies. The KIO declared Kachin State an “opium-free zone” in the early 1990s. U.S. 
government satellites subsequently documented the reduction in poppy production.17 Following the 
cease-fire, however, the KIO was unable to maintain its anti-drug policy because of the increasing 
influence of the Burmese government,18 resulting in increased production in northern and western 
Kachin State. The Palaung Women’s Organization (PWO) reports a similar increase in drug 
production and use after the PSLP was forced to surrender in 2005.19 The Burmese army 
reportedly permits production as long as taxes are paid at various stages in the production cycle.20 
 
Opium growing in Kokang was reportedly stopped in 2003. Opium growing in the Wa area was 
supposed to have been stopped by 2005, and has in fact been highly reduced according to the 
UNODC.21 Elsewhere in Shan State, fighting continues between the Burmese military and Shan 
ethnic organizations. Opium poppy growing is said by some sources to have been moved south 
from the Wa area, and there is large-scale production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) in 
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20 World Resources Institute, supra note 17.  
21 UNODC, supra note 16.  
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Eastern Shan State.22 Burma is one of the world’s largest producers of ATS, with most of the 
chemical precursors imported from China. 
 
Although tensions have been reduced in recent years by peace agreements between the Burmese 
government and many of the conflict groups, and although the UNODC has apparently achieved 
major reductions in poppy growth, Shan state is turbulent, much of the border area is extremely 
remote, and health services are few. The reported reductions in opium cultivation are disputed by 
some ethnic organizations and there has been a small recent increase in Kachin State.23 
Furthermore, reductions in opium cultivation have produced an economic crisis in parts of 
Kokang and the Wa area, leading to the need for World Food Program support.24 Poverty, poppy 




There is very little quantitative information on HIV in the China-Burma border region. 
Nationally, Burma has perhaps the worst HIV problem in Southeast Asia, with an estimated adult 
prevalence of between 1 percent and 2 percent in the country as a whole. Recent seropositivity 
rates nationwide are reported as 1.8 percent in pregnant women, 43 percent in injecting drug 
users (IDU) and 32 percent in sex workers.25 Rates in IDUs are even higher in the opium-
growing regions of eastern Burma, reported at 47 percent in Myitkyina, capital of Kachin State, 
and 60 percent in Lashio, in Northern Shan State. UNODC considers the area between Myitkyina 
and Lashio to be a corridor of particularly high vulnerability for HIV.26 Township-level rates are 
not, in general, available; however, the Ministry of Health includes Lashio and Myitkyina on its 
list of 29 priority townships for drug-user interventions, along with Mogaung in central Kachin 
State; Hopin and Bhamaw in south Kachin State; Muse (across the border from Ruili), Mogoke, 
and Kutkai in Northern Shan State; and Kyaingtone in Eastern Shan State.27 These townships are 
all on or close to the Chinese border.  
 
Seroprevalence data usually comes from the urban centers under government control, rather than 
from the more inaccessible areas controlled (to varying extents) by the cease-fire organizations. 
In this context, two fragments of data from the border are suggestive. First, the Kachin 
Independence Organization, the cease-fire organization in the Kachin Independent Area, recently 
                                                           
22 Shan Herald Agency for News, Hand in Glove:  The Burma Army and the Drug Trade in Shan State, 
http://www.shanland.org/resources/bookspub/drugs/Hand%20in%20Glove.pdf. 
23 Palaung Women’s Association, supra note 2. Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, “Driven Away:  Trafficking 
of Women on the China-Burma Border,” http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Driven_Away-ocr.pdf. 
24 International Crisis Group, “Burma: Aid to the Border Areas,” Asia Report No. 82, Yangon/Brussels, 2004. 
25 Myanmar Ministry of Health, First Coordinating Meeting on Three Diseases, August 2006. 
26 UNODC, Myanmar: Strategic Programme Framework 2004–2007, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/myanmar/myanmar_strategic_programme_framework.pdf. 
27 Myanmar Ministry of Health, supra note 25.  
China-Burma Border Region 
 82 
found a seroprevalence rate of 9 percent among military recruits28—about four times the 
nationwide rate in Burma for military personnel. In addition, 57 percent of IDUs tested positive 
for HIV. Second, the Palaung Women’s Organization reports very high levels of opiate addiction 
in villages in the Palaung area of Northern Shan State (in the UNODC “vulnerable corridor”), 
with catastrophic effects on families. Conditions reported in 11 villages are similar to those 
described below in villages on the Chinese side of the border, but with less awareness of HIV. 
To our knowledge, no seroprevalence studies have been conducted. 
 
Outside funders have recognized the acuteness of the border HIV problem, its origin in the 
opium-growing areas, and the inability or unwillingness of the Burmese government to fund an 
intervention program without assistance. The Burma Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS was 
established in 2003, under the aegis of UNAIDS and with funding primarily from Europe, to 
“change behavior to reduce the transmission of HIV and to improve the health of people living 
with HIV/AIDS.” The Fund for HIV/AIDS in Burma (FHAM) was established to fund the Joint 
Programme. As of October 2005, FHAM had raised a total of $49 million (directly and 
indirectly) to support the Programme during 2003–05.29 The Programme has adopted a harm-
reduction approach, following initial work by the Asia Regional HIV/AIDS Project (ARHP). 
Meanwhile, the main approach to prevention in sex workers appears to be a “100% condom” 
campaign on the Thai or Cambodian model, more directly associated with the national 
government than the interventions aimed at drug users and less under NGO control. There are 
treatment programs for sexually transmitted diseases in the urban centers, but programs 
addressed to sex workers are few. 
 
Concurrently with the development of the Joint Programme, UNODC adopted as its second 
Strategic Objective “by 2008, to have reduced significantly the spread of HIV/AIDS through 
injecting drug use in targeted intervention areas.”30 There is thus a coordinated approach to 
prevent HIV transmission among drug users in Burma, involving major international 
organizations and aimed specifically at some of the high-risk areas in the northeast.  
 
This approach was incorporated into the HIV section of the Global Fund’s Round 5 proposal,31 
and subsequently into the program of the Three Diseases Fund.32 It is largely harm-reduction 
based, centering on drop-in centers and needle-exchange programs in high-risk townships. In 
addition, a pilot methadone maintenance program has been developed in four townships 
(Yangon, Lashio, Myitkyina, and Mogaung) with some hundred or so IDUs currently on 
treatment in late 2006. Antiretroviral treatment has just begun in Burma, and treatment of drug 
                                                           
28 Wang Bangyuan, “Build a Primary Health System along the China-Burma Border,” presentation given at the 
conference “Responding to Infectious Diseases in the Border Regions of South and Southeast Asia,” Bangkok, 
January 2007. 
29 Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, 2003–2005 Mid-term Review:  Findings and recommendations of 
the review team, http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub06/ 
Final%20MTR%20report_2005_en.pdf?preview=true. 
30 UNODC, supra note 26. The “targeted intervention areas” are initially in the Myitkyina-Lashio corridor described 
above. The UNODC “third strategic objective” is to reduce trafficking in human beings from Burma. This is 
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31 Joint Programme of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, Progress Report 2003–2004, and Fund for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar 
(FHAM), Annual Progress Report 2004–2005, 
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users is extremely rare. (It is worth noting that the current antiretroviral treatment sites include a 
cross-border treatment project on the Thai border.) 
 
There is clearly a focused approach to preventing HIV in drug users in Burma that targets at least 
some of the border areas. Somewhat ironically, given the authoritarian nature of the government, 
this approach is harm-reduction based. But is it successful and does it get to the border areas? 
 
In a severe but generally supportive mid-term review,33 four independent reviewers noted that 
coverage of the Programme is extremely low for all interventions. (“Most reach no more than a 
few hundred people.” “Many of the proposed strategies … are not yet being done, and indeed 
some of them cannot be taken forward in Burma at this time.” “With a few notable exceptions, 
those who are most vulnerable and at highest risk of contracting HIV are not being reached.”) On 
the other hand, the review noted that real progress had been made over a relatively short period, 
and that the Programme “successfully mobilized donor resources and a multi-sectoral response to 
HIV/AIDS in a very challenging situation, where a response is critically needed.”  
 
The primary question is whether the response can expand from the urban centers into the border 
areas, where control is less likely to be in the hands of the central government. In this context, 
interviews with staff of three clinics in border areas were discouraging. We interviewed staff from 
a hospital in the Kachin Independent Area, from a clinic in a border gambling town in Kachin State 
but outside the Kachin Independent Area, and from a clinic in the high-risk corridor in Northern 
Shan State. Concern about HIV was high in all three groups. All reported pervasive intravenous 
drug use, a lack of the most basic information about HIV in the population, clinical AIDS, and very 
limited HIV seroprevalence information. In no case were any resources being received from 
central government, and HIV testing was not generally available. Although Population Services 
International (PSI), a major international humanitarian organization working from Rangoon, 
reports that it increased the total market for condoms in Burma to 40 million by 2005 through 
promotion campaigns, the groups we spoke to reported none of this activity in their areas.  
 
Clearly more than the lack of resources is playing a role here. At least one international 
humanitarian organization has accessed KIO areas to provide some HIV services. However, it 
must work with some secrecy as this activity places its Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Burmese government at risk.34 A European physician working for this organization reported that 
in Kachin state, two-weeks advance warning was required before staff could visit their own 
clinics, and that despite giving notice staff were subject to military checkpoints at 2–5 kilometer 
intervals en route. This physician also reported phone taps and military intelligence personnel 
working in the organization’s office.  
 
HIV Infection in Yunnan Province 
 
With the identification of 146 HIV-seropositive injecting drug users in Ruili in 1989, the 
Yunnan-Burma border was officially identified as the site of China’s principal HIV problem. 
                                                           
33 Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, supra note 29.  
34 Interview with NGO worker, August 2006. 
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HIV infection was already widespread in the border villages at that time.35 Since then, the course 
of HIV infection in Yunnan has been relatively well studied. With health leadership from the 
provincial level, and with substantial international funding from the UK via the UK-China 
Collaboration (now folded into the Global Fund) and from AUSAID via the Asia Harm 
Reduction Project, Yunnan Province has become something of a laboratory for the development 
of IDU interventions. However, intervention has been cautious. For example, there have been 
needle-exchange sites in Yunnan for some years, but the program is still apparently regarded as a 
pilot program.  
 
HIV seroprevalence data is considered a state secret in China, and during our visit to Yunnan in 
2006 neither local nor provincial health officials would release prevalence data for border 
counties without central government authorization. However, four prefectures in Yunnan are 
now regarded as having “generalized HIV epidemics” with HIV seroprevalence rates among 
pregnant women greater than 1 percent. These are Dehong Prefecture, where the road crosses the 
China-Burma border at Ruili; Dali Prefecture, west along the road towards Kunming; Lincang 
Prefecture south of Dehong and running along the border with Kokang and the Wa area; and 
Wenshang Prefecture, further south on the Vietnamese border.36 County-level seroprevalence 
rates in pregnant women may be 2 percent or higher in some parts of these prefectures.  
 
Cross-border gambling in the many casinos along the China-Burma border is accompanied by 
widespread prostitution. (There are casinos at many—if not most—of the border crossings. 
Although the casinos are Chinese-owned and the patrons are Chinese, gambling is not legal in 
China so the casinos are positioned across the border in gambling enclaves.) In Ruili, the main 
border town, there were an estimated 700 Chinese sex workers in the main downtown sex area in 
summer 2006, plus a smaller number of lower-priced Burmese sex workers.37  
 
The situation of the Burmese sex workers is difficult because they are illegal and there is 
trafficking across the border.38 There was apparently no large-scale organized intervention with 
sex workers in progress in Ruili in summer 2006, nor any available data on current HIV 
seroprevalence in the sex workers. It was explained that since “prostitution is illegal” it was 
difficult for the local health authority to intervene. Since Ruili is the largest and probably the 
best-organized of the border towns, HIV in sex workers clearly remains a major problem on the 
border. There appear to be essentially no sex-worker interventions on the Burmese side, except 
perhaps in Muse, opposite Ruili. 
 
HIV seroprevalence rates in injecting drug users of 60–80 percent were recorded at Ruili in the 
1990s. One recent survey reports the seroprevalence rate among IDUs in Yunnan as a whole is 
20 percent, while the rate in commercial sex workers is 3.7 percent, and the rate in patients with 
sexually transmitted infections is 2.5 percent.39 These are substantial rates for a province with 43 
million inhabitants. 
                                                           
35 Interview with Jing Paw, ethnographer, Ethnology Institute of Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, August 2006. 
36 Interview with ARHP staff member, August 2006. 
37 Interview with NGO volunteer, August 2006. 
38 Interview with Burmese Women’s Union spokesperson, August 2006. Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, 
supra note 23. Available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Driven_Away-ocr.pdf. 
39 C. Bartlett, personal communication.  
  China-Burma Border Region 
 85 
The HIV problem has diffused across Yunnan, with those infected recently being largely 
younger, further from the border, and less likely to be ethnic minorities than in the 1990s. Rates 
on the border are still undoubtedly very high. Those infected in the 1980s and 1990s are now 
likely to have progressed to clinical AIDS. Two studies of border villages suggest rather startling 
levels of infection at the village level. In one village of 365 persons, 18 had died of AIDS by 
2005 and a further 12 were known to be living with HIV infection, with a cumulative infection 
rate of at least 8 percent.40 In a second village of 200 people, there had been 20 deaths and at 
least 30 were known to be HIV positive, with a cumulative infection rate of 15 percent.41 These 
figures suggest levels of HIV infection in the villages close to the border that are comparable to 
those in East Africa. This is almost certainly the case in villages on the Burma side of the border, 
particularly in the Palaung and Wa areas.  
 
In 2003 the Chinese government adopted an aggressive national approach to AIDS. The policy for 
injecting drug users is now based on intensified policing, with the intent of putting a high 
proportion of injectors nationwide in “detoxification camps” and “re-education camps.” (There are 
currently an officially estimated 60,000 to 80,000 injectors in Yunnan, although NGO personnel 
believe this estimate is low.) In addition, the central government has adopted methadone 
maintenance as the primary method of reducing HIV-infection risk in drug users. Chinese national 
policy is to establish a methadone maintenance program in every county with more than 500 drug 
users. The strategy is to place half of the drug users in detox and re-education camps at any one 
time and 80–90 percent of the remainder in methadone maintenance. There are currently 29 
methadone clinics in Yunnan, linked to the camps. In addition, antiretroviral treatment for HIV, 
just beginning in Yunnan, is linked to the maintenance programs.42  
 
With the intense government focus on law enforcement, local officials were distancing 
themselves from needle-exchange programs in the summer of 2006. In interviews with officials 
and NGO workers it was clear that the aggressive policing of drug users was making it somewhat 
difficult for needle exchanges to function properly.43 However, there are currently 30–40 needle-
exchange programs in Yunnan Province, supported by ARHP and the China–UK Project. In July 
2006, a high-level official in the Yunnan Institute of Drug Abuse told us that “this does make our 
intervention work quite difficult. … The whole society, including many government officials, 
does not really accept the idea of needle exchange among drug users. … In contrast, methadone 
maintenance programs are more acceptable to the people.” This official does not believe that the 
current police policy will work in the long run:  “We won’t see a lot of benefits coming out of 
the costly input of resources on expanded forced detox and re-education camps. At present the 
policies are still clashing.” 
 
It remains to be seen what effect the current aggressive law-enforcement approach will have on 
injecting drug use and HIV infection in the China-Burma border region. No sequential 
seroprevalence data is available to examine trends and the Chinese government is likely to hold 
any such data closely. Furthermore, local officials suggest that improvements in surveillance 
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following the 2003 change in policy will make it difficult to see trends in seroprevalence rates. 
Although central and local governments are aggressively engaged in the issue, it is not clear that 
HIV infection is under control.  
Malaria 
Malaria in Burma 
 
Burma suffers from a high burden of malaria with a very high proportion of Plasmodium 
falciparum cases. Both Kachin and Shan states are at high risk overall with 2004 official 
morbidity rates in the range 20–29 per 1,000 and 10–19 per 1,000 respectively and mortality 
rates of 8–10 per 100,000.44 These treatment-based statistics severely underestimate the malaria 
burden on the border because no data is collected in many areas and because most treatment is in 
the private sector. Local data is sparse; however, among 20 KIO clinics, nearly 38 percent of all 
patients seen in a recent count (4,394 of 11,443) were diagnosed with malaria (usually diagnosed 
clinically). This is consistent with other studies from rural Burma documenting infection rates of 
12–75 percent per year.45 In a pilot KIO malaria program, 22 percent of asymptomatic villagers 
tested positive for falciparum malaria (by microscopy), consistent with other surveys 
documenting prevalence rates of 10–40 percent.46 A foreign doctor who visited the KIO area in 
summer 2006 reported “a person with fever in every house.” 
 
Township-level malaria data are sparse and there is no data at all for some areas in Kachin and 
Shan states.47 Of 100 high-risk townships listed in the Myanmar National Malaria Plan, many are 
in the high-risk corridor for HIV between Myitkyina and Lashio. Thus, in the China border area, 
very high HIV infection rates coexist with very high malaria rates and a high prevalence of drug-
resistant malaria—a situation with severe consequences for maternal health and perhaps HIV 
transmission. So far, this issue does not seem to have been raised in the Burma national plan. 
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Although the extent of drug-resistant P. falciparum on the Yunnan border has not been as well 
documented as on the Thai border, drug resistance levels are universally believed to be very 
high. Surveillance data from Myitkyina reported by the Mekong Roll Back Malaria Partnership 
shows Adequate Clinical Responses to chloroquine (76%), SP (67%), and mefloquine (80%) in 
2001–02. These rates are lower than at any other surveillance sites in Burma except on the Thai 
border.48 More recent or more detailed surveillance data for drug resistance does not appear to be 
available. (The Roll Back Malaria–Mekong Partnership reports a surveillance site in Bhamaw, 
but no data was reported.) In a recent study in northern Kachin State, Smithuis et al. reported that 
chloroquine and mefloquine were completely ineffective for treatment of falciparum malaria.49 
Based in part on this study the Burmese national treatment protocol for falciparum malaria was 
changed to a three-day regimen with artesunate-mefloquine combination therapy in 2003.  
 
The border regions are particularly susceptible to counterfeit malaria drugs, including fake 
artesunate.50 Private sector–supplied pharmaceuticals with low concentrations of drugs such as 
artesunate are more dangerous, from the resistance point of view, than drugs with no active 
ingredient at all.51  
 
The vulnerability of the border regions is extreme because in addition to remoteness, conflict, low 
living standards, decay of the public health system, and control by military forces who are 
essentially living off the land, there is major movement of non-immune populations. Logging in 
Shan State after the cease-fire there and current logging operations in Kachin State have moved 
non-immune populations into the forest fringe.52 Forced movement of non-immune Wa people 
south, as part of the poppy-control activities in Shan State, generated malaria outbreaks, which are 
officially admitted to have killed thousands of people.53 Jade, gold mining, and uncontrolled 
logging in Kachin State have produced what has been described as a “wild west” atmosphere on 
the border. In this situation, with little or no health-systems support from the Burmese government, 
with major population movements within and into the country, and with self-medication the rule 
for malaria, the border is likely to remain a global hotspot for drug resistance. 
 
The vulnerability of the border regions has been noted by all malaria organizations working in 
Burma. The National Operational Plan on Prevention and Control of Malaria (now included as 
part of the “Three Diseases” program) identifies as high-risk groups “mobile populations in 
search of economic opportunities (e.g., forest-related workers, miners, workers in development 
projects, plantation workers), upland subsistence farmers, settlers in the forest or forest fringes, 
and the national races (ethnic groups) living in remote endemic areas, particularly along the 
borders.”54 The Asian Development Bank has identified the “conditions of ethnic minorities 
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living in isolated locations” as the primary malaria challenge and proposed targeted support to 
help address them.55 The WHO Roll Back Malaria–Mekong Collaboration notes expressly that 
drug-resistant malaria is a border problem and that “cross-border control of malaria should be a 
priority for control of drug resistance.”56  
 
Given this consensus on the importance of the ethnic areas along the border it is somewhat 
alarming to discover that the Burmese national malaria plan does not penetrate very far into the 
border region. As of late 2006, the Burmese government was not providing malarial-control 
assistance to the Kachin Health Department of the KIO nor the Palaung and Shan health 
organizations. Health workers from these ethnic groups report severe shortages of medical supplies 
to diagnose or treat malaria. Villagers will often purchase as few as two or three tablets from local 
shops for malaria, and even health workers in clinics describe resorting to monotherapy or shorter-
than-recommended courses of antimalarials, which contributes to drug resistance.  
 
Insecticide treated nets (ITN), another mainstay of malaria control, were almost non-existent in 
the areas where these organizations operate. During the implementation phase of an ITN 
program in Kachin and Palaung areas, many villagers had never heard of an ITN or of “supatab” 
(the Burmese name for KO-Tab), a tablet marketed by Population Services International (PSI) to 
treat bednets. PSI, well-known internationally for effective social marketing strategies, sold 
226,000 KO-tabs in 2005,57 but apparently did not reach the border areas. The Kachin and 
Palaung groups had to travel to the urban areas of Myitkyina and Lashio respectively to purchase 
KO-tabs for their programs.  
 
The Burmese National Malaria Control Programme was reviewed by outside reviewers in 2005, 
but the reviewers do not appear to have visited the border areas. A map of areas visited by the 
review team shows no visits in Kachin state, or in Northern or Eastern Shan states, or in fact 
anywhere close to the Yunnan border.58 Given the disparity between the identification of high-risk 
areas and the actual provision of service, funders of the Three Diseases Fund may need to consider 
setting up a separate review process for the border areas. An experienced doctor working with 
international humanitarian organizations observed that the Three Diseases Fund would not work 
“unless the money is monitored right down to the person taking the medication.”59 
Malaria in Yunnan Province 
 
Because of its border with Burma, Yunnan Province is China’s national malaria hotspot. Malaria 
is a re-emergent disease in China with estimated cases rising to about half a million nationwide 
in 2003. This rise follows major successes in reducing malaria incidence in the 1980s and is a 
result of the economic reforms of 1990. According to China’s surprisingly frank Global Fund 
Round 5 application, “the development of the private economy in the countryside has had a 
negative impact on the primary care network. This has been particularly pronounced in the 
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poorest areas where the once strong Public Health System has been greatly weakened and in 
some cases destroyed.”60 According to the application, in 2001 only one-third of township 
hospitals in malaria-endemic areas could perform blood examinations due to lack of facilities 
and/or a trained microscopist. The writers estimated that no more than 10 percent of patients 
were currently receiving prompt and accurate diagnoses at the village level. The bednet program 
was also said to have disintegrated with only 5 percent ownership of bednets in project areas. 
“The most endemic areas,” the application noted, “are the least accessible areas.” 
 
These most endemic and least accessible areas are the counties along the border with Burma. 
Forty percent of all China’s malaria cases are in Yunnan province61 as are 60–80 percent of its 
falciparum cases. In 2001, 26 of 35 counties in China with falciparum malaria were along the 
Burma border. The Global Fund application was focused on these border counties and 
specifically aimed at problems of access and drug resistance in the border area. (It was expanded 
in Round 5 to include the counties immediately east of the border counties.) The primary 
Chinese concern appears to be that migration from within China to the economic boom areas on 
the Burma border and then back home could spread Plasmodium falciparum back north and east 
to areas of China where it has been eradicated. As noted above, there are some 10 million border 
crossings a year in each direction.  
 
However, even though the Chinese malaria control program seems to have disintegrated in the 
1990s, malaria incidence rates in the border counties are something like one tenth of the 
(undoubtedly underreported) rates on the Burma side.62 Malaria deaths in Yunnan Province as a 
whole were on the order of 30 per year in 2002 compared with perhaps thousands on the Burma 
side, and laboratory confirmation rates in 2002 were reported as greater than 90 percent versus 
10 percent or less on the Burma side.  
 
Even though counterfeit drugs are a problem (fake artesunate was reported in Ruili in 200463), 
and even though resistance to artemisins has been seen since the middle 1990s,64 malaria is 
essentially under control, or close to it, in Yunnan Province. This is probably true, or will soon 
be true, even in the border counties. “Compared to other Mekong countries,” a recent review of 
malaria surveillance in the Roll Back Malaria–Mekong Partnership noted, “malaria is not a major 
problem in Yunnan.” 
 
The reviving Chinese malaria control program stops dead at the border. The difference between 
Chinese and Burmese malaria control efforts in the region is graphically visible in the malaria 
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data reported by the Roll Back Malaria–Mekong collaboration. In maps of incidence, mortality, 
and laboratory confirmation rates for the Yunnan border counties and the Burmese townships 
immediately opposite, the differences in rates are so large that the whole border is in fact 
outlined by the malaria rates. Given that the border is permeable to every variety of legal and 
illegal trade, it is unfortunate that malaria treatment and prevention are not able to cross it. It 
seems that the Burma-Yunnan border is permeable to everything except public health. 
Cross-Border Initiatives 
 
Formal cross-border initiatives in the region include the Roll Back Malaria–Mekong partnership, 
the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Project, the Asian Development Bank regional technical 
assistance program, and the Asian Collaborative Training Network for Malaria, all of which give 
high priority to drug-resistant malaria on the Burma-Yunnan border. There is a powerful 
consensus that drug-resistant P. falciparum is an issue of primary international concern. In 
addition, the Roll Back Malaria–Mekong partnership and other organizations have emphasized 
the importance of access to the ethnic groups living in the border regions. There is thus an 
international framework for a cross-border approach to infectious diseases that would 
supplement an expansion of the Burmese national malaria program into the underserved areas 
from the other direction (and perhaps the HIV and TB programs as well). However, although the 
Burmese government has signed on to the cross-border collaborations, its participation appears 
to be limited. Thus, no Burmese data appears in the recent reports of the Mekong Basin Disease 
Surveillance Project65 and no Burmese sentinel site was reviewed by the USP–DQI review of 
border surveillance sites for drug quality on behalf of WHO in 2002.66 Nor is there any evidence 
of up-to-date surveillance for malaria drug resistance.  
 
Health Unlimited, a nongovernmental organization based in China with historic ties to the KIO 
and the Wa, has achieved considerable success in its efforts to bring health care to rural 
communities along the China-Burma border. By the end of 2007, the organization will have built 
some 60 health centers on the Burma side of the border, most of which are concentrated in 
Kachin State. It has also trained nearly 800 Burmese medical practitioners and health workers, 
thus improving the accessibility of primary health care to approximately 200,000 people.  
 
The border ethnic groups told us they welcomed international support. The KIO, despite its 
former hardline stance on drugs, has begun negotiations to open harm-reduction programs with 
assistance from the China side. The KIO also receives some assistance with bednets and drugs 
from two small nongovernmental organizations operating across the border from China, and 
purchases most antimalarial supplies from China. Local Chinese government health officials 
recently joined KIO in a visit to Kachin areas to conduct malaria screening and insecticide 
treatment of bednets.  
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Chinese health officials also welcome cross-border support projects, though they told us such 
activities should be “low profile.” Yunnanese government entities including the Yunnan Center 
for Disease Control have recently begun to make cross-border overtures to KIO on HIV 
prevention, providing technical resources for an IDU survey and possibly harm reduction.  
 
A local health worker in Ruili told us that most international border collaborations involve 
administrators traveling to Mandalay or Rangoon. She said that local and provincial-level 
contacts are probably more useful than the high-level collaborations sponsored by UN 
organizations, which must operate government-to-government. Given that the Burma border has 
been the source of two major cross-border public health problems in recent decades—HIV and 
drug-resistant malaria—and that it could easily be the source of new ones such as spread of 
lymphatic filariasis or avian influenza, it is hard to believe that the Chinese government would 
not support increased cross-border public health.  
Conclusion 
 
Different public health programs have different needs. Thus, the Joint Programme for 
HIV/AIDS, which is harm-reduction based, should be supported but needs to be expanded in the 
border areas; this is unlikely to happen without external pressure and monitoring. The malaria 
program in the border areas is almost nonexistent, and a natural approach to upgrading it would 
be a combination of international collaboration mechanisms with China, and expanding access to 
Burmese central resources. Finally, the Burmese government must recognize the right to public 
health of people in cease-fire areas or those ethnically affiliated with cease-fire groups. 
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7. Thai-Burma Border Region 
Health indicators along Burma’s eastern border with Thailand, which stretches over 2,400 km and 
is overwhelmingly populated by ethnic non-Burmans, are some of the worst in Asia. Infant, child, 
and maternal mortality rates in internally displaced (IDP) communities of eastern Burma are more 
akin to rates seen in other humanitarian disaster zones such as Sierra Leone, Angola, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most deaths are due to infectious diseases that are both 
preventable and curable. Also, narcotics have been and continue to be an export across this border 
to Thailand and markets beyond, fueling addiction and infections. 
 
The abusive policies of the Burmese government, including forced relocation, forced labor, and 
the seizure and destruction of food, coupled with pervasive poverty, have caused the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in eastern Burma over the past twelve years, 
causing one of the largest human migrations Asia has seen in modern times. Today, an estimated 
350,000 Burmese live in government-controlled relocation centers in eastern Burma and another 
540,000 are internally displaced, often living in small communities in the jungle without access 
to adequate health care.  
 
Hundreds of thousands of Burmese have also fled across the border to Thailand seeking safety 
and work. Today, perhaps two million Burmese eke out a living in Thailand as migrant workers, 
while approximately 140,000 others are considered official refugees by the Thai government. 
Burmese migrants, who often work in dangerous conditions, are particularly vulnerable to 
tuberculosis and HIV infection. At least one migrant group, the Shan, face a generalized HIV 
epidemic. Malaria is endemic on both sides of the Thai-Burma border and is particularly rampant 
in IDP communities in Burma. This border area also suffers from some of the highest rates of 
drug-resistant malaria in the world. These conditions pose a threat to public health in Thailand 
and place a heavy financial burden on Thai health care institutions, eroding their capacity to 
provide adequate services for all. 
 
The Burmese military regime is largely responsible for these health problems, yet it has done 
little to correct them. Not only has the Burmese junta failed to invest in public infrastructure, but 
military campaigns in eastern Burma continue to disrupt the work of community-based 
organizations (CBOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and limit the ability of 
international humanitarian organizations to access vulnerable populations. Burmese soldiers have 
harassed and killed ethnic health workers and destroyed village-level health clinics. Meanwhile, 
underfunded health groups struggle to provide care to Burmese migrants, a reality that Thai 
health officials have increasingly recognized. The international community urgently needs to 
become more engaged in health and human rights issues on the Thai-Burma border region. More 
financial and collaborative support is necessary to establish and sustain cross-border health 
projects, and greater pressure must be placed on the Burmese government to end its violations of 
international humanitarian law in eastern Burma.  
 
 




Until the 1980s, most of the Thai-Burma border was controlled by ethnic insurgent armies, 
including Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Shan groups, as well as those of various drug barons and 
Kuomintang remnants. Thailand cultivated cordial relations with many of these groups during 
the Cold War in an effort to isolate the Burmese regime and provide a buffer against the 
Communist Party of Burma (BCP).1 By the end of the Cold War, relations between the Thai 
and Burmese governments improved.2 However, the Thai-Burma border remained volatile and 
border clashes continued. Thailand frequently accused the Burmese and their allies of 
encroaching onto Thai soil and smuggling drugs, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS), into Thailand.3 In return, Rangoon frequently charged Thailand with supporting ethnic 
insurgent groups.4 Thailand’s relationship with Burma reached a nadir under Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai, who publicly condemned the Burmese junta’s human rights record and never 
paid a state visit to Burma.5 Chuan’s military commanders, including General Surayud 
Chulanont, took a hardline stance on the junta’s alliance with groups indicted for drug 
trafficking.6 
 
In 2001, the newly elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initiated a “forward engagement” 
policy cultivating amicable relations with the Burmese generals, which allowed for mutually 
advantageous economic deals.7 Today, Thailand is the third-largest foreign investor in Burma 
and is the largest buyer of Burmese natural gas.8 Growth of trade in other sectors has also 
skyrocketed. In the first eleven months of 2005, the value of Thai-Burmese trade reached a 
record 90.4 billion baht ($2.4 billion), an increase of over 17 percent from the preceding year, 
making 2005–06 the most profitable year for Burma since 1989.9 In December 2005, a 
Memorandum of Understanding between Thailand’s Electricity Generating Authority (EGAT) 
and Burma’s military junta was signed, paving the way for the construction of a series of dams 
along the Salween River. The first planned is Hatgyi Dam, in Karen State, scheduled to begin in 
2007. The project, shrouded in secrecy, is in an area where the Burmese military has been 
violently evicting villagers and destroying their homes.10 At a cost of $1 billion, Hatgyi is the 
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single biggest economic deal involving Burma, Thailand, and China, whose state-controlled 
Sinohydro Corporation will be the main construction contractor.11 Another planned dam, Tasang, 
in Shan State, is estimated to cost $6 billion to build and will be, at 228 meters, the tallest dam in 
Asia. This area has also been heavily militarized, and since 1996 up to 300,000 Shan civilians 
have been forcibly displaced, many fleeing to Thailand.12 Moreover, Thailand’s business links 
with the Burmese generals benefited companies linked to Prime Minister Thaksin.13 In one 
highly irregular deal, Thailand’s Export-Import Bank extended soft loans to Burma so it could 
purchase telecommunications goods and equipment from the Thaksin family’s Shin 
Corporation.14 
 
Thaksin, in an effort to maintain good relations with the Burmese junta, also cracked down on 
Burmese dissidents living in Thailand.15 He reined in the activities of ethnic resistance groups, 
pressuring some to negotiate with Rangoon, and banned Burmese pro-democracy groups from 
holding public demonstrations.16 He ordered the Thai police to crackdown on refugees, 
particularly ethnic Shans, arresting and deporting them.17 Thailand reassured the Burmese 
generals that they would not allow opposition groups in Thailand to mount any military or 
politically sensitive activities.18  
 
On September 19, 2006, the Thai military deposed Thaksin in a bloodless coup and installed a 
military junta. The junta named the former Thai Army Chief General Surayud Chulanond as 
Prime Minister. While Army Chief, Surayud had incurred Rangoon’s displeasure by taking a 
hard-line stance against Burma’s narcotics trade, and was removed from his post by Premier 
Thaksin.19 Surayud has stated that all commitments made by his predecessor to Burma would be 
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honored but refused to extend the lending period for soft loans.20 The Surayud administration 
also is considering revitalizing links with armed ethnic groups to counter the increasing influx of 
narcotics from Burma.21  
Ethnic Groups 
 
Burma’s border with Thailand comprises four ethnic states (Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon) and 
one division (Tenasserim). However, the region is also home to many other ethnic groups, 
including the Wa, Pa-O, Lahu, Padaung, Akha, Lahu, Lisu, and Palaung.22 Much of this frontier 
erupted in warfare after Ne Win’s coup of 1962, which officially ended any possibility of 
secession or significant autonomy for ethnic minority peoples.23 By the 1980s, all major ethnic 
groups in the border region were involved in armed rebellion.24 
 
The government responded with a combination of negotiations and brokered deals and an iron-
fisted military policy (The Four Cuts Policy). Since 1989, 17 armed ethnic groups have signed 
cease-fires with the Burmese junta, splintering several large ethnic insurgencies along the 
frontiers. Today, only the Shan State Army–South (SSA-S), Karenni National Progressive Party 
(KNPP), and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen 
National Union (KNU), are continuing armed resistance. Where these groups are active, the 
military junta has committed widespread abuses against ethnic civilians, including forced 
displacement, forced labor, and destruction of crops and food supplies. Within the past year, the 
army has destroyed hundreds of villages and displaced 27,000 civilians in the Karen State 
alone.25 In government-controlled areas, arbitrary taxation, forced displacement, and forced labor 
are more common.26 The latter is frequently employed in the construction of Burmese military 
bases and roads, solidifying the army’s control of vast areas in eastern Burma.27 
 
Several ethnic organizations continue to provide limited social services for internally displaced 
and war-affected residents in eastern Burma. These include the Karen Department of Health and 
Welfare, the Karenni Health Department, the Shan Health Committee, the Mon National Health 
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Committee, and a multitude of women’s, youth, and other community groups. The most 
prominent organization is the Mae Tao Clinic, founded by Dr. Cynthia Maung in 1989 in Mae 
Sot, Thailand, which provides medical care to migrants from Burma. Dr. Maung, an ethnic 
Karen, and other local ethnic leaders also established the multiethnic Back Pack Health Worker 
Team (BPHWT), which provides primary health care services to internally displaced people in 
Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan areas. 
 
The Thai government, despite some well-publicized ill-treatment of refugees and activists from 
Burma, has largely left such organizations alone. In Thailand, these groups are able to access 
financial and technical support from a wide range of nongovernmental organizations, religious 
groups, and international donors, enabling them to provide essential social services otherwise 
unavailable in eastern Burma.  
 
The Thai government’s official recognition of some Burmese migrants as refugees (with the 
notable exception of the Shan) has provided refuge to 140,000 displaced persons currently 
housed in nine official camps in Thailand.28 Although the camps are fairly secure, that situation 
can quickly change. In 1997 and 1998, Burmese troops crossed into Thailand, attacking and 
burning refugee camps.29 In 1994, the Thai government forcibly repatriated approximately 
12,000 Mon refugees, drawing heavy criticism from international human rights organizations.30 
Despite these incidents, the refugee camps have provided food, protection, and essential services 
to tens of thousands of Burmese refugees for over 20 years.  
Drugs 
 
Rampant illicit drug use in Thailand has been a thorny issue in Thai-Burmese relations, one 
historically linked to political failures in Burma. Allies of the Burmese military government, 
most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), have been permitted to move from northern 
Shan State to areas adjacent to the Thai border and engage in narcotics production and 
trafficking.31 By the mid-2000s, 700–900 million ATS pills were being smuggled from Burma 
into Thailand annually, fueling soaring addiction rates in Thailand, particularly among youth.32 
Thaksin exploited increasing Thai concern on this issue while on the campaign trail in 2001, 
promising a war on drugs, which was officially launched in 2003. The campaign sanctioned 
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extrajudicial execution of suspected drug dealers and distributors, claiming over 2,000 lives in 
three months.33 Most of those killed were likely innocent, and police have closed many cases 
within one year without proper investigations.34 Thai police have also been implicated in using 
the campaign to blackmail and destroy their enemies.35 However, Thaksin steered clear of border 
activities that might antagonize the UWSA and their Burmese junta allies.36 He scaled down the 
activities of Thai Task Force 399, a covert unit created from Thai and U.S. Special Forces to 
tackle drug trafficking along the border—long a sore point in Thailand’s relationship with 
Rangoon.37 As a result, drug-producing allies of the junta were emboldened to continue their 
activities as Thai authorities became increasingly reluctant to deal with the source of the 
problem.38 Today, there are no signs that cross-border smuggling of drugs from Burma has 
decreased; drug traffickers are simply using alternate routes.39  
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
 
The Burmese military government is responsible for widespread and systematic violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law in the Thai-Burma border regions, particularly 
against ethnic minorities. These abuses include summary executions, forced displacement, forced 
labor, rape, confiscation of land and property, attacks against health clinics and medical 
personnel, and the destruction of rice fields and food storage facilities.40 Forced displacement is 
particularly common and used as a counter-insurgency strategy. Up to 9 percent of IDP 
households in eastern Burma have been forcibly displaced within the preceding 12 months; in the 
more heavily contested areas of northern Karen State, the corresponding figure was over 60 
percent.41 Since 1996, the Burmese army had destroyed or forced civilians to abandon over 3,000 
villages in eastern Burma. 42  
 
Other abuses commonly accompany forced displacement. A third of IDP households in eastern 
Burma had experienced arbitrary taxation or forced labor within the preceding 12 months.43 Rape 
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of ethnic civilian women and girls in these areas has been particularly well documented.44 
Widespread abuses of civilians by army troops worsened significantly after 1996–97, when the 
central government, unable to support the costs of maintaining one of the largest standing armies 
in Asia, introduced a policy of self-sufficiency for the regional commands, forcing those 
operating along the frontiers of Burma to engage in the illicit economy (including the narcotics 
trade) and increase arbitrary taxation, confiscation of land and property, and forced labor.45  
 
The brunt of these policies has been directed at Karen and Shan States. Between 1996 and 1998, 
the Burmese army had forcibly relocated over 300,000 residents from over 1,400 villages in 
Shan State.46 In other areas of Shan State, the Burmese authorities forced farmers to sell quotas 
of rice at depressed prices to the government, which, when combined with forced relocation, 
resulted in precipitous declines in agricultural production.47  
 
Although less frequently reported, armed militia groups operating along the eastern frontier have 
also been implicated in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. These 
groups include the Karen National Union (KNU), the largest group still mounting armed 
resistance against the Burmese government, and the Karen Peace Force and the Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), both allies of the Burmese government.48 
  
As a result of these policies, an estimated 350,000 Burmese reside in government-controlled 
relocation centers while at least another 540,000 live as internally displaced persons in eastern 
Burma.49 In Shan State, perhaps 400,000 villagers have fled their homes and are living as 
internally displaced persons or as undocumented migrants in Thailand.50 
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http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/KW116.htm.  
49 Human Rights Watch, supra note 27; Gary Risser, Oum Kher, and Sein Htun, Running the Gauntlet:  The Impact 
of Internal Displacement in Southern Shan State, Bangkok:  Chulalongkorn University, 2003, 
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Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Thai government prefers 
to consider these individuals “temporarily displaced” after “fleeing fighting.”51 This narrow 
definition often excludes ethnicities like the Shan, who have fled fighting and human rights 
abuses. Without official refugee status, these groups are denied access to refugee camps and 
certain forms of humanitarian assistance.52 Classified as “economic migrants,” they are forced to 
find work, often in exploitative conditions, including in the Thai sex industry where they are 
vulnerable to sexually transmitted infections, including HIV.53 Thailand’s demand for cheap 
labor has led to the implementation of a guest-worker registration program, which allows 
migrants access to the Thai government’s universal health care plan.54 However, most Burmese 
migrants have not registered for these services due to restrictions and complicated measures that 
accompany the registration process. Recently, as part of the work permit application process, the 
Thai government has required migrants to provide additional personal information that could 
potentially be sent to governments of origin for verification purposes. As a result, many Burmese 
migrants, particularly members of ethnic groups that have fled abuses at home, are wary of 
applying for work permits, particularly since it is against Burmese law to leave the country 
without permission.55 Today, most of the two million Burmese migrants believed to be in 
Thailand remain undocumented and are considered “illegal” by the Thai authorities.56 They live 
in constant fear of arrest and deportation back to Burma.57  
Health Indicators 
 
The health situation in IDP communities in eastern Burma is dire. In a report recently released by 
the Back Pack Health Worker Team, IDP communities along the frontier with Thailand had 
infant, child, and maternal mortality rates far higher than Burma’s official rates.58 Table 1 
summarizes these health indicators. 
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Workers,” The Nation, June 19, 2006, 
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Death (1 in 
XX) 
Thailand 18 21 44 900 
Burma (official) 76 106 360 75 
IDPs in eastern 
conflict zones of 
Burma 
91 221 1,000–1,200 12 
Rwanda   1,400 10 
Sierra Leone 165 283 N/A N/A 
Angola 154 260 N/A N/A 
Congo, D. R. 129 205 990 13 
 
IMR: rate of deaths in children aged less than one year, per 1,000 live births. 
U5MR: rate of deaths in children aged less than five years, per 1,000 live births. Also called 
Child Mortality Rate. 
MMR: ratio of deaths among women after 28 weeks gestation and before six weeks postpartum, 
per 100,000 live births. 
 
(Sources: UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/index.html, and BPHWT, 2006) 
 
Most deaths recorded by the Back Packer teams were from infectious diseases, especially 
malaria, which accounted for almost half the identified deaths of the internally displaced in 
eastern Burma.59 In IDP communities, the Back Packer team surveys demonstrated widespread 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the high prevalence of 
forced displacement, food seizure and/or destruction, and forced labor. These abuses were found 
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Table 2: Prevalence of Selected Human Rights Abuses and Adverse Health Consequences in 
IDP Communities of Eastern Burma 
 
Human Rights 
Violation in the 










Childhood (under 5) death 2.4 
Childhood malnutrition 3.1 






Landmine Injury 4.5 
Overall death 1.5 
Moderate child 
malnutrition in household 
4.4 
Severe child malnutrition 
in household 
2.0 
Landmine injury 4.6 
Food Insecurity 
(food destroyed or 
looted) 
25.7% 
Head of Household 
suffering from malaria at 
time of survey 
1.7 
Diarrhea in two weeks 
prior to survey 
1.6 Forced Labor 32.9% 




(Adapted from BPHWT, 2006) 
 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of large-scale population migration within the borders of 
Burma and beyond, the Burmese government refuses to acknowledge that IDPs exist in Burma or 
that there are Burmese refugees living in Thailand and thus fails to provide for their needs.60  
 
Travel restrictions placed on local and international humanitarian organizations by the Burmese 
government greatly hinders their access to affected communities in eastern Burma.61 In some of 
the areas, the Burmese military blocks supplies of medications and other essentials from reaching 
civilians. Health workers trying to provide aid are often targeted:  since the inception of the Back 
Pack Health Worker Team in 1998, seven medics and one traditional birth attendant have been 
killed by Burmese soldiers or landmines.62 The activities of the few international humanitarian 
aid organizations operating in these areas have also been sharply limited. Most notably, 
                                                           
60 Shukla, supra note 49 at 1–2. 
61 Id. at 2–6; BPHWT, supra note 26. 
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Médecins Sans Frontières–France (MSF–France) stopped its work in conflict areas in the Mon 
and Karen states in 2001, and the International Committee of the Red Cross has closed all of its 
field offices in eastern Burma because of travel restrictions (see “Burma” chapter).  
 
Burma’s failure to provide adequate health and social services has driven many Burmese across the 
border to Thailand in search of these services.63 Each year, the Mae Tao Clinic sees an increase in 
the number of patients seeking care. In 2005, the clinic logged 90,000 outpatient visits and 8,000 
inpatient admissions. Of these, almost half were Burmese residents who had crossed the border.64 
For specialized services such as eye surgery, the ratio of Burma residents to Thailand residents is 
5:1, with many patients coming from major urban areas in Burma.65 Similarly, about half of the 
patients in MSF–France’s TB program in Mae Sot came across the border specifically for 
treatment. Of those crossing from Burma, only 12 percent were from the nearest Burmese town of 
Myawaddy; most traveled from elsewhere in Karen State or further away.66  
 
Increasing numbers of Burmese migrants are seeking care at Thai government hospitals, 
straining already tight Thai public health budgets. At Nakornping Hospital in Chiang Mai, 30 
percent of pregnant women seeking care are migrants.67 These are mostly ethnic Shans who have 
fled Burma, of whom only about half are legally registered and able to access the government’s 
universal health care plan.68 In 2003, Mae Sot Hospital spent 20 million baht (approximately 
$625,000) to treat Burmese migrants.69 Mae Hong Son, a Thai province bordering Shan State and 
home to over 50,000 stateless people, spends over 40 million baht (approximately $1,250,000) 
per year providing care to migrants.70 
 
Burma’s under-financed health care system is contributing to the emergence and re-emergence of 
diseases in Thailand, a reality not lost on the Thai authorities. Saengchai Sothiworakul, chairman of 
a panel evaluating the impact of migration from Burma to Thailand for the National Economic and 
Social Advisory Council, notes: “What we feared most are communicable diseases. Several diseases 
which disappeared from Thailand have since re-emerged along Tak’s [a western Thai province 
bordering Karen State] border, such as elephantiasis, tuberculosis, dengue fever and syphilis.”71 
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Burma continues to be the major source of heroin and ATS for Thai markets, fueling drug 
addiction and HIV infection in many border regions.72 These problems persist despite claims by 
the Thaksin Shinawatra administration that his “War on Drugs” has been a success.73 Although 
Thailand has achieved notable successes in HIV/AIDS control with the “100% Condom 
Campaign,” the incidence and prevalence rates of HIV in intravenous drug users (IDUs) remains 
high.74 In addition to narcotics use and trafficking, other factors disproportionately present in 
rural Burma fuel the spread of HIV. As noted in a World Health Organization (WHO) report, 
“poverty, internal and external mobility, risk behavior, and a generalized lack of response 
capacity, coupled with an acknowledged high prevalence rate of HIV infection, means that this 
very serious epidemic may grown out of control.”75 
 
As in many other parts of the world, commercial sex workers and IDUs suffer from especially 
high rates of HIV infection on the Thai-Burma border. But there is also concern that the virus 
may be spreading into the general population. In sentinel surveillance conducted by the Burmese 
Ministry of Health, the prevalence of HIV in women presenting for antenatal care is often above 
1 percent, suggesting a generalized epidemic. (See Figure 1.) However, this figure appears to 
vary from year to year, further indicating that official data may be inaccurate and that sentinel 
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(Adapted from UNAIDS.) 
 
Note the considerable year-to-year variation and that for Kawthaung and Moulmein, there are 
missing figures, all of which suggest problems with data quality.  
 
The lack of accurate surveillance data on HIV is especially concerning, given anecdotal data that 
suggests a high prevalence of HIV infection in the general population living in eastern Burma. 
Prevalence rates such as 9 percent in Shan men and 7.5 percent in pregnant women in Hpa-an, 
the capital of Karen State and a “pass through” site for many Burmese migrants workers heading 
to Thailand, have been cited.77 Following worldwide trends, the epidemic in Burma is 
increasingly affecting women, particularly those whose husbands or boyfriends used drugs or 
bought sex, often during migration for work.78 A Burmese physician who has worked in Mon 
State and Tenasserim Division recently noted that “HIV/AIDS was not a big problem [about a 
decade ago] but now it is horrible, in Tavoy, in Mon State. Many people cross the border to work 
in border towns like Ranong.”79 Uncertainties about the accuracy of official HIV data add to the 
concern about Burma’s ability and willingness to monitor and control the epidemic along its 
borders. Recent reports suggest that the central office for AIDS control in northern Burma, 
responsible for the most-affected Shan and Kachin States, is woefully understaffed and 
underbudgeted.80  
 
Meanwhile, there is a growing concern about the prevalence of HIV on the Thai side of the 
border.81 In a clinic that serves mostly Burmese sex workers in Mae Sot, the prevalence of HIV is 
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around 10 percent.82 Sentinel surveillance surveys of migrant sex workers in another border 
town, Ranong, demonstrate a persistent one-quarter to one-third are infected with HIV.83 There is 
increasing evidence from the Thai side to show that the epidemic is generalizing beyond high-
risk groups. In Mae Sot, HIV infection rates in women presenting for antenatal care have been 
increasing. At the Mae Tao Clinic, the most recent prevalence rate is 2.2 percent, compared with 
0.8 percent five years earlier.84 The rate in Burmese women presenting for antenatal care at Mae 
Sot Hospital is 1.6 percent, triple that of their Thai counterparts.85 (See Figure 2.) Two percent of 
migrant women presenting for antenatal care in Ranong in 2004 were infected with HIV.86 
 
Figure 2: Prevalence of HIV Infection in Target Burmese and Thai Populations,  
Tak Province, 1999–2004 
 
(Source: Sawasdiwuthipong, supra note 82) 
 
 
The situation is particularly dire for Shan migrants, many of whom are denied official status in 
Thailand and often work as undocumented migrants, including in the Thai sex industry.87 For 
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many, the combination of low levels of knowledge, lack of legal status, and fear heightens the 
risk for exploitation, including trafficking and debt-bondage.88 In a 1997 survey of all the major 
ethnic minorities living in northern Thailand, the Shan had the highest prevalence of HIV, at 8.75 
percent.89 In a 2002 survey, Shan migrant construction workers in Chiang Mai had an overall 
HIV prevalence rate of 4.9 percent, double that of their northern Thai counterparts.90 
 
Without access to lifesaving antiretroviral treatment, an increasing number of Burmese migrants 
are falling ill and dying of AIDS in Thailand. At the Mae Tao Clinic, AIDS is now responsible 
for almost a quarter of deaths among this population.91 Similarly, in Chiang Mai Province, the 
second most commonly reported disease in migrants to local health authorities is AIDS.92 While 
data collection for HIV along the eastern frontiers of Burma remains weak, available data 
suggests a maturing and generalized epidemic. Furthermore, the high rates among Burmese 
migrants on the Thai side of the border suggest that Burma is a primary exporter of the virus into 
Thailand. Moreover, the ongoing failure to address the root causes of migration is a virtual 
guarantee that Thailand will continue to have problems with HIV into the foreseeable future.93 
Tuberculosis 
 
Epidemiologic data on tuberculosis (TB) in eastern Burma is sparse, but what information is 
available raises cause for concern. TB is the most prevalent infectious disease found in Burmese 
migrants who undergo health screening for work-permit registration on the Thai side of the 
border.94 In Tak Province alone, 885 out of 30,000 Burmese migrants who registered to work in 
the province in 2002 had active tuberculosis that required treatment. By 2006, the figure had 
climbed to 4,000.95 The Mae Tao Clinic diagnosed 700 cases of TB in Burmese migrants in 
2004, with residents of Burma outnumbering residents of Thailand 2:1.96 This is consistent with 
data from MSF–France in Mae Sot, which shows that almost half of their patients came from 
Burma for TB treatment.97 
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The situation is further compounded by the fact that TB rates are likely to increase as HIV 
becomes entrenched in migrant communities. In 2006, among cases reported to the Thai Ministry 
of Public Health, almost 20 percent of migrants with AIDS are infected with tuberculosis.98 That 
same year, MSF–France in Mae Sot reported that 16 percent of TB patients at its clinic were co-
infected with HIV.99 In some northern Thai border provinces almost half the patients diagnosed 
with tuberculosis are now non-Thai, overwhelming the capacity of local health care providers to 
isolate and follow up with patients.100 TB cure rates in these migrants are significantly lower than 
their Thai counterparts, and treatment default rates are higher.101 In Chiang Rai, a northern Thai 
province bordering Shan State, only 25.8 percent of non-Thai patients with TB were cured.102 
Similarly, in Mae Sot, treatment-discontinuation rates in Burmese patients with tuberculosis are 
consistently higher than in Thais (Table 3).103 These failures reflect not only the high burden of 
the disease in migrants but also the barriers to their abilities to access care in Thailand.104  
 
Table 3: Percentage of Missed Treatment (Discontinuous Treatment) in Patients with Sputum-
Positive Tuberculosis, A. Mae Sot, 1999-2004 
 
 Thai Burmese 








1999 33 21.2 16 68.8 
2000 69 27.5 26 35.6 
2001 61 23.0 18 5.6 
2002 46 15.1 23 47.8 
2003 51 2.0 67 19.7 
2004 50 0.0 43 37.2 
Source: Sawasdiwuthipong, supra note 82. 
 
TB in Thailand continues to increase despite efforts at control.105 This has raised alarms for 
public health authorities as it has implications for the general population, threatening to reverse 
Thailand’s gains in controlling the disease. 
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Failures in TB control have more urgent implications given the possibility of multi-drug 
resistance that generally arises as a result of failure to complete a full course of treatment. 
However, data on multi-drug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis along the Thai-Burma border is 
sparse and often discordant. In Mae Sot, MSF–France reported that about 1.5% of their TB 
patients in 2006 had MDR TB.106 Other figures for the border are much higher. In one evaluation, 
MDR TB accounted for 6.5 percent of TB isolates collected on the Thai side of the border with 
Burma, compared with the national average of 0.9 percent.107 A survey by the National 
Tuberculosis Reference Laboratory of Thailand in 2002 found a 5.3 percent rate on the border, 
resembling MDR rates seen in other high-risk settings, such as prisons.108 The cost of treating 
MDR TB is currently estimated at almost 100,000 baht (approximately $3,000) per patient per 
month,109 with significant economic implications for control.110  
Malaria 
 
The Thai-Burma border region is a highly endemic zone for malaria, particularly for multi-drug 
resistant malaria. A survey by the Back Pack Health Worker Team, published in 2006, found that 
malaria was the cause of almost half the deaths in internally displaced communities in eastern 
Burma. Of all age groups, young children were particularly vulnerable.111 In 2004, the Back Pack 
medics diagnosed and treated over 15,500 cases of presumptive and confirmed malaria in a 
population of 176,200 internally displaced persons.112 The team also found that, at any given 
time, 12.4 percent of the internally displaced were infected with Plasmodium falciparum, the 
most dangerous form of malaria, representing a massive reservoir of untreated individuals.113 
These figures are consistent with prevalence rates for malaria of 10–40 percent in other rural 
areas of Burma.114 
 
Similar data has been reported by the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW), which 
treated over 10,000 cases of malaria out of a population of over 80,000 internally displaced persons 
in eastern Burma.115 Where KDHW operates, 44 percent of all deaths are due to malaria.116 Other 
clinics and mobile health teams managed by local community-based organizations along Burma’s 
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eastern frontier, including Shan, Palaung, Mon, and Karenni groups, also report that malaria is the 
most significant health problem in their respective areas.117 
 
The Back Pack Health Worker Team has concluded that the spread of malaria in eastern Burma is 
linked to the Burmese military’s practice of forced displacement and destruction of villages and 
food stores. During a recent survey, the group found that households of internally displaced 
persons that suffered food destruction or confiscation by the military had higher odds of having 
malaria, as they were forced to forage in the jungles for longer periods of time without shelter or 
protective equipment, and thus were at a higher risk of contracting malaria.118 
 
Burmese migrants have higher prevalence rates of malaria than other population groups living 
along the Thai-Burma border. Of approximately 25,000 cases of malaria reported to the Thai 
Ministry of Public Health in 2005, 92 percent (23,000) were found in Burmese migrants.119 Thirty 
percent of all reported cases of malaria in Thailand occur in Tak Province, adjacent to Burma’s 
Karen State.120 Here, malaria is the most commonly reported disease in migrants.121 In one estimate, 
the annual incidence of Plasmodium falciparum malaria was 87.8 per 1,000 in Thais and 285.9 per 
1,000 for non-Thais.122 In 2005, the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot treated 7,505 cases of malaria, 
almost double the number of patients the preceding year.123 
 
Burmese migrants in Thailand are not only more likely to be ill from malaria but also commonly 
have asymptomatic parasitemia. According to a study published in 2002, Burmese migrants in 
Tak Province had a 4.4 percent asymptomatic parasitemia prevalence rate compared to 0.2% in 
local Thais.124 This large reservoir of both symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals who 
remain untreated has contributed to large outbreaks of malaria in Thailand. Control of these 
outbreaks has been complicated by high mobility in undocumented migrants, a problem 
compounded by difficulties in accessing care and prevention.125 In 2005, a severe outbreak of 
malaria occurred in the southern Thai border province of Ranong. Thai health officials found that 
345 ethnic Thais out of a population of approximately 29,000 had contracted malaria. By 
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comparison, malaria was detected in 1,000 of approximately 6,000 migrants, the vast majority of 
whom were Burmese.126 
 
Multi-drug resistant malaria is an increasing problem along the Thai-Burma border for several 
reasons.127 First, many Burmese who lack access to adequate health care often buy and take 
medications without supervision and control.128 As a result, they may purchase ineffective drugs 
or fail to adhere to the treatment regime. Second, while the mainstay of treatment for falciparum 
malaria along the border is artesunate with mefloquine combination therapy,129 counterfeiters 
have undermined this treatment therapy by producing and selling fake artesunate. Recent studies 
have found that counterfeit artesunate is common throughout Burma, with over a fifth of drugs 
sampled in one analysis being fake.130 Counterfeit and expired drugs believed to originate from 
outside of Thailand have also been discovered in pharmacies in 10 Thai provinces bordering 
Burma.131 Finally, the Burmese government’s use of forced labor places workers at a higher risk 
of exposure to mosquitoes that carry the disease. Once infected, these laborers may seek out 
cheap and inappropriate antimalarials, largely because they have no access to adequate health 
services.  
 
A Burmese physician who formerly worked in Mon State and Tenaserrim Division has described 
the problem as follows: 
 
I think malaria has become worse [around the Yadana Pipeline project, in 
Tenasserim Division, where forced labor was employed]. The workers have to clear 
the forest and … have increased exposure to mosquitoes that may be better at 
transmitting malaria. Many laborers have also contracted malaria working on 
railway construction projects [the Ye-Tavoy Railroad]. They had forced labor … 
every household was asked to send one worker to help. … If someone got sick with 
malaria, they had to pay for their own treatment. There were often places that sold 
medicines [at the forced labor sites]. The workers often bought ineffective 
medicines. Many bought chloroquine, which doesn’t work anymore, and so many 
died of cerebral malaria. There is no control of medicines in many areas of Mon 
State. Pharmacy shops sell them but sometimes even betel nut stalls sell medicines. 
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There is a lot of indiscriminate use of [antimicrobial agents] and I worry about the 
spread of resistant strains.132 
Filariasis 
  
Lymphatic filariasis remains highly endemic in Burma.133 The epidemiologic situation for 
lymphatic filariasis remains unknown in many areas of Burma, and adequate mass-drug-





















Map 2: Areas of the country where more than 80 







Source: National Programme to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis, supra note 133. 
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In sharp contrast, Thailand, using MDA in areas known to be endemic, has been able to reduce 
significantly the prevalence of this disease.135 Today, the disease is mainly present in the three 
western border provinces of Tak, Mae Hong Son, and Kanchanaburi, all adjacent to Burma.136 
Figure 3 shows the yearly prevalence of lymphatic filariasis in Thailand from 1992 to 2002.  
 
Figure 3: Prevalence of Lymphatic Filariasis in Thailand 
 
 
Adapted from: Division of Communicable Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand, supra note 135. 
 
Burmese migrants are more likely to be infected with filariasis than any other population group 
in Thailand. Ten percent of Burmese migrants are infected, many without symptoms, with 
another 40 percent exhibiting previous exposure to Wuchereria bancrofti, the etiologic agents.137 
Almost no one in these surveys was treated for this disease prior to coming to Thailand.138 The 
mandatory Thai health evaluation for guest-worker registration includes a survey for lymphatic 
filariasis. However, as more undocumented migrants flee Burma, often venturing to Thai urban 
areas far from the border, concern has been raised in Thailand, where competent mosquito 
vectors exist, of the possibility of re-emergent urban filariasis.139 In 2004, two Shan migrants 
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from Burma with symptomatic lymphatic filariasis were found in Chiang Mai City, the first time 
it has been found there in decades. 140 
Other Infectious Diseases  
 
Cholera continues to occur in Burma in both rural and urban settings, including Rangoon.141 
Information regarding outbreaks is difficult to confirm and often hidden, making this an 
underreported disease.142 Even less information about cholera exists along the Thai-Burmese 
borders, although occasionally outbreaks have been reported in refugee communities displaced 
by civil conflict.143 Similarly, several outbreaks of dengue fever have occurred in the northern 
Thai border provinces of Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai, adjacent to Laos and Burma’s Shan State, 
with cross-border migration by hidden populations complicating attempts at control.144  
 
Other infectious diseases, including oropharyngeal anthrax, diphtheria, tetanus, and avian 
influenza, continue to be prevalent in Burmese migrants to Thailand. The first cases of 
oropharyngeal anthrax were described in northern Thailand following an outbreak resulting from 
consumption of affected cattle smuggled across the Thai-Burma border.145 In Mae Sot district, 
some vaccine-preventable illnesses, including diphtheria and tetanus, are found almost solely in 
Burmese migrants.146 Thai health authorities have publicly warned that Thailand is at the highest 
risk of a polio resurgence in a decade, partly because health officials have been unable to access 
undocumented migrants.147 
 
In recent years, Thailand and Burma have experienced outbreaks of avian influenza within their 
borders. In October 2006, after an outbreak of avian influenza struck poultry farms north the 
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Burmese city of Mandalay, Thai health officials convened a meeting with health organizations 
based along the Thai-Burma border to prepare an influenza preparedness plan.148 Thai health 
authorities acknowledged at the meeting that the large number of undocumented Burmese 
migrants, coupled with Burma’s poor health infrastructure, posed a significant threat of 
spreading of avian influenza, especially in the border provinces.149  
Conclusion  
 
The Thai government has become increasingly concerned about the disproportionate burden of 
infectious diseases in migrants and recognizes that the borders of Burma pose a “high risk” area 
for health.150 Thai health officials in Mae Hong Son Province have noted: “Due to the high 
mobility of legal and illegal migrant workers along [our] border, data collection, provision of 
water supply and sanitation, disease control and following up for treatment cannot be effectively 
implemented. This leads to disease transmission and outbreaks among Thai and non-Thai 
populations.”151 
 
Thai health officials have begun forging partnerships with local health-based groups to increase 
access to care for migrants. One example is the Tak Malaria Initiative, which was formed to 
address problems of malaria in Tak province with the assistance of the Global Fund to Fight 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.152 The Initiative’s goal is to expand rapid diagnosis and 
combination treatment for falciparum malaria by establishing malaria posts and training local 
staff in the five districts that border Burma. Media advertising for these services was developed 
and publicized in Thai, Burmese, and Karen. Over the course of six years, the program has 
realized sustained decreases in falciparum malaria incidence, morbidity, and mortality. However, 
the most significant decreases in incidence were noted in Thais, likely as a result of their being 
less mobile, with less cross-border migration to zones where large malaria reservoirs persist.153 
Similar efforts are now being expanded to other provinces in Thailand, particularly along the 
border with Burma.154 
 
Another Global Fund–supported initiative is PHAMIT (Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among 
Migrant Workers in Thailand). A partnership of eight nongovernmental organizations and the 
Thai Ministry of Public Health, PHAMIT is disseminating HIV and reproductive health 
information along the Thai-Burma border. PHAMIT also partners with migrant-community 
health stations and local health providers to help increase access to health services.155 
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In sharp contrast, the Burmese government denies the existence of displaced populations in 
conflict zones of eastern Burma and offers few programs to address their needs.156 The failure of 
the Burmese government to recognize and address the needs of its citizens abroad was 
highlighted by its response to the tsunami of December 2004, which killed thousands of non-
Thais in Thailand. Foreign governments and relief organizations quickly moved to help those 
affected; the glaring absence was Burma, which failed to send any aid to the thousands of 
Burmese who were killed or affected by the disaster.157 
 
In recent years, Thai and Burmese health officials have held meetings better to coordinate health 
delivery along the Thai-Burma border, but these events have produced few, if any, concrete 
results.158 This lack of action is largely due to the Burmese junta’s firm control over the activities 
of its health officials, especially when they engage with their overseas colleagues. Travel 
restrictions imposed on Burmese health officials have at times bordered on the absurd. For 
example, Burmese military authorities recently required local health officials traveling to a cross-
border health meeting in Mae Sot to travel from Myawaddy to Rangoon, fly from Rangoon to 
Bangkok, then travel on road from Bangkok to Mae Sot, rather than simply cross the bridge over 
the Moei River which forms the natural boundary between Mae Sot and Myawaddy.159 
 
Major decisions made by central military authorities and the presence of the Burmese military 
along the border may dissuade local health officials from implementing coordinated activities 
with nongovernmental organizations working on the Thai side. A Burmese physician living in 
Mae Sot provides this example: “We wanted to do HIV awareness [with Burmese health 
authorities in the Burmese border town of Myawaddy]. We had one poster that had a picture of 
Mae La [a Karen refugee camp just across the border, in Thailand]. But they told us please don’t 
use that one, they are afraid:  the Burmese government doesn’t like to acknowledge that they 
have refugees.”160 
 
Only a few international humanitarian organizations maintain health programs near conflict zones 
in eastern Burma.161 MSF–Switzerland operates in Karenni State, near the capital of Loikaw, 
providing primary health care and malaria treatment.162 However, these activities are confined to 
areas controlled by the KNPLF, a cease-fire group allied to the Burmese government.  
 
Because most eastern border zones are off-limits to international humanitarian organizations 
operating inside Burma, Thailand-based health groups have moved in to help fill this gap, despite 
the fact that the Thai government does not officially allow cross-border programs.163 These 
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include ethnic-based health organizations, such as KDHW, the Mon National Health Committee, 
the Shan Health Committee, and the Karenni Mobile Health Worker Team.164 These clinics 
implement a variety of programs including vitamin-A distribution, reproductive health, malaria 
treatment and control, and vaccination.165 They have been able to demonstrate dramatic, 
sustained control of malaria in the areas they serve.166 
 
Such efforts notwithstanding, these organizations face significant logistical and financial 
barriers. They also face constant threats from the Burmese army.167 Burmese soldiers have 
deliberately blocked supplies and aid being delivered to communities of internally displaced 
persons living in conflict zones.168 In addition, Burmese troops have killed members of BPHWT 
and destroyed several of their clinics.169 
 
Other organizations operate on the Thai side of the border, serving increasing numbers of 
migrants coming across the border specifically for health services. MSF–France operates the 
largest TB treatment program in Mae Sot, and other organizations caring for non-Thai patients 
with suspected tuberculosis will refer patients there for evaluation and care. Similarly, the Mae 
Tao Clinic, founded in 1989, provides a range of curative and preventive health services for 
Burmese migrants and is a key institution providing training in health. In 2005, there were over 
8,000 admissions and 99,000 outpatient consultations, many coming from deep within Burma, 
for basic medical services.170 
 
Such incidents have cast a “chilling effect” on community-based health organizations working in 
or near conflict zones in eastern Burma. A Burmese physician now living in Mae Sot put it this 
way:  “The activities of these health groups need to be registered and approved. If they are doing 
something that is not, the authorities can take action. It has been like this for a long time but [the 
Burmese government] has become more strict lately. [One community-based organization in 
Myawaddy] is not allowed to have an office. They have to meet secretly.”171 
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8. Bangladesh-Burma Border Region 
The inability or unwillingness of the governments of Bangladesh and Burma and the 
international community to resolve the long-standing crisis of Burmese refugees in southeastern 
Bangladesh threatens the health of populations on both sides of the border. Tens if not hundreds 
of thousands of Muslim Rohingyas from Burma’s Arakan State are now living in the Cox’s 
Bazar and Teknaf coastal strip of Bangladesh, most of them illegally, in squalid conditions that 
promote the spread of infectious diseases, malnutrition, and other ailments. There are also 
estimated to be thousands of Rakhaings, the other main ethnic group from Arakan, living in 
Bangladesh. 
 
Though Muslims have lived in Arakan for centuries, the Burmese government and many 
Rakhaings maintain that they are illegal migrants from Bangladesh, with no rights to citizenship 
in Arakan or Burma. The Bangladeshi government does not recognize them as citizens of 
Bangladesh, since many have roots in Burma that extend back generations. The Rohingyas are 
essentially stateless and suffer from all the physical, political, and economic vulnerabilities that 
such status imparts. Although the international community expressed concern during large-scale 
refugee crises in the 1980s and 1990s and took some steps to defuse the situation, its attention 
waned once the acute problems and threats have eased into chronic—but festering—wounds. 
 
The prevalence of HIV in Bangladesh remains significantly below that in Burma. This is 
undoubtedly in part because circumcision inhibits viral transmission, and HIV rates in Muslim 
countries are in general much lower than in non-Muslim neighbor states. But the high rate of 
other sexually transmitted infections indicates a significant level of unsafe behaviors. Given 
frequent cross-border movement in the southeastern region, as well as the limited awareness and 
understanding of HIV among many sectors of the population, especially among disenfranchised 
and undocumented migrants, the virus could spread efficiently if it gained a bit of traction.  
 
Malaria is endemic in 13 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, including in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
that border Burma and India’s Mizoram State and, to a lesser degree, the Cox’s Bazar and 
Teknaf area. Bangladesh also has one of the world’s highest tuberculosis rates, and the crowded 
living conditions of the Rohingyas and Bengalis in the southeast corner place them at particular 
risk. The increasing prevalence of drug-resistant strains of both TB and malaria represent a 
serious threat to public health. 
 
The recent reappearance of polio along the Bangladesh-Burma border highlights the complexity, 
and the cross-border nature of infectious disease patterns. In March 2007, a young boy with polio 
from the Burmese side of the border was brought to Bangladesh for treatment at two different 
hospitals. As more cases appeared on the Burmese side, both countries launched vaccination 
campaigns in their respective border areas. Burma’s official media have cited “a neighboring 








Southeastern Bangladesh shares a relatively short land border—270 kilometers—with Burma. 
The Burmese state of Arakan, also known as either Rakhine or Rakhaing, occupies the southern 
part of the border, with Chin State along the border to the north. The Bengalis of the Chittagong 
area and the Rakhaing people in Arakan share an entangled history that dates back centuries and 
includes a lengthy period when both areas were integral parts of Britain’s empire.  
 
The governments of Bangladesh and Burma cooperate with each other in trade, economic 
development, border control, and other matters of mutual interest; along with India, the two 
countries had been negotiating an agreement on a gas pipeline that would cross from Arakan to 
the northeast Indian states and then through Bangladesh to Kolkata.1 However, Bangladeshi 
politics have proven to be extremely volatile in recent years, and successive Bangladeshi 
governments have differed on the pipeline project in terms of concessions demanded from the 
Indian government; no final deal was ever signed. Burma finally announced in March 2007 that 
it was awarding the pipeline project, and the flow of natural gas, to China.  
 
The relationship between Bangladesh and Burma has also been strained by the refugee problems 
of recent decades, with successive waves of Rohingyas—as most members of the Muslim 
population in Arakan are called—fleeing their homes to settle in the southeastern tip of 
Bangladesh, particularly around Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf.2 More than 20,000 official refugees, 
some of whom have been in Bangladesh for more than a decade, remain in two camps 
administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Human Rights Watch 
estimates that there are as many as 100,000 unregistered Rohingyas living in the area as well,3 
although estimates of the number from other observers have ranged as high as 200,000.4  
 
Bangladesh and Burma have not managed to solve the refugee problem, nor have they addressed 
the issues that caused the flow across the border, in particular the Burmese government’s 
extremely repressive policies toward the Rohingya population. That paralysis, along with the 
international community’s apparent indifference to the situation and its lack of success in 
brokering a satisfactory settlement, has exacerbated the threat to the public health of 
communities in the border regions. So have the fetid living conditions of many of the Rohingya 
refugees, as well as their overall lack of access to critical health care services.  
  
Although national surveillance has indicated that HIV rates could be slowly increasing in 
Bangladesh, they remain well below the levels in neighboring countries. However, high levels of 
unsafe sexual and drug-taking behaviors combined with a constant flow of back-and-forth traffic 
across the border suggest that a generalized epidemic could break out.5 One reason that has not 
                                                           
1 “Bangladesh again turns eye to three nations pipeline,” Narinjara News, March 5, 2007. 
2 For more historical background and a full discussion of the successive refugee crises of recent decades, see Human 
Rights Watch, Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh:  Still No Durable Solution, May 2000. 
3 Human Rights Watch press release, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/27/bangla15571_txt.htm, March 27, 2007.  
4 Remarks delivered by Chris Lewa at the “Regional Conference on the Protection for Refugees from Burma,” 
Chiang Mai, November 6–7, 2003; “The situation of Burmese refugees in Bangladesh,” Forum-Asia, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/CMP2003-11-07.htm.  
5 Information on current state of HIV infection in Bangladesh is from the government’s “National HIV Serological 
Surveillance, 2004–2005: Sixth Round Technical Report,” September 2005. 
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happened so far is most likely the fact that the Muslim Rohingyas from Burma and their 
Bangladeshi counterparts are circumcised, which studies have shown to inhibit HIV 
transmission.6 But circumcision does not provide absolute protection, and vigilance is warranted 
given high prevalence of other sexually transmitted infections in the border regions and other 
areas of the country.  
 
In terms of other major infectious diseases, the situation is grimmer. Bangladesh has one of the 
world’s most serious epidemics of tuberculosis (TB); the country ranks sixth on the World 
Health Organization’s 2006 list of high-burden countries, with an estimated 300,000 new cases 
and 70,000 deaths a year.7 TB is a problem throughout the country, but the crowded conditions in 
which both legal and illegal Rohingya refugees live and the difficulties they face in accessing 
appropriate medical treatment place them at significant risk and present an ideal environment for 
the spread of TB infection. The chaotic conditions of life, which make it challenging to ensure 
that people routinely take their medications and complete their full course of treatment, can 
facilitate the development of drug-resistant strains of the bacterium.  
 
Malaria is considered endemic in 13 of the country’s 64 districts, in particular those northeastern 
districts that border India as well as the southeast region adjacent to Burma, with widespread 
drug resistance reported.8 Many of these areas are remote and have very little or no health care 
infrastructure, so monitoring disease patterns and providing treatment present enormous 
obstacles. Plasmodium falciparum accounts for more than two-thirds of the total malaria burden. 
There were an estimated 1,250 deaths among the 435,000 probable or clinically diagnosed cases 
in 2003; in addition, 574 people died out of 57,000 with laboratory-confirmed cases. 
 
More recently, a resurgence of polio—with seven cases reported in Burma near the border as of 
late May 2007—has alarmed public health officials in both countries and caused tensions 
between them.9 Bangladesh had not experienced any polio cases since 2000, but the disease 
resurfaced in 2006 and the country launched a mass-vaccination campaign. In 2007, authorities 
discovered that a little boy with polio from Arakan’s Maungdaw district had been taken across 
the border for treatment in hospitals in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar before being sent back to 
Burma. Subsequently, additional cases of polio were identified in Arakan near the border, and 
both countries began emergency vaccination campaigns to prevent the disease from spreading, 
with official Burmese media blaming Bangladesh for the outbreak. 
 
The border is porous, exacerbating the potential for the spread of infectious diseases. The 
northern end of the border lies in the middle of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, specifically in the 
                                                           
6 Interview with Dr. Tasnim Azim, head of the HIV/AIDS Programme & Virology Laboratory, International Center 
for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B). Unless otherwise noted, all interviews were conducted in 
Bangladesh in July 2006. 
7 World Health Organization (WHO) report on tuberculosis in Bangladesh, 
http://www.whoban.org/communicable_dis_tb.html.  
8 WHO report on malaria in Bangladesh, http://www.whoban.org/communicable_dis_malaria.html.  
9 Information about the polio outbreak is from the following news articles: “Polio Strikes Seven Children in Burma,” 
Radio Free Europe, May 26, 2007; “Bangladesh:  Polio vaccination drive launched,” Reuters, May 21, 2007; 
“Health Minister receives WHO representatives,” New Light of Myanmar, May 9, 2007; “Bangladesh district 
bordering Myanmar steps up efforts to check polio,” International Herald Tribune, April 25, 2007; “Bangladesh 
beings new polio drive,” BBC News, March 2, 2007 
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malaria-endemic district known as Bandarban. The border runs due south and then hits the Naaf 
River, which separates the two countries until it opens into the Bay of Bengal. In addition to the 
official daily traffic, there is significant illegal movement between the two countries, much of it 
related to the smuggling of drugs and other commodities. Even when border guards officially 
monitor the flow, they can be bribed with cash, drugs, or sex, according to several key 
informants. The border has also been heavily landmined in the past 15 years, which the Burmese 
regime has defended as necessary to prevent incursions by armed ethnic opposition groups 
operating out of Bangladesh.10 However, the mines have reportedly sometimes been laid on the 
Bangladeshi side of the border, and hundreds of Bangladeshi nationals have been killed over the 
years while working or traveling through the heavily forested and hilly terrain.11 
Arakan State and Southeastern Bangladesh: A Long and Complex History 
 
The state of Arakan is a coastal strip of land wedged between the Bay of Bengal to the west and 
the Arakan Yoma mountains to the east. The Yoma range rises to more than 10,000 feet in places 
and has historically helped to isolate the region from the central Burmese government. The 
majority ethnic group from Arakan, known variously as the Arakan, Rakhine, or Rakhaing 
people,12 make up about two-thirds of Arakan’s estimated population of 2.7 million. They are 
ethnically close to the Burmans, and their language is a variant of Burmese, although this 
connection has not warmed relations between the two groups.  
         
Most of the remaining residents of Arakan are the Muslim Rohingyas, although there are also 
small numbers of people from other ethnic groups. The Burmese Rohingyas are related to the 
Bengalis of Bangladesh and in particular to the Chittagonians, the main population group in the 
country’s southeast region. Their language is extremely close to the Chittagonian variant of 
Bengali, with the two populations able to understand each other easily. The Rohingyas comprise 
a large majority in some swaths of northern Arakan adjacent to the Naaf River and Bangladesh’s 
southeastern border, in particular the regional townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.  
           
They have long sought—and been refused—official designation as one of the more than 100 
indigenous ethnic groups recognized by the Burmese state. Successive Burmese governments 
have fanned anti-Muslim feelings when it has suited their interests, but those tensions increased 
after the events of September 11, 2001. The military regime was reported to have increased 
surveillance and repression of areas with large Muslim populations, like Arakan. At the same 
time, there were rumors that foreign Muslim extremists and Rohingya separatists were entering 
the country from Bangladesh and that some Rohingyas had joined the Taliban forces.13  
For much of its history, Arakan has served as the crossroads between the Indian subcontinent and 
Southeast Asia, and it has experienced epochs of both independence and subjugation. Muslim 
                                                           
10 Human Rights Documentation Unit, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, “Burma Human 
Rights Yearbook, 2001–2002,” http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=1315, accessed April 1, 2007. 
11 “Burma Human Rights Yearbook 2001–2002,” WHO, supra note 7.  
12 Rakhaing is preferred by some who have settled in Bangladesh as part of the opposition to the government of 
Burma, although armed rebels still call themselves the Arakan Liberation Party; some international NGOs, such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières–Holland, have adopted Rakhine. This report will use Arakan for the state name and 
Rakhaing for the people. 
13 Maung Maung Oo, “Terror in America, Backlash in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, October–November 2001. 
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traders started arriving during the eighth century, and Muslim administrators and advisors often 
played key roles in the political life of Arakan kingdoms. Strong financial and diplomatic ties 
between Arakan and Bengal ensured that the border between them frequently experienced 
significant population flows, with the direction and strength of the migration determined by 
prevailing political, economic, and social factors.  
       
The rulers of Arakan repeatedly clashed with their neighbors to the east and south, the Burmans, 
who finally conquered the area in 1784. The invasion caused a flood of Muslim refugees to flee to 
the area of southeastern Bangladesh now known as Cox’s Bazar. Forty years later, the British 
absorbed Arakan into India, and then Burma after that. Although Muslims had lived in Arakan for 
centuries, the number grew during the British period, with regular waves of laborers imported from 
Bengal to toil in the forests and fields of Burma. When the British left, the Muslims remained. 
 
After Burma achieved its independence in 1948, the new government began to treat the Muslims, 
by this time widely referred to as the Rohingyas, as immigrants from Bengal rather than 
legitimate and long-time citizens of Burma. Their movements within Arakan were restricted to 
the Rohingya population centers and they were denied other citizenship rights, a situation that 
led to armed conflict in the early 1950s. After General Ne Win seized power in 1962, his 
government cracked down even more on Rohingya social and political groups. In the late 1970s, 
the regime sought to prepare for a national census and conducted an aggressive campaign to 
register the people it deemed citizens and designate others as foreigners. Hundreds of thousands 
of Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh, with many accusing the Burmese army of committing 
widespread abuses, including rape, torture, and murder, and evicting them from the country.14 
         
A majority of the refugees were eventually repatriated. However, following the crackdown on 
the 1988 student democracy movement and the rejection of the 1990 national election results, the 
regime directed greater military pressure against areas not fully under its control, including 
Arakan. The army confiscated the land and food supply of many Rohingyas, forced them to 
relocate to areas under military control, and pressed them into labor. Some were tortured and 
executed. More than a quarter of a million fled to nearby Bangladesh during 1991 and 1992, with 
smaller waves of refugees streaming across the border when conditions worsened at other points 
in the 1990s.  
        
Most of these new Rohingya refugees were repatriated between 1993 and 1997 under an agreement 
implemented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But efforts to 
complete the task were hampered by Burma’s continued reluctance to grant full citizenship rights 
to Rohingyas as well as the unwillingness of many of the remaining refugees to return to Burma 
under the existing regime, especially with reports of increased repression against Rohingyas, 
sparked by heightened concerns about Muslim groups after 9/11. Bangladesh remains home to 
about 22,000 registered refugees living in two UNHCR camps called Nayapara and Kutupalong, 
both located on the strip of land between Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf, and some have complained 
about attempts by Bangladeshi authorities to force them to return to Burma unwillingly.15 
         
                                                           
14 For more details on the causes and consequences of the successive refugee crises, see Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 2; and Amnesty International, The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, May 2004. 
15 Amnesty International, supra note 14.  
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However, it is also estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Rohingyas are living in the area 
illegally. About 6,000 were living until recently in an unofficial encampment squeezed into the 
narrow band between the Naaf River and the road that runs between Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf,16 
where they had settled several years ago after being evicted from rented homes because of their 
undocumented status. However, according to Human Rights Watch, in March 2007 the 
Bangladeshi authorities destroyed a large part of the makeshift encampment in order to enlarge 
the nearby highway without making any provisions for housing elsewhere.17 
 
In fact, many of the Rohingyas currently in Bangladesh are believed to be among those who 
were repatriated to Burma during the 1990s but returned to Bangladesh for extended periods to 
find work in construction or agriculture, engage in smuggling or prostitution, escape persecution, 
spend time with family members and friends, or seek medical care. Since it can be impossible to 
distinguish Rohingyas from Chittagonians visually, and even sometimes by accent, the exact 
figure remains unknown. Yet conditions both for the official and unofficial refugees have 
remained extremely poor, with regular reports of abuses inflicted by Bangladeshi security 
personnel, including sexual violence against women.18 International humanitarian personnel 
noted in interviews that authorities have thwarted the building of permanent structures in order to 
discourage migrants from staying indefinitely in Bangladesh. MSF officials said they obtained 
permission to build latrines for the makeshift camp, despite major problems with sewage being 
swept across the area by the tides from the Naaf River, only after making repeated appeals to the 
government.19 “The Rohingya have been caught between a hammer and anvil for over a decade 
in desperate circumstances, with Bangladesh making it difficult for them to seek refuge and 
Burma continuing to abuse the rights of the Muslim minority in Arakan State,” said Brad Adams, 
Human Rights Watch’s Asia director.20 
          
There are considerably fewer Rakhaings than Rohingyas in Bangladesh, with some estimating 
that the total number is about 25,000, although fewer than 200 of them are officially recognized 
as refugees by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.21 The Rakhaing Women’s 
Union (RWU) and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), both of which advocate for Arakan 
independence from Burma, have for several years run clinics along the border to provide primary 
medical care to Rakhaings and others living in the hill tracts that characterize the northern part of 
the Bangladesh-Burma border region. The ALP site, called the Chakma clinic, is actually located 
not in Bangladesh but right across the country’s northeastern border with Mizoram, India, in a 
corner where the three nations meet. The RWU clinic, which focuses on maternal and child 
health, is further south in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, near the village of Moduk. 
        
Many Rakhaing, especially those affiliated with the groups seeking to establish an independent 
state, agree with the Burmese regime that the Rohingyas are not one of the country’s legitimate 
indigenous groups and have no right to press claims on Arakan. These Rakhaing routinely and 
disdainfully refer to the Rohingyas as “the so-called Rohingyas,”22 and they insist, like the 
                                                           
16 Interview with Frido Herinckx, Bangladesh head of mission, MSF–Holland. 
17 Human Rights Watch, supra note 3. 
18 Id.  
19 Interviews with personnel from international NGOs in Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf. 
20 Human Rights Watch, supra note 3. 
21 Interview with Mra Raza Linn, chairwoman and founder of Rakhaing Women’s Union. 
22 Interviews with Mra Raza Linn and the head of the health department of the Arakan Liberation Party. 
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Burmese government, that the Muslims are actually illegal Bengali immigrants who want to 
pursue their own economic and political interests in Arakan at the expense of the majority 
population. Mra Raza Linn of the RWU attributed Rohingya demands for recognition of their 
status within Burma to instigation by “Muslim extremists” seeking to stir up the feelings of their 
co-religionists. 
          
Rakhaing and Rohingya political and revolutionary organizations have frequently operated out of 
Bangladesh and continue to do so. They have been plagued by internal debates and splits over 
tactics and goals but have also formed strategic alliances. Among the Rohingyas, the 
organizations have included the Arakan Rohingya National Organization, the Arakan Rohingya 
Islamic Front, and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization. In addition to the Arakan Liberation 
Party, the National Unity Party of Arakan has engaged in occasional armed fights with the 
Burmese military, while the Arakan League for Democracy is an ally of Burma’s National 
League for Democracy. The Arakan branch of the Communist Party of Burma has signed a 
cease-fire agreement with the regime.23 
         
The expatriate communities both have media that try to report on what is happening to their 
compatriots on the Burmese side. Kaladan Press is an online news agency that chronicles the 
situation of the Rohingyas, and Narinjara News does the same for the Rakhaings. Both editors 
are based in Bangladesh and appear to be in regular contact with anonymous correspondents 
inside Burma.24 
The Border Region 
  
Concern about cross-border disease transmission focuses on the southeastern strip of Bangladesh, 
and especially the area stretching from Cox’s Bazar south to Teknaf. Cox’s Bazar is a popular 
tourist resort, with beach-lovers and others converging there from all parts of  Bangladesh and even 
neighboring countries; it is also starting to attract some attention from Western travelers in search 
of little-known destinations, as noted—and promoted—in a recent article in The New York Times.25 
The district’s seasonal and permanent populations include tens if not hundreds of thousands of 
illegal refugees living in fetid conditions.26 
        
The tourist traffic attracts a large number of sex workers to the area, from both the Bangladeshi 
and refugee populations. There are also many injecting drug users, especially since some of the 
drug trafficking routes out of Burma pass through the area. And Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf are 
thriving centers for smuggling food, clothes, medicine, arms, and other goods back and forth 
across the border. Truckers and others involved in the transport of goods regularly converge on 
the area, with many believed to engage in unsafe sexual and drug-taking behaviors. 
         
Locations along the Naaf River serve as the primary border-crossing points for the region, 
whether people are seeking to cross over legally or illegally. The Burmese and Bangladesh 
                                                           
23 Amnesty International, supra note 14.  
24 Personal interviews with the editors of Kaladan Press and Narinjara News in July, 2006. 
25 Jeff Koyan, “Lured By the Beach Side of a Beleaguered Land,” New York Times, December 24, 2006. 
26 Information about the characteristics of the border region was drawn largely from interviews with key informants, 
including international and local NGO officials, peer educators, and local journalists. 
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authorities allow movement across the river, but obtaining official permission can be 
cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive. There are frequent reports of harassment by both 
Burmese and Bangladeshi border guards and of demands for bribes and sexual services in 
exchange for safe passage. Key informants uniformly agree that there is also significant 
unofficial cross-border movement in both directions, for a great variety of reasons. Smuggling 
drugs and other contraband is a prime occupation, but some simply want to visit family members 
on the other side of the border while others come from Burma to Bangladesh specifically seeking 
health care. 
         
Border security forces—the Bangladesh Rifles and the Nasaka, their Burmese counterparts—
occasionally hold meetings in Cox’s Bazar for prisoner returns and discussion of bilateral border 
issues. Most recently, on March 29, 2007, Kaladan Press reported that 15 Bangladeshis who had 
been jailed in Arakan after being caught collecting firewood or fishing on the wrong side of the 
border were returned by Nasaka at a meeting in Maungdaw with the Bangladesh Rifles.27 A year 
earlier, at a meeting in Maungdaw, expatriate news outlets reported that Bangladesh handed over 
75 Burmese who had been arrested while trying to cross the border from Arakan illegally.28    
          
This complex of factors renders the border region an area of potential high risk for the 
transmission of infectious diseases, especially sexually transmitted infections, including HIV. A 
recent study conducted by the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh 
(ICDDR,B), a leading infectious diseases research center in Dhaka, highlights the potential for 
the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV in the southeast corner of 
Bangladesh.29 The study, a cross-sectional survey of a convenience sample of 433 boatmen from 
the Teknaf area, revealed high levels of unsafe sexual behavior combined with significant cross-
border movement. The study identified three groups of boatmen: those who transport people 
holding legal travel documents; those engaged in unofficial crossings, often to transport 
smugglers, migrant workers and others; and deep-sea fishermen.  
         
More than a third of all the boatmen reported spending time in Burma in the course of work, and 
17 percent of those who did also reported intimate contact with sex workers while there. 
Depending upon the group, between 10 and 21 percent of the men reported having had male-to-
male sex in the previous year, and 13 to 20 percent reported group sex, with the groups ranging 
in size from two to 14 people. Condom use, however, was extremely low. The boatmen also 
evidenced little understanding of how HIV is transmitted and were not aware of their own risk 
for infection. Many reported symptoms consistent with infection by a number of sexually 
transmitted pathogens, although no confirmatory diagnostic testing was performed. Although the 
presence or rate of HIV infection was not determined during this study, it is evident that unsafe 
sexual behaviors are prevalent, and there is little knowledge of how HIV spreads and how to 
protect oneself from infection.  
        
Commercial sex work on the Bangladesh side is also a significant potential disseminator of HIV. 
Visitors flock to the area from all over the country for rest and relaxation. Many prostitutes are 
known to have links with, and serve the clientele of, specific hotels. Others operate 
                                                           
27 “Fifteen Bangladeshis released after flag meeting,” Kaladan Press, March 29, 2007. 
28 “Bangladesh hands 75 Burmese to security forces,” Mizzima Journal, March 2006. 
29 Interview with Dr. Rukhsana Gaza, associate scientist at ICDDR,B and the primary researcher on the study. 
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independently of the hotels. According to peer group educators with the local NGO, Health and 
Education for the Less-Privileged People (HELP), who have in the past worked as prostitutes 
themselves, on a good night, a woman will have sex with up to 20 men. They said it was not 
unheard of for a woman to have 100 clients in a single 24-hour period, and condoms are not 
consistently used.30  
        
The situation in the border region is complicated by the presence of the tens or hundreds of 
thousands of undocumented Rohingya migrants from Burma, many of whom have settled near 
Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf with family members and friends who preceded them. Some live with 
people they know in the two UNHCR refugee camps located in the region, although they 
themselves are unregistered. While refugee camp residents have access to at least a minimal 
level of medical care, which is provided onsite by the Government of Bangladesh, the illegal 
migrants do not. The crowded living conditions—both in the camps and outside—create ideal 
conditions for the spread of tuberculosis and other respiratory infections. While official refugees 
are technically not supposed to leave the camps, many find themselves forced to do so in order to 
seek food and firewood or earn money through commerce or sex work in order to supplement 
their rations, according to interviews with humanitarian officials. Regular movement into and out 
of the camps exposes both camp residents and those who live in the larger community to 
increased risk of infectious diseases and the spread of drug-resistant strains. 
         
The 2005 annual report from UNHCR about the two camps provides some insight into 
conditions there. When the government of Bangladesh officially began administering the health 
program at the camps in August 2003, it reported that, “the quality of health services 
deteriorated” and noted that UNHCR had to cope with “an acute shortage of medicines” and 
other shortfalls in basic health care.”31 Moreover, the Bangladeshi government reported that, 
“The health clinic’s infrastructure is in poor condition with lack of water supply and non-
functioning latrine. Since government controls all construction work, attempts by UNHCR to get 
these repaired were not allowed.”32 The most common diseases reported were respiratory 
problems, with 77 cases per 1,000 people per month, skin infections (53 cases per 1,000 per 
month), and diarrhea (28 cases per 1,000 per month). 
 
On the Burma side of the border, the conditions that have long fueled the exodus of Rohingyas 
have not changed, according to international observers, expatriate press reports, and refugees 
themselves. While independent verification of such conditions is difficult because access to the 
region is severely restricted by the regime, consistent reporting of confiscated land, forced labor, 
restrictions on movement and other basic freedoms, severe discrimination based on religion and 
ethnicity, and limited or no access to health care is compelling. A 2003 report from Forum-Asia 
stated: “Their lack of mobility has devastating consequences, limiting their access to markets, 
employment opportunities, health facilities and higher education. … Forced labourers continue 
to be recruited for army camp construction and maintenance, sentry duty, portering, and 
especially for such tasks as shrimp farm maintenance, plantation work, brick baking, bamboo 
collection and woodcutting for commercial ventures belonging to the military.”33  
                                                           
30 Interviews with peer educators from HELP. 
31 UNHCR, “Bangladesh Health and Nutrition Annual Report 2005.”  
32 Id. 
33 Forum-Asia, supra note 4. 
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There are also frequent reports of displacement of Rohingyas and confiscation of their land to make 
way for the creation of “model villages” built for settlers moved in by the regime from other parts of 
Burma. Most recently, the government was said to have forced 300 carpenters from Buthidaung and 
Maungdaw to build 120 houses for Taungbro, a new village in the area.34  In early April 2007, 500 
new settlers were reported to have arrived via boat in Akyab, the capital of Arakan, en route to 
Taungbro, which is near the Bangladesh border.35 These forced-settlement policies continue to cause 
severe tension and occasional violence between the recent arrivals from central Burma and local 
Rohingyas; such a clash recently occurred in a model village near Maungdaw, Shwe Yin Aye, with 
50 people suffering injuries, including 32 who required hospitalization.36 
HIV/AIDS 
 
Although HIV infection rates among nearby countries, including India, Thailand, and Burma, are 
high enough to cause significant concern, Bangladesh, to date, has not experienced a generalized 
HIV epidemic. Given the situation in neighboring countries, the infection rate is surprisingly 
low. According to UNAIDS, the rate among adults of reproductive age is less than 0.1 %, which 
would mean less than 140,000 HIV-infected people in a population of 140 million, although only 
a tiny fraction of those have been identified to date. Dr. Tasmin Azim, an HIV expert at the 
ICDDR,B, speculated that the Muslim practice of male circumcision was likely to be a 
contributing factor in keeping rates as low as they are. “Why HIV is so slow to spread, we really 
do not know,” said Dr. Azim. “Circumcision is an issue, because circumcision protects. So it can 
slow down the epidemic considerably, but it’s not absolute.”37 
 
The most recent national HIV surveillance data was collected from August 2004 to April 2005.38 
The participants were not randomly selected but were drawn from individuals attending clinics as 
well as from outreach and intervention programs. Among other demographic groups surveyed were 
truckers, dockworkers, rickshaw pullers, and others considered members of “bridge” populations—
those who may serve as epidemiologic links between high-risk cohorts, such as sex workers, and the 
larger population. Male sex workers and men who have sex with men were also included. 
   
Rates among most groups, even high-risk groups, remain well under 1 percent. However, injecting 
drug users (IDUs) in central Bangladesh, which includes Dhaka, the capital, were found to have an 
HIV-infection rate of 4.9 percent, with 52 of 1,061 testing positive. This was in contrast to rates of 
1.4 percent in 2000 and 4 percent in 2002. Moreover, while no HIV at all was detected in IDUs 
outside Dhaka in previous surveillance rounds, this round identified two additional cases among 
IDUs—one in the southeast, near the Burma border, and one in the northwest.  
         
No cases of HIV were found among female sex workers in the southeast corner bordering 
Burma, although nine cases in total were found among the 4,000 tested in all sections of the 
                                                           
34 “300 Carpenters Forced to Construct New Model Village,” Narinjara News, March 26, 2007. 
35 “Over 500 New Settlers Arrive in Akyab Bound for Model Village from Burma Proper,” Narinjara News, April 3, 
2007. 
36 “Security Beefed Up on Western Border After Murder and Clash,” Narinjara News, March 31, 2007. 
37 Interview with Dr. Azim. 
38 “National HIV Serological Surveillance, 2004–2005: Sixth Round Technical Report,” supra note 5.  
Bangladesh-Burma Border Region 
129 
country. The highest female sex-worker infection rate was found in the northwest frontier area 
bordering India, where two out of 120 casual female sex workers screened were found to be 
HIV-positive. 
         
The low rates of HIV infection in these groups should not be taken as cause for celebration. High 
rates of other major sexually transmitted infections, which were included in the surveillance 
studies, not only indicate that significant levels of unprotected intercourse or other unsafe 
behaviors take place among these populations but constitute a worrisome trend in themselves. In 
the southeast border areas, syphilis rates were 9 percent among IDUs and 10 percent among 
female sex workers, among the highest in the country. Not only can untreated sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) lead to long-term medical problems, they also facilitate the spread 
of HIV.  
             
Little is publicly known or disclosed about HIV/AIDS rates across the border in Arakan. If the 
prevalence in Arakan reflects HIV rates in southeastern Bangladesh, then it is relatively low, 
which would not be surprising for the primarily Muslim Rohingya-majority areas that lie directly 
across the southern parts of the border.  
          
Some information is provided by expatriate media, such as Kaladan Press and Narinjara News, 
which publish occasional accounts of people diagnosed with HIV/AIDS who suffer serious 
human rights abuses, as well as other news related to HIV. Although government hospitals exist 
in the large townships in Arakan, editors of these two news services reported that little or no 
treatment is available at these facilities and that the infected are sometimes forcibly removed 
from their families. They also reported that people who find out they are HIV-positive are 
terrified to reveal it to anyone, even to family members.39  
 
Dr. A. Q. M. Serajul Islam, a professor in the department of dermatology and sexually 
transmitted infections at Chittagong Medical College, who treats dozens of HIV-positive patients 
privately, offered a similar account. Of the 67 patients enrolled in his clinic as of July 2006, two 
were Rohingyas from Arakan, he reported. “They come here because where they are there is no 
care, just traditional healers,” said Dr. Islam. “And there they don’t disclose their HIV status, 
because the moment the government knows, they will be taken away to some center for 
treatment, away from their families.”40
                                                           
39 Interviews with Tin Soe, assistant editor of Kaladan Press in Chittagong, and Khaing Mrat Kyaw, editor of 
Narinjara News in Dhaka. 
40 Interview with Dr. Islam in Chittagong. 




Malaria is endemic in some parts of Bangladesh, with 13 out of 64 districts considered to be 
high-risk zones; about 15 million people live in these districts.41 The endemic areas are 
concentrated along the borders with India and Burma. The region known as the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts, parts of which lie on the frontier with Arakan, account for about two-thirds of the 
country’s laboratory-confirmed malaria cases. The prevalence of malaria drops in areas further 
south toward Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf, where many of the Rohingyas have settled, although the 
disease is still considered endemic in that coastal strip. 
         
There were 435,000 probable or clinically diagnosed malaria cases in Bangladesh in 2003, with 
an estimated 1,250 deaths; there were also 57,000 laboratory-confirmed cases and, among those, 
574 deaths.42 Plasmodium falciparum is the most common malarial  species, accounting for up to 
71 percent of the total cases. Increased levels of drug resistance to the traditional first-line drugs, 
chloroquine and sulphadoxine-pyramethamine, have been reported from the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts region bordering Burma, although data on patterns and prevalence of such resistance 
remain limited. In 2004, the government adopted artemisinin combination therapy (ACT), 
specifically artemether-lumefantrine, as the approved first-line treatment for laboratory-
confirmed cases.43 Recognizing that the new treatment regimens are expensive and may not 
always be available in sufficient quantities, researchers are testing alternatives.44  
         
The difficult terrain in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region complicates the situation, impeding the 
provision of services and medicines to those who need it most. Many villages are poorly served 
by the transportation system and can be reached only after many hours or even days of trekking. 
WHO also reported that a shortage of trained staff and weak surveillance and supervision 
systems have generated problems in Bangladesh’s malaria control program, much of which 
targets the regions near the Burma border.45 Moreover, according to ICDDR,B, “due to the lack 
of financial resources and the resulting shortcomings in malaria research, surveillance, and 
control, the disease burden may be far greater than reported.”46 
         
Cases of malaria have also been reported by UNHCR in the two refugee camps, although 
certainly the disease is not as widespread as farther north. In fact, the agency reported that in 
2005 there were far more cases in Kutupalong than Nayapara camp—30.7 cases per 1,000 of P. 
falciparum compared to 7.4 cases per 1,000—specifically because residents of Kutupalong were 
more likely to leave the camp to travel to the highly endemic district of Bandarban and because 
the water supply system in the camp provided a breeding ground for mosquitoes.47 
         
                                                           
41 WHO, supra note 8.  
42 WHO, World Malaria Report 2005. Bangladesh country profile accessed at 
http://rbm.who.int/wmr2005/profiles/bangladesh.pdf. 
43 ICDDR,B, “New strategies for treating falciparum malaria in Bangladesh,” Health and Science Bulletin 4:3, 
September 2006. 
44 Interview with Dr. Rashidul Haque, head of parasitology laboratory, ICDDR,B. 
45 WHO, supra note 8.  
46 ICDDR,B, supra note 43.  
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Across the border in Arakan, the most authoritative information on the malaria situation comes 
from MSF–Holland, which has been active in Burma since 1992. MSF has conducted a number of 
studies in Arakan that have documented high rates of resistance to first-line drugs and has been 
treating malaria there with ACT since 1996. Since launching its malaria project in Arakan State in 
1994, MSF has treated about 850,000 people for the disease.48 In 2004, the organization tested 
265,000 residents of Arakan for malaria, and 115,000 received treatment; the same year, the 
national government recorded a total of 152,000 cases of laboratory-confirmed malaria for the 
entire country. Over a number of years, 82 percent of the malaria cases in Arakan were caused by 
P. falciparum, although the percentage appeared to be declining somewhat more recently. 
          
The number of patients increased 20 times during the first decade of the MSF project, and the 
positivity levels of screening tests, which averaged 54 percent, have not declined significantly over 
the years. MSF expected that the numbers of patients and the rate of positive diagnoses would start 
to decline as evidence that the program was having an impact on the epidemic. But despite 
eventually opening 30 clinics, overall coverage was relatively low because of the large geographic 
distances, rugged terrain, poor transportation networks, and the undoubtedly high burden of 
disease. “The increase in patients can only be explained by the enormity of the problem and the 
popularity of the project,” wrote Dr. Frank Smithuis, MSF’s country director in Burma.  
Tuberculosis 
         
According to WHO, Bangladesh ranks sixth in the world of countries with the highest burden of 
disease from tuberculosis.49 There are an estimated 300,000 new cases a year, an incidence of 
220 per 100,000 people. About 70,000 people die from TB annually—in other words, one person 
every 7.5 minutes—despite the existence of effective treatment that is provided free of charge. 
Extreme population density, widespread poverty, and crowded living conditions, as well as poor 
nutrition, sanitation, and other factors affecting general health status allow the bacterium to 
spread with relative efficiency in many parts of the country. 
         
Countries with a high TB prevalence also frequently experience major HIV problems, generating 
an epidemic of co-infection that exacts a tremendous toll on both individuals and society. With 
its current low rates of HIV, Bangladesh has so far been lucky enough to escape this situation. 
Recommended by WHO, Bangladesh adopted directly observed treatment, short-course, or 
DOTS, to combat TB in 1993.50 The strategy includes diagnosis by direct microscopic 
examination of sputum smears, directly observed treatment, a commitment to providing an 
uninterrupted supply of necessary drugs, and standard recording and monitoring protocols for 
detection and treatment results. The case-detection rate of new smear-positive cases has risen 
under the strategy from less than 35 percent in 2001 to 61 percent in 2005, with a treatment 
success rate last year of 89 percent. The official WHO target for DOTS programs is to achieve a 
70 percent detection rate and a treatment success rate of at least 85 percent. A recent study 
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analyzed 657 TB isolates from both rural and urban settings and found that 48.4 percent were 
resistant to at least one drug, with 5.5 percent resistant to more than one—a high and worrisome 
rate of multi-drug resistance.51 
          
Partially due to the challenges of diagnosing tuberculosis onsite, obtaining accurate rates of 
disease among refugees from Burma is difficult. The UNHCR annual report for 2005 noted that 
40 new TB patients were registered that year at the camps but the agency considered the 
incidence—one case per 1,000 per month—to be a serious undercount; case-detection capability 
“is much below the acceptable standard” due to a lack of staff sufficiently trained in TB 
detection and a shortage of technological resources.52 The UNHCR report also noted that the 
poor health and nutritional status of the refugees and the high incidence of respiratory infections 
suggest that the true TB rate in the camps is significantly higher. All humanitarian officials 
interviewed expressed concern about tuberculosis as a major and continuing health concern that 
is exacerbated by the Rohingya’s living conditions, both inside and outside the official refugee 
camps.53 Even less information is available about tuberculosis in Arakan State, although 
anecdotal reports occasionally appear in the expatriate press. 
Polio 
 
Until last year, neither Bangladesh nor Burma had reported any cases of polio since 2000.54 In 
2006, however, Burma reported a case of a child near Mandalay, although that later turned out to 
be based on a reaction to a polio vaccine. In Bangladesh, a 9-year-old girl from the Chittagong 
division was diagnosed with polio, and a Mumbai laboratory identified the viral strain as closely 
related to a strain from the Indian State of Utter Pradesh. The country launched a nationwide 
multi-stage vaccination campaign but still experienced 17 reported cases of polio. 
 
In March 2007, a little boy with polio from Arakan’s Maungdaw district was taken across the 
border for screening and treatment at hospitals in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar before being taken 
back to Burma. When Bangladeshi health authorities learned of the episode, they ordered an 
emergency vaccination campaign for 2 million children in the southeastern region in addition to 
the national effort launched in 2006. By late May 2007, seven cases of polio were reported to 
have been identified in Arakan near the border with Bangladesh, and Burma began its own 
emergency regional immunization campaign. 
 
Polio’s reappearance, however, has apparently led to tensions between the two countries. On 
May 9, 2007, the New Light of Myanmar, a government newspaper, published an article about a 
meeting between Burma’s health minister, Dr. Kyaw Myint and international NGO officials to 
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discuss the polio situation. The article stated that the disease, “was spread from certain 
neighboring countries which still have the virus,” a clear reference to Bangladesh. The incident 
highlights how lack of cross-border cooperation and communication can contribute to increased 
transmission of infectious agents, greater morbidity and mortality on both sides of the border, 
and to serious disruptions of bilateral relations. 
Conclusion 
 
Although the flow of refugees, both legal and illegal, has been a regular fact of life in 
southeastern Bangladesh for years, the current situation represents both a health and human 
rights disaster for the disenfranchised. No effort to lessen the burden of infectious disease in the 
region is likely to succeed without a determined commitment on the part of all concerned to 
resolve the refugee issue. 
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9. Indo-Burma Border Region 
  
 
What is the border? Just a line on a map. We share the same cultures, are 
affected by the same common illnesses, fight the same insurgencies, and 
find ourselves equally far from the seats of power and thus often forgotten. 
In India, we have government and international agencies, NGOs, and civil 
society organizations. Who is our counterpart in Myanmar?1 
 
 Dr. Biangtung Langkham, Director of Emmanuel Hospitals, 
 Project Orchid, Northeast India 
 
 
Although geographically isolated and afflicted with political instability for decades, the Indo-
Burma border region is rapidly growing in regional political and economic importance. India has 
looked to Burma to meet its growing need for natural resources and to suppress insurgencies, and 
because of this relationship has increasingly ignored human rights abuses along its borders.  
 
The Indo-Burma border region is a site of ethnic conflict and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights. This situation has exacerbated the spread of 
infectious disease and obstructed efforts to control it. The Burmese regime has increasingly 
militarized Sagaing Division and Chin State, contributing to displacement, forced labor for 
infrastructure projects such as roads and dams, and interference in local health-related activities. 
Although less militarized, northeast India’s ethnic tensions have led to discrimination, 
deportation of migrants, and decreased access to health services.  
 
Drug trafficking from Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle has been a driving force for an HIV 
epidemic in a region ill-equipped to handle the health burden and necessary prevention measures 
for injecting drug users (IDUs) and other high-risk groups. Home to two of the six most 
prevalent states for HIV infection in all of India, Nagaland and Manipur—with antenatal 
prevalence rates at 1.43 percent and 1.5 percent respectively in 2004—share a highly permeable 
border with Burma and a burgeoning HIV dilemma that has spread from IDUs to their partners 
and the general population.  
 
Finally, there are few health prevention and treatment services in the border region. On the 
Indian side, despite admirable efforts by Indian government and nongovernmental organizations, 
access to primary health care and disease prevention services remains limited outside of the state 
capitals. On the Burma side, government and international nongovernmental health services are 
virtually non-existent. Rough terrain, poor communication networks, and travel restrictions 
imposed on the international aid community make health-care delivery deficient in border areas 
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where the need is generally most acute. Local community-based health organizations operating 
in western Burma have had limited success in accessing these populations. 
 
Many individuals infected with TB, HIV, or malaria thus receive ineffective or no treatment 
because of their illegal status, rural residence, and limited access to medications; the true burden 
of disease is much higher than officially reported. The dearth of health information is one of the 
major problems plaguing the northeast Indo-Burma border. A collaborative approach involving 
UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local NGOs is needed to 
improve disease surveillance, service delivery, and prevention programs throughout northeast 
India and western Burma.  
Indo-Burma Relationship 
 
In the last decade, India, the world’s largest democracy, has become increasingly friendly with 
the Burmese military regime. Strategic partnerships in natural gas, railways, road construction, 
counter-insurgency efforts, and arms delivery have bolstered this relationship, which has 
experienced multiple swings since both countries obtained their independence after World War 
II. Throughout the 1950s, India and Burma maintained cooperative ties.  
 
Relations between the two countries were largely severed after the signing of a Sino-Burmese 
treaty of friendship and non-aggression with China in 1960 and after the military coup led by 
General Ne Win two years later.2 Indeed, China’s relationship with Burma has long posed a 
particular concern for India. The strategic land route between China and the often-contested 
regions of northeast India passes through Burma. Burmese silence during a Chinese-Indian 
conflict in northeast India in 1962 confirmed India’s suspicions that Burma was pro-China. 
Relationships were further strained when Ne Win’s nationalist policies of the early 1960s left 
more than 12,000 Indians living in Burma impoverished and unable even to pay their way back 
to India.3 
 
Ties between General Ne Win and India’s late prime minister, Indira Gandhi, helped to improve 
relations again in the late 1960s, especially as Burma’s relations with China experienced signs of 
strain. In March 1967, the two countries officially demarcated the 1,643 km border between 
northeast India and western Burma.4 In the years since, the two countries have often helped each 
other in their respective counter-insurgency efforts against the Naga, Mizo, and Manipuri 
populations, who live on both sides of the newly defined border. Both governments continue to 
experience difficulties in effectively policing this border, which many local residents consider a 
fluid boundary to be crossed at will. From 1977 to 1988, Burma’s renewed association with 
China posed new challenges for Indo-Burma relations, as did India’s provision of asylum to 
Burma’s ousted Prime Minister U Nu from 1974–1980.5  
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After the crackdown on the democracy movement in 1988, India criticized Burma’s suppression 
of political opposition and its poor human rights record and even provided refugee status to 
Burmese citizens fleeing the regime’s repression.6 Following the 1988 events, the Indian 
government committed support to the democratic movement and practiced “complete 
disengagement” with the Burmese regime.7 Refugee camps were opened in Mizoram and 
Manipur. Then External Affairs Commissioner (later Prime Minister) Narashima Rao issued 
strict instructions to welcome any legitimate refugee entering northeast India from Burma.8 India 
sponsored the 1992 United Nations resolution condemning the junta for violations of human 
rights.  
 
Since the early 1990s, India’s relationship with Burma has shifted from an apparent support of the 
democratic aspirations of its people to a more pragmatic approach. This change presents a concern 
to the pro-democracy forces as well as to the estimated 100,000 Burmese nationals living in India. 
This shift in strategy resulted from persistent insurgencies in northeast India, concern over China’s 
influence in Burma, desire for greater access to its neighbor’s vast natural resources, and the Indian 
government’s pursuit of a global economy with its “Look-East Policy” requiring Burma’s 
cooperation in the areas of natural resources, trade, and energy. The Indian government first began 
to seek favor with Burma in the early 1990s by complying with junta demands to cancel broadcasts 
of a Burmese language radio station that criticized the military regime.9  
 
The change in approach was not monolithic. In the early years of renewed contacts, India 
continued to demand the release of political prisoners in Burma and offer asylum to democratic 
activists. The government lauded the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 
1991 and even awarded her the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International 
Understanding four years later. In 1992, President Venkataraman appealed for a restoration of 
democracy in Burma and expressed concern over the delay in forming a popular government.10 
 
India’s calls for democracy weakened over the years as the country, aware of China’s growing 
role in Burma, began to pursue closer economic, political, and military ties. Incidents of 
antidemocratic activity in India in support of its renewed links with Burma have included the 
arrest of a Burmese language journalist in Manipur in 1999 (later released), the banning of pro-
democracy meetings, and the refusal to grant Indian visas to pro-democracy Burmese citizens.11 
General Than Shwe paid a diplomatic visit to India in 2004. India has increased arms sales to 
Burma and, under much international scrutiny, Indian President Abdul Kalam visited Burma last 
year to discuss joint economic ventures and development.12 It was the first visit by an Indian 
head of state since 1987. 
 
In March 2007, the China-India competition for Burma’s favor took a significant turn when the 
junta formally announced plans to award the long-contested Shwe (golden) gas field pipeline to 
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China. India had hoped that the natural gas from two fields off the coast of Arakan State, first 
discovered in 2003, could have been a crucial supply source for its rapidly expanding energy 
needs. One field alone holds an estimated 4.8 trillion cubic tons of natural gas.13 The rights to 
develop the gas fields are split between Korean corporations, which own a 70 percent stake in 
the venture, and two Indian companies, Gas Authority of India Limited and Oil and Natural Gas 
Videsh Limited,14 which own the remaining 30 percent. 
 
The decision to award the natural gas pipeline to China likely reflects China’s ability to shield 
the junta from international censure through its permanent seat on the UN Security council.15 The 
Indian pipeline route was originally scheduled to travel 897 kilometers through Bangladesh to 
Kolkata, but difficulties in negotiating an agreement with Bangladesh prompted an expensive 
($1.3 billion) 1,400-kilometer proposed re-routing from Sittwe, a port in Arakan State, up 
through Arakan and into Chin State, and finally through Mizoram, Assam, and Bihar and into 
Kolkata.16 Instead, the 900-kilometer China pipeline will require substantially more Burmese 
infrastructure to reach the China border.  
 
Despite this setback, India’s pursuit of other economic interests in Burma continue unabated. 
Burma is a member of both BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand 
Economic Cooperation) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), making the 
country a crucial regional and bi-lateral trade partner for India.17 Through these partnerships, 
Burma is a major player in such regional projects such as the Trans-Asian Highway, new railway 
systems, and the development of the Sittwe port. Burma is the gateway to the Bay of Bengal in 
the west and Andaman Sea in the south. These points are of particular value to India as its 
northeast states have no open sea access. Since 1998, India has provided over $100 million to the 
junta for development projects such as the Rangoon-Mandalay railway line and an additional $27 
million for a 160-kilometer Tamu-Kaletwa highway in Burma’s Sagaing Division.18 The Indian 
government also doubled development aid to Burma for the 2007–08 fiscal year,19 and President 
Kalam, during his 2006 visit to Rangoon, declared that he hoped bilateral trade would reach $2 
billion within three years.20 India is the second largest market for Burma, following Thailand, 
and absorbs 25 percent of the country’s exports.21 
 
India and Burma are also cooperating on counter-insurgency efforts in northeast India. India 
faces long-standing ethnic revolts in the states of Nagaland and Manipur and some parts of 
Mizoram from, respectively, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the United 
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), and the Mizo National Front. Burma faces similar problems 
from the Naga Khaplang group, which operates from the Indian side of the Naga border, and the 
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Chin National Front (CNF), which is based in Chin State but has many active supporters living 
illegally in Mizoram.  
 
In recent years, the two countries have agreed to strengthen intelligence exchange mechanisms 
along their border to quell cross-border movement and violence. In January 2006, the Burmese 
military and the Indian Army undertook a coordinated operation to root out NSCN rebels on the 
Nagaland border.22 The Burmese military holds border post meetings at the Moreh border in 
Manipur, and India agreed in early 2006 to create four additional border posts for army meetings. 
India is also constructing iron fencing along Mizoram’s 404-kilometer border with Burma and 
along the porous 14-kilometer border at Moreh. Indian army chief General Sankar 
Roychoudhury, now a member of the upper house of the Indian parliament, bluntly stated India’s 
position on the issue:  “We want our relations with the Burmese military government to improve 
further. The Burmese army is attacking some of our northeastern rebels based in that country and 
we are happy about it.”23  
 
In addition to coordinated military efforts, India continues to engage in arms sales to Burma. In 
early 2006, India sold Burma two BN-2 maritime surveillance aircraft bought from the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s.24 The aircraft were delivered over British government objections that the 
sales violated the EU arms embargo. In late 2006, India sold tanks, artillery pieces, and 
counterinsurgency helicopters to Burma. The helicopter sales were of particular concern to the 
international community, since they could facilitate junta attacks on ground targets that are likely 
to cause great suffering among civilians.25 
Ethnic Groups and Human Rights Abuses 
 
Four states in northeast India share borders with Burma (from north to south):  Arunachal 
Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. The northwestern Burma border includes the 
Sagaing Division, with its vast reaches including more than 4.5 million inhabitants, and Chin 
State, home to more than 500,000 of the estimated one million Chin in Burma, and a small 
portion of Kachin State (discussed in the “China” chapter). The predominant Burmese ethnic 
groups in these border areas are the Kukis, Nagas, and Zomis to the north, and the Chin, Mara, 
and Rakhaing (or Arakan, discussed in the “Bangladesh” chapter) to the south.  
 
The border between India and Burma splits various ethnic groups into different countries, 
contributing to the formation of several armed ethnic organizations resisting either India, Burma, 
or both. Nagaland, for example, was split into Burmese Nagaland to the east and Indian 
Nagaland to the west after the British withdrew in 1947. This border, however, does little to stem 
population movement across it. An Indian Naga health advocate explained the relationship 
between eastern and western Nagas this way:  “In Mon district there is a Naga village that 
straddles the border. The inhabitants cannot claim a country—the village leader’s home straddles 
the border line.”26  
                                                           
22 See www.mizzima.com. 
23 Subir Bhaumik, supra note 12.  
24 See Human Rights Watch, “India: Military Aid to Burma Fuels Abuses,” December 7, 2006. 
25 Id.  
26 Local respondent interview, July 2006. 
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Although not on the same scale as in eastern Burma, the Naga and other ethnic groups have 
suffered significant conflict-related displacement, perhaps numbering in the tens of thousands.27 
Despite some ongoing skirmishes, however, several armed groups have signed long-term cease-
fires or are not engaged in active conflict. One of the main resistance organizations, CNF has not 
yet entered into a cease-fire agreement with the regime but has begun preliminary cease-fire talks.28  
 
Displacement in western Burma results less from open conflict between the military and ethnic 
groups than from other abuses associated with increased militarization by the Burmese regime. 
In the Sagaing Division, major causes of displacement have included land confiscation for 
infrastructure projects such as roads29, 30 and dams,31 forced labor,32 interference in agriculture 
causing food insecurity,33 extortion,34 and religious discrimination.35 In a recent survey of 560 
migrants and refugees from Burma in neighboring countries, the majority of respondents from 
the Sagaing Division reported experiencing one or more of these rights violations as a reason for 
their displacement.36  
 
With a reported eight Burmese military battalions present in Chin State (see Map 1), residents of 
these areas have experienced a similar range of human rights abuses, also including gender-based 
violence.37 “Unsafe State:  State-Sanctioned Sexual Violence Against Women in Burma,” issued 
by the Women’s League of Chinland, reports 38 cases of rape at the hands of the Burmese 













                                                           
27 S. Lanjouw et al., “Internal Displacement in Burma,” Disasters, 2000, 24:3, 228–39. 
28 “CNF Junta for Second Round of Talks Soon,” Mizzima News, March 20, 2007. 
29 “Eviction order served to residents of Tamu-Kalay Highway,” Kuki International Forum, March 14, 2004.  
30 “Thousand acres of land may be confiscated for road construction,” Khonumthung News, October 17, 2006.  
31 “Over 380 houses compelled to relocate for Tamanthi Dam,” Mizzima News, March 5 2007, 
http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/News/2007/Mar/07-Mar-2007.html. 
32 “Intervention by the ILO to the SPDC dated 10 December 2004,” International Labour Organisation, December 
10, 2004.  
33 “Burmese farmers forced to grow summer paddy,” Democratic Voice of Burma, January 2, 2006.  
34 “Brick Tax for Pagoda in Wuntho Township,” National League for Democracy via Human Rights Yearbook, 
Burma, 2000, para 5.11. 
35 “Religious discrimination against Nagas,” Carrying the Cross (extract), Christian Solidarity Worldwide, February 
2007.  
36 A. Bosson, A Forced Migration/Internal Displacement in Burma, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2007. 
37 Women’s League of Chinland, Unsafe State: State-Sanctioned Sexual Violence Against Women in Burma, March 
2007. 
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Map 1:  Militarization in Chin State 
 
Source:  “Unsafe State:  State-Sanctioned Sexual Violence Against Women in Burma,”  
Women’s League of Chinland, March 2007 
 
  
The Chin Human Rights Organization’s (CHRO) most recent report, issued in January/February 
2007, details threats to village-level food security by the government’s wide-ranging plan to 
force local farmers to grow the bio-diesel plant, jatropa, on one acre per household.38 Villagers 
are reportedly forced to purchase seeds, cultivate the plant, and hand over the crop to the military 
government. Soldiers also demand food supplies from local farmers. A local villager reported to 
CHRO:  “Whenever the Burmese troops come we have to give them whatever they want … they 
threatened us that they’ll burn our house and farms if we don’t give, and we are afraid of that.”39 
Compulsory work assignments also threaten local productivity. According to CHRO, anti-
Christian measures include the compulsory building of pagodas instead of churches, and forced 
labor at the time of religious services. Because of the military’s increasing demands for food and 
labor, many families who were previously self-sufficient can no longer survive.  
 
In the same CHRO survey for the Sagaing Division, Chins reported these human rights abuses as 
a reason for displacement.40 Chin have mostly fled to neighboring Bangladesh, the northeast 
Indian States of Mizoram and Manipur, as well as Delhi and Malaysia. Currently there are an 
                                                           
38 Chin Human Rights Organization, January/February 2007 Report, www.chro.org. 
39 Id.  
40 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2007, supra note 36. 
Indo-Burma Border Region 
142 
estimated 60,000 Chin living in India, with more than 50,000 in Mizoram, and 12,000 Chin in 
Malaysia. Most of them are living in these areas illegally.41 The Indian government initially 
established refugee camps for the Chin, but these sites were closed in 1995 as Indo-Burma 
relations improved. Many of the Chin who arrive through northeast India reportedly flee to Delhi 
to avoid immediate deportation and seek more permanent status.42  
 
In Delhi, Chin refugees are able to access the offices of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). There are currently roughly 1,000 registered Chin in Delhi. In Mizoram, 
however, the Chin are governed under the terms of the India Foreigners Act of 1946, which does 
not distinguish between illegal immigrants and refugees. India has not signed the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 protocol, even though it sits on the 
executive committee of UNHCR.43 The Indian government does not allow UNHCR into 
Mizoram, and with no domestic refugee law to protect Chin migrants, they are left vulnerable to 
discrimination and an array of other human rights abuses.  
 
Movement from Burma into Mizoram and Manipur has been suppressed in recent years by an 
increased military presence in the border areas, with repeated clashes between the Burmese army 
and Chin resistance forces on one side and between the Assam Rifles, an Indian paramilitary force, 
and northeast Indian insurgents on the other. Coordinated attempts between the government forces 
to block the Indo-Burma border with increased troops from both sides have led to the arrest, 
torture, and execution of many Chin during their attempts to cross over into Mizoram.44  
 
While ethnically and culturally similar to their Christian Mizo neighbors, the Chin are often 
distinguishable from Indian citizens by accent and other subtle linguistic differences. Many Chin 
attempt to remain undetected by staying in low-paying jobs in the capital city of Aizawl or by 
engaging in subsistence farming in the mountainous and remote border regions. Forced repatriation 
has become a serious problem for Chin in recent years. In 2000, Mizoram repatriated hundreds of 
Chin to Burma, and 87 of them were reportedly arrested and sent to forced labor camps.45  
 
Chin without documentation are subject to deportation when they are arrested and unable to pay 
the standard bribe of 200–500 rupees ($4.50 to $11).46 According to Chin key informants in 
Mizoram, the Young Mizo Association (YMA), a broad-based social organization that appears to 
be widely admired among Mizos for its aggressive defense of indigenous culture, plays a 
disturbing role in advocating and promoting discrimination and punitive actions against Chin 
refugees. The group’s xenophobic attitude was a evident in a September 2006 statement:  “The 
YMA Order: Proposed Measures to be taken by the YMA Against Foreigners and Others Staying 
Illegally.”47 Initiatives undertaken by the YMA include the continued practice of door-to-door 
searches in rural villages for illegal migrants without proper housing documentation.48  
                                                           
41 Chin Human Rights Organization, www.chro.org.  
42 Women’s League of Chinland, supra note 37.  
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44 CHRO, supra note 41.  
45 Id.  
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YMA members intermittently call for the eviction of Chin refugees, and they control many 
important social services. Drug distribution centers for malaria and HIV prevention and 
education services throughout rural Mizoram are at least partially administered by YMA 
members. The group’s presence and power likely keep many Chin from seeking health services 
and lead to underreporting of Chin health problems in Mizoram. In March 2002, in Lunglei 
District, the YMA were reportedly responsible for the forcible eviction of 5,000 Chin families. 
The deportation was part of a YMA-launched campaign, in collaboration with the local 
authorities, to evict 10,000 Chin from their homes. Over half were forced to return to Burma.49 In 
July 2003, a Chin man allegedly raped a Mizo woman. Since that time, the YMA has heightened 
pressure on the government to expel the Chin, with an additional 6,000 being sent back to 
Burma. Many of the returnees face serious risk of arrest and human rights abuses if detained by 
the authorities on the Burmese side. According to a Chin doctor living in Aizawl:  “The YMA is 
a big problem. When a Chin does something bad, they make it seem like the whole Chin people 
are guilty.” 
 
In an effort to address their community’s concerns, many Chin health, education, and other civil 
society organizations have been established in Mizoram. However, these organizations have 
difficulty registering officially in Mizoram State, thus limiting their ability to conduct basic 
activities such as transferring funds or ordering medical supplies from outside of the northeast.50 
One group conducting HIV education and prevention in primarily Chin communities in the 
border areas of Champai and Lunglei districts successfully registered in Mizoram with the 
assistance of sympathetic Mizos.51  
Local Ethnic Health Organizations 
 
Despite these barriers, an impressive local effort has been orchestrated to address health needs of 
Burmese ethnic groups along the border areas and deeper within the Chin State and Sagaing 
Division. The Burmese regime-sponsored health system includes one hospital in each of the nine 
townships in the state. Local interviews, however, indicate that only two of the nine hospitals are 
functioning. In response to local needs, the Chin Back Pack Health Worker Team (CBPHWT) 
coordinates a network of mobile health worker teams that provides primary health care for 
approximately 36,000 people living within Chin State.  
 
Because of the widespread presence of military camps, the health workers must move from 
village to village quickly. “We have to make agreements with local villagers not to mention our 
names … they will act as if they’re doing it, not that we are.” CBPHWT is also involved in local 
capacity-building; villages select the people who will be trained as future health workers. Other 
Burmese health organizations from Arakan, Chin, Kuki, Naga, and Zomi ethnic groups provide 
limited health and/or prevention services within Chin State and Sagaing Division. These health 
organizations have the potential to expand the scope of their services but lack access to adequate 
resources and training.  
                                                           
49 Refugees International, Between a Rock and Hard Place:  Burmese Chin Refugees Living in India, July, 2007. 
50 Interviews with members of several Chin organizations in Aizawal, India, July 2006 and January 2007. 
51 Interview with staff member, Integrated Voluntary Public Health Education Network, Mizoram, India, January 
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Currently, access to the northeast border region by international organizations is limited by an 
Indian government policy requiring permits for foreigners to reach the border states of Nagaland, 
Manipur, and Mizoram. The permit process requires groups of four and limits visits to ten days. 
Indian officials state the restrictions are for the protection of travelers given the insurgencies, but 
some locals believe they represent an attempt by the national government to restrict the 
autonomy of the states. Limited foreign access in the region was lifted in 2004 in Churachandpur 
district of Manipur where Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) obtained permission to conduct 
malaria-control activities. In 2005, MSF expanded their work to treat sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs), HIV/AIDS, and TB in the district.52  
 
The Indian military sometimes hinders the activities of Burmese health care providers working in 
northeast India. In January 2007, India’s state militia, the Assam Rifles, arrested 24 Burmese 
ethnic health workers conducting a training workshop in the Saiha district of Mizoram. The 
militia accused the health workers of organizing Burmese armed insurgency activities from 
inside Mizoram.53 Although the health workers were eventually released, they were prohibited 
from further health training.  
 
Finally, health workers who cross the border into Burma report that they often face discrimination, 
extensive searches, and demands for bribes from both Indian and Burmese soldiers. A 
Namphalong-based health worker attempted to return to Burma following an HIV-care training 
camp in Manipur and faced five hours of interrogation into her suspected “anti-national” 
activities.54 In addition, health workers cited risk of arrest throughout the Western Burma border 




Situated between the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, the world’s two largest regions 
of opium production, India is distinctly vulnerable to epidemics of injecting drug use and drug-
driven HIV/AIDS. Although more heroin is produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the vast 
majority of this passes through India en route to its final destinations. Much of the narcotics 
passing from Burma through northeast India, however, are consumed locally.56 Burma, the 
world’s second-largest producer and exporter of illicit opium, introduced heroin to northeast 
India in the late 1970s. Since then, the northeast has undergone a significant shift from 
traditional cannabis and opium use.57 The trend continues today—as of 2006, the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that the four states bordering Burma have higher rates of 
heroin seizures and injection drug use than the northeastern states not bordering Burma.58  
                                                           
52 Doctors Without Borders, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/india.ctm. 
53 Interview with Dr. Aung Kyaw Oo, January 2007. 
54 “Burma Junta Forces Health Workers Underground,” Washington Times, March 2, 2007. 
55 Interviews with health workers, January 2007. 
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Heroin entering the northeast from Burma is typically very pure (known as “Number 4”59). 
Increased law enforcement, coupled with rising prices for heroin, however, has shifted 
consumption patterns to the cheaper heroin product, known as “Brown sugar” and finally to 
Spasmoproxyvon, a frequently injected oral narcotic analgesic (containing propoxyphene).60  
 
In northeast India, injection drug use is widely recognized as the driving force for the region’s 
growing HIV/AIDS problem. As in other parts of south and Southeast Asia, the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic northeast India has been associated with widespread needle sharing. In 2000, a 
Manipur study of 191 IDUs reported 93 percent having shared injecting equipment, 61 and three-
quarters were infected with HIV.  
 
Some of the strongest evidence linking drug-trafficking routes with HIV comes from molecular 
epidemiological data, which suggest that unusual recombinant forms of HIV generated in the 
extremely high-exposure injection-drug-use settings in northern Burma are subsequently found 
along drug-trafficking routes such as northeastern India.62 
 
Further molecular evidence of spread comes from a 2006 study of IDUs in Darjeeling, a district 
of West Bengal, India, which found 11.8 percent HIV seroprevalence.63 Most revealing, the IDU 
sequences from Darjeeling were found to be closer to the C strains from Manipur; this 
relationship strengthens the epidemic’s link to the Golden Triangle via the Manipur-Burma 
border, rather than to the C sequences from IDUs in Nepal, another neighboring country, as some 
have suggested.64 The authors concluded that their results “indicate a rapid spread of HIV-1 by 
possible drug trafficking along international boundaries,” and may “help in the invasion of HIV-
1 among IDUs of Darjeeling through the Manipur–Myanmar border of India.”
                                                           
59 NCB, 2002. 
60 UNODC, Myanmar Country Report. 
61 A. D. Eicher, N. Crofts, S. Benjamin, P. Deutschmann, A. J. Rodger, “A Certain Fate:  Spread of HIV among 
Young Injecting Drug Users in Manipur, North-East India,” Shalom, Macfarlane Burnet Centre for Medical 
Research, Fairfield, Victoria, Australia. 
62 C. Beyrer, M. H. Razak, K. Lisam, J. Chen, W. Lui, X. F. Yu, “Overland Heroin Trafficking Routes and HIV-1 
Spread in South and South-east Asia,” AIDS 14:1, January 7, 2000, 75–83. 
63 Ranajoy Mullick, Satarupa Sengupta, Kamalesh Sarkar, M. K. Saha, Sekhar Chakrabarti, “Phylogenetic Analysis 
of env, gag, and tat Genes of HIV Type 1 Detected among the Injecting Drug Users in West Bengal, India,” AIDS 
Research and Human Retoviruses 22:12, November 12, 2006, 1293–99. 
64 Id.  





The national HIV prevalence rate of 0.9 percent65 masks the significant variation among regions 
of the country and various risk groups, particularly along the Indo-Burma border. Nagaland and 
Manipur have been identified as two of the six highest prevalence states (among 35 total) 
targeted for HIV prevention. Together with four southern states (Tamil Nadu, Andra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, and Maharashtra), these states account for more than 80 percent of the country’s 
reported HIV cases. Rates among women seeking antenatal care in these six states, as measured 
in 2004, exceeded 1 percent, with rates in some high-risk groups exceeding 5 percent.66 (See Map 
2.) While heterosexual transmission accounts for the majority of reported cases in the southern 
states, injection drug use has historically been the predominant mode of transmission in Manipur 
and Nagaland.67  
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66 Id.  
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Table 1: Sentinel Surveillance Data, National AIDS Control Organization (NACO), 2004 
Sites with 75% coverage of desired sample size (STD:250 & ANC:400) are included for analysis. 
Name of State Number 




































































































Unlike traditional urban transmission patterns centered on mobile male labor populations and 
commercial sex work, the HIV epidemic in northeast India has its roots in border areas that serve 
as zones for drug trafficking and injection drug use. HIV infection rates among injection drug 
users in Manipur increased from 2 percent in 1989 to 64 percent in 2000.68 Similarly in 
Nagaland, HIV prevalence among IDUs increased to nearly 14 percent in 2003, and in Mizoram 
to 6.8 percent in 2004.69  
 
Although the rates of infection among IDUs appear to be stabilizing, those among women 
seeking antenatal care (ANC) continue to rise, suggesting an increase in the proportion of new 
infections attributable to heterosexual transmission. In Manipur, a 2000 study showed that 45 
percent of wives of HIV-positive IDUs became positive within 6 years of their spouses’ 
documented infection. None of the wives in the study reported injection drug use and 98 percent 
were monogamous.70 ANC rates in Nagaland and Manipur have exceeded 1 percent since 1999. 
Mizoram has been close behind, reporting ANC rates of 1.5 percent in 2002 and similarly high 
rates in 2003 and 2004.71  
 
                                                           
68 National AIDS Control Organization, supra note 65.  
69 National AIDS Control Organization, supra note 65.  
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ANC rates in these three states are strikingly high in several border districts known for drug 
trafficking. Manipur’s Churachandpur and Chandel districts reported ANC rates of more than 8 
percent in 2005.72 According to Nagaland surveillance data, the ANC rate in the border district of 
Tuensang has been more than 3 percent for five consecutive years (Table 2), with Noklak, the 
district capital, also reporting an ANC rate of more than 8 percent—the highest in all of 
Nagaland.73 South of Manipur in Mizoram, the border district of Champai also reported mean 
ANC rates of 3 percent from 2001–05.74  
 
Table 2: Nagaland’s Border District of Tuensang’s HIV Surveillance Data, 2001–0575 
 
Year IDU %  ANC % 
2001 5.5 3.05 
2002 24.63 8.00 
2003 24.8 4.20 
2004 8.8 3.64 
2005 10.8 4.73 
 
The reduction in HIV infections among IDUs may be due in part to the expansive collaboration 
between donors, state AIDS-control organizations, and a multitude of local NGOs. In 2003, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation partnered with the National AIDS Control Organization 
(NACO) to implement a $200 million initiative for prevention programs targeting men who have 
sex with men (MSM), commercial sex workers, and IDUs in the six states with the highest 
prevalence. In Nagaland and Manipur, more than 50 local NGOs have developed in the last five 
to ten years, focusing primarily on IDUs through peer-education networks and harm reduction.76 
These programs may have achieved limited success, with IDU rates in Nagaland and Manipur 
falling from their high points. 
 
The challenge for these collaborative efforts as the epidemic evolves is to reach out to other 
disenfranchised and high-risk groups, such as rural communities, migrants, sex workers, and 
MSMs. The majority of the groups partnering with Avahan (Project Orchid in Northeast India) 
focus largely on IDUs, and concentrate services in urban centers. Only one needle-exchange 
project is situated in the highest-prevalence Tuanseng district, over 10 hours by car from 
Kohima, the capital of Nagaland. 
 
Local state governments and NGO services are increasingly targeting sex workers, who had HIV 
rates exceeding 10 percent in Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram in 2006, among the highest in 
India.77 The 2005 annual report of the Nagaland State AIDS Control Society states:  “It is 
important to understand that HIV transmission in the State does not merely confine itself to IDUs 
and their sexual partners but it has percolated down to the general population through the sexual 
                                                           
72 National AIDS Control Organization, supra note 65.  
73 Nagaland State AIDS Control Society (NSACS), 2005 Annual Report.  
74 Mizoram State AIDS Control Society (MZSACS), 2005 Annual Report.  
75 NSACS, supra note 73. 
76 See http://www.nacoonline.org/directory_ngo.htm. 
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Indo-Burma Border Region 
149 
route. More efforts have to be taken to address vulnerable women like commercial sex 
workers.”78  
  
Few treatment services for people with HIV/AIDS exist on the Indo-Burma border. In April 
2004, the National AIDS Control Organization established the only antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
center in Nagaland in the state capital at Kohima Hospital, which, as of July 2006, was treating 
210 patients.79 The situation is similar in Mizoram, with ART being delivered to only 25 patients 
in Aizawl, the capital.  
  
Little data is available on the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in western Burma. The National 
AIDS Program reports a total of 30 sentinel sites, with only one site near the Indo-Burma border 
in Haka, the capital of Chin State. Two sites in Sagaing Division are quite far from the border, in 
Monywa and Shwebo.80 Given the highly permeable nature of the Indo-Burma border and the 
closely related border populations, it is possible that the HIV rates in northwestern Burma 
approximate the more extensively measured rates in northeast India, whose sentinel sites are also 
closer geographically. Given the strikingly high HIV rates along the border with northeast India, 
it is surprising to find that UNAIDS Myanmar reports that the western border of Burma has the 
lowest HIV rates in Burma.81 
 
Regarding HIV services in western Burma, independent reviewers of the National AIDS Program 
report that coverage, “which is not actually measured by any indicators, appears to be extremely 
low for all interventions. Most reach no more than a few hundred people.”82 The 2006 national 
review cited one government IDU treatment facility on the western border,83 and Population 
Services International (PSI) operates a single district office in Kalay township in western Burma 
for its HIV-prevention programs.84 Given the militarization and restrictions on health workers 
noted earlier, it is unclear whether access to these critical services could be expanded. 
 
A potentially important source of HIV services for inhabitants of western Burma is being 
provided by State AIDS Control Societies and local NGO partners in India. In the Manipuri 
border town of Moreh, for example, the Dedicated People’s Union (DPU), registered 131 IDUs 
from Tamu and Namphalong towns directly across the border in western Burma.85 DPU 
estimates that 300 commercial sex workers and 400 IDUs reside in the two towns and that 100 to 
130 cross over each day for drugs, particularly now that popular injectable pharmaceutical 
products are readily available in India. As of December 2006, 80 to 95 IDUs from Burma 
regularly received harm-reduction services from DPU in Moreh.86  
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India’s national tuberculosis program (the Revised National Tuberculosis Program) provides 
services on a massive scale,87 treating 1.4 million patients in 2006, according to the WHO-
recommended protocol for directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS) adopted in 1997.88 
Although information on the disease is limited in northeast India, all four of the Indian states 
bordering Burma have implemented TB programs since then according to national guidelines, 
treating nearly 12,000 cases in 2006. In Nagaland, the program currently offers 250 DOTS 
centers, 29 Designated Microscope Centers, and eight district TB centers that monitor the work 
of village DOTS providers and conduct interviews with patients and family members to identify 
new cases for possible testing and treatment. 
 
Although impressive in its magnitude, the TB program has several weaknesses. People who 
receive positive TB smears are supposed to be referred to voluntary counseling and testing 
centers for HIV tests. However, there is no cross-monitoring of co-infection and few of these 
centers exist in rural areas. Since TB cultures cannot be performed anywhere in northeast India, 
cultures must be sent to Bangalore for further testing. Finally, the director of the TB program in 
Nagaland told us that poor access to testing and DOTS in rural areas was the biggest failing of 
the current program.89 
 
In Mizoram, some promising signs of cooperation between Chin and Mizo populations have 
arisen. Local Chin health organizations reported that suspected TB cases in border areas were 
routinely referred to—and accepted by—Saiha hospital in southern Mizoram, as well as the main 
public hospital in the capital.90 Saiha hospital had even offered diagnostic training workshops to 
the Chin health workers. 
 
Unfortunately, Chin migrants still pose a challenge for proper TB control. The Mizoram TB 
program director told us in July 2006 that most DOTS defaulters were Chin who moved 
frequently and were difficult to track.91 In addition, YMA members have volunteered to staff 
many rural DOTS outposts, a situation that could discourage Chin migrants from seeking 
treatment. According to 2006 data from Mizoram, only 58 percent of newly diagnosed smear-
positive patients started DOTS within seven days of diagnosis, and only 66 percent had a follow-
up sputum after completing treatment, the lowest reported by any state in India.92 
 
As with HIV, available TB data specific to western Burma is sparse. Regarding TB programs, 
although the Ministry of Health reports 100 percent coverage across its 324 townships,93 none of 
the health workers we interviewed from Chin and Sagaing Division reported the existence of 
diagnosis and treatment services for tuberculosis in their areas. The National Review of Burma’s 
TB program is slated for 2007. 
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In 2003, India reported 1,006 malaria deaths and 1.87 million cases, including 860,000 
Plasmodium falciparum cases. Malaria remains a major cause of morbidity and mortality in 
northeast India, an area that accounts for less than 4 percent of the country’s population but 
nearly 10 percent of falciparum malaria cases and 20 percent of reported malaria deaths for 
India.94 Mizoram, for example, has less than 0.1 percent of the country’s population but is ranked 
third among the states in total malaria deaths and first in the actual rate of death.95 
 
A key issue in the growing epidemic of falciparum malaria in northeast India is increasing drug 
resistance to chloroquine (CQ) and sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine (SP), two first-line 
antimalarials used under the existing Indian National Drug Policy.96 The national policy 
recommends SP as first-line therapy for falciparum cases in chloroquine-resistant areas. 
Unfortunately, drug resistance to CQ has spread throughout the northeast, and SP resistance is 
also rapidly increasing (Map 3).97 Although combination therapy (artesunate plus SP) is 
theoretically recommended as second-line therapy, it is not easily available. The Mizoram 
Malaria Program director reported that the use of such an important medicine as artesunate-SP 
was restricted to physicians.98 
 
The spread of drug-resistant strains, first reported in 2003, along the Indo-Burma border is of 
particular concern because of the high degree of drug resistance to CQ, SP, and mefloquine 
reported earlier from western Burma.99, 100, 101 In 2005, researchers determined that treatment 
failure with CQ and SP was highest along the border and decreased further into the interior of 
India.102 As migration from western Burma to northeast India increases, so does the need for a 




                                                           
94 V. Dev et al., “Transmission of Malaria and its Control in The Northeastern Region of India,” Journal of the 
Association of Physicians in India, November 2003. 
95 See http://www.nvbdcp.gov.in/malaria3.html. 
96 P. K. Mohapatra et al., “Evaluation of chloroquine (CQ) and Sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine (SP) in Uncomplicated 
Falciparum Malaria in Indo-Myanmar Border Areas,” Trop Med Intl Health, 10:5, 478–83. 
97 P. K. Mohapatra, A. Prakash, D. R. Bhattacharyya, B. K. Goswami, J. Mahanta, “Concurrent Multi-drug Resistant 
Plasmodium Falciparum from Northeast India, a Case Report,” Journal of the Association of Physicians in India 47, 
1999, 823–24. 
98 Interview with the Mizoram Malaria Program director, July 2006. 
99 P. K. Mohapatra, N. S. Namchoom, A. Prakash, D. R. Bhattacharyya, B. K. Goswami, J. Mahanta, “Therapeutic 
Efficacy of Antimalarials in Plasmodium Falciparum Malaria in an Indo-Myanmar Border Area of Arunachal 
Pradesh,” Indian Journal of Medical Research 118, 2003, 71–76. 
100 F. M. Smithuis, F. Monti, M. Grundi et al., “Plasmodium Falciparum: Sensitivity in Vivo to Chloroquine, 
Pyrimethamine/Sulfadoxine and Mefloquine in Western Myanmar,” Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene 91, 1997, 468–72. 
101 M. N. Ejov, T. Tun, S. Aung, K. Sein, “Response of Falciparum Malaria to Different Antimalarials in Myanmar,” 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 77, 1999, 244–49. 
102 P. K. Mohapatra, et al., supra note 96. 
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Map 3: Drug Resistance to Antimalarials (CQ and SP) 
 
Source: National Vector Borne Disease Control Program103 
 
India’s National Vector Borne Disease Control Program combats malaria through indoor 
spraying with DDT and other pesticides, the distribution of insecticide-treated nets, and a system 
known as Early Case Detection and Prompt Treatment.104 The case detection and treatment 
efforts in rural areas are largely provided through a network of drug distribution centers, which 
may be little more than a lay person trained to deliver chloroquine presumptively, without 
diagnostic testing. In a visit to a Nagaland village near the border of both Manipur and Burma, 
there appeared to be little awareness of such services in rural areas, and villagers and field NGOs 
interviewed had not heard of them.  
 
Our research team queried the directors for malaria control in both Nagaland and Mizoram 
regarding the increase in malaria cases between 2004 and 2005,105 despite control measures. Both 
believed the increases reflected real growth in malaria burden rather than reporting bias. Citing the 
opinions of others interviewed, they both attributed these increases, in part, to migration into India 
from Burma—one of numerous examples of the repeated theme of migrants as carriers of disease.  
 
                                                           
103 See http://www.nvbdcp.gov.in/DRUG.html. 
104 National Vector Borne Disease Control Program, Malaria Control Strategies, 
http://www.nvbdcp.gov.in/malaria11.html. 
105 National Vector Borne Disease Control Program, Malaria Situation in India, 
http://www.nvbdcp.gov.in/Doc/Malaria%20Situation.pdf. 
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Although state officials asserted that distribution centers do not discriminate against non-Indian 
citizens, fear of local organizations that manage the sites has created significant barriers to malaria 
treatment access, especially in Mizoram. YMA members, the most powerful organization in 
Mizoram,106 have been charged with running many drug-distribution centers. Interviews with Chin 
refugees confirmed that the role of the YMA in the distribution of drugs was perceived as a reason 
for avoiding treatment. Yet the head of the vector-borne disease program in Mizoram challenged 
that perception by noting it was “difficult to provide medical treatment to Burma migrants as influx 
population are mostly ignorant and do not approach health facilities.”107  
 
The western region of Burma is considered high-risk for malaria, especially among subsistence 
farmers, migrants, and forest-related workers. In 2004, Arakan and Chin states reported the 
highest official malaria morbidity rates for all of Burma:  62 per 1,000 and 40 per 1,000 
respectively. In Chin state, malaria accounts for more than half of all health-care consultations.108  
 
Despite this increased risk, the Burmese government and international NGOs working within 
Burma do not appear to reach the northwestern border areas. The only INGO known to offer 
malaria-related services in western Burma is Population Services International, which distributes 
insecticide tabs for net treatment, artesunate-combination therapies, and rapid diagnostic tests. 
Although they maintain an office in Tamu, directly across the border from Manipur, none of the 
health workers we interviewed reported access to these products. Malaria services are mostly 
distributed through their Sun Quality Health Franchise, a network of private physicians, that 
appears to be primarily based in more central areas of Burma.109 
Conclusion 
 
Much needs to be done to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in the Indo-Burma border 
region. First, the Indian and Burmese regimes should work together to reduce militarization of 
the border areas, which has led to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, 
and likely worsening of infectious disease epidemics. Other abuses that have impeded the 
effective delivery of health interventions, such as the arrest of health workers, restriction in their 
freedom of movement, and discrimination in the delivery of health services, should be ended. 
 
Second, drug trafficking into a vulnerable population ill-equipped to manage the effects has 
created one of the worst HIV epidemics in South and Southeast Asia. Effective interventions 
such as harm-reduction targeting IDUs need to be expanded, in addition to improving HIV 
prevention and treatment services for largely ignored rural populations, migrants, and other high-
risk groups such as sex workers and MSMs.  
 
Third, restrictions on international NGOs need to be removed, so their considerable resources and 
technical expertise can be brought to bear. Local community-based organizations, which are likely 
                                                           
106 Mizoram government website, http://mizoram.nic.in/more/yma.htm. 
107 Dr. Lalkailiani, “Communicable Disease in Mizoram,” conference address, “Responding to Infectious Diseases 
in the Border Regions of South and Southeast Asia,” Bangkok, January 24, 2007.  
108 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office, 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/decisions/2004/dec_myanmar_01000.pdf. 
109 Sam O’Connor, supra note 84.  
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to be composed of disenfranchised groups such as displaced persons, should be allowed to register 
and operate freely, and should be provided additional support by the government and donors.  
 
Finally, national and local governments, international nongovernmental and local community-
based organizations, and UN agencies should collaborate to develop a common cross-border 
strategy to improve disease surveillance, prevention, and treatment, and strategies for control of 
infectious diseases.
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10. Conclusions and Recommendations 
We offer the following conclusions and recommendations: 
 
Health Care System in Burma 
 
• The Government of Burma must develop a national health care system that is 
participatory and incorporates human rights to ensure that health care is distributed 
effectively, equitably, and transparently. Promoting participation as a feature of health 
system reform is now commonplace. With the rise of Primary Health Care in the 1970s, 
community involvement was seen as an essential ingredient of a nation’s health 
improvement. More recently, the emphasis has shifted to stakeholder consultation in 
sector reform. With the rise of rights-based approaches, emphasis is increasingly being 
placed on the participation of service users not as “beneficiaries” or “consumers” but as 
citizens who have the right to have a say in shaping health care policies. Community 
participation in the promotion and implementation of prevention and treatment programs 
is essential in any campaign to combat infectious diseases.     
 
Burma must develop a health care system that provides medical treatment and 
preventative care to all citizens, especially the most marginalized members of society 
including the very poor, ethnic and religious minorities, refugees and the displaced, 
persons living in conflict and cease-fire zones, and persons belonging to socially 
stigmatized groups including commercial sex workers, injecting drug users, and men who 
have sex with men.  
 
• The Government of Burma should increase its expenditures on health and education. 
Decades of neglect by Burma’s military government have turned the country into an 
incubator of infectious diseases. Those of gravest concern are HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, acute respiratory infections, filariasis, and diarrheal diseases. The authorities 
have a responsibility to protect the people of Burma and residents of neighboring 
countries to turn back the spread of communicable diseases. Such an effort requires both 
public health measures and providing citizens with increased access to both formal and 
informal education. Schools are places not only for teaching traditional academic 
subjects, but also for disseminating information about measures that can be taken to halt 
the spread of infectious diseases. Military expenditures should be re-routed to support 
health and education. Burma is not at war with its neighbors, and its security is more 
profoundly threatened by the rise of drug-resistant malaria and tuberculosis, and 
emerging communicable diseases such as avian influenza and recrudescent polio 
myelitis, than from external military threats. 
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Donors and International Aid Organizations 
 
• Donors and international aid organizations operating in Burma have a duty to uphold 
and promote internationally accepted standards of human rights and international 
humanitarian law. Donors and international aid organizations should put into practice 
the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations” drafted 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2005. 
Principle 6 states:  “Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and 
conflict, and leads to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states1 
should consistently promote gender equality, social inclusion and human rights. These 
are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form 
part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and 
participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included 
in state-building and service delivery strategies from the onset.”2 
 
• The Government of Burma should immediately rescind the “Guidelines for UN 
Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs/INGOs on Cooperation Programme in 
Myanmar” (See Appendix). These Guidelines, issued by the Ministry of National Planning 
and Economic Development in February 2006, directly contravene several formal 
agreements established between international organizations and the Burmese government 
since the early 1990s. They also contravene several international agreements on effective 
aid delivery, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was endorsed by 
the European Union; 27 regional and international institutions, including the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank; and over 90 countries in Paris in 2005. The Guidelines 
have restricted the work of international organizations, especially the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), operating in Burma. While aid to Burma should not 
be considered optional given the dire need, the “exigencies of need” should never override 
the ability of organizations to access project sites on a regular and unhindered basis to 
ensure that aid is being delivered in a manner that is transparent, accountable, efficient, and 
equitable. The Guidelines are antithetical to this fundamental principle. 
 
• The Government of Burma should allow the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to resume visits to prisoners without the requirement that ICRC doctors be 
accompanied by members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA) or other organizations. As mandated by the Geneva Conventions, to which 
Burma has been a party since 1992, ICRC conducts confidential, one-on-one visits 
with prisoners and has done so in dozens of countries since the Franco-Prussian war 
of 1870. In addition, the Government of Burma should allow ICRC to reopen field 
offices that have been closed since late 2006 due to government restrictions. Since 
1999, the ICRC has played an essential role by visiting and providing health care to 
prisoners in Burma and developing water and sanitation projects in war-torn communities 
where weakened infrastructure, isolation, and the security situation make the population 
                                                           
1 States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. 
2 The full set of principles can be accessed through the OECD web site at http://www.oecd.org. 
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particularly vulnerable.3 ICRC staff have convened surgical training seminars for scores 
of Burmese health workers stationed in conflict areas, built water and sanitation facilities 
reaching more than 70,000 beneficiaries, provided over 7,000 landmine victims and other 
physically disabled people with prosthetic services, and supported the local manufacture 
of 19,600 prostheses. Between 1999 and late 2005, ICRC made 453 visits to dozens of 
prisons and labor camps throughout the country and provided training to Burmese doctors 
on prison health care. ICRC has used information gleaned from these visits to persuade 
health authorities to improve prison conditions. Yet, due to government restrictions, 
ICRC has been forced to suspend its prison visits and to close most of its field offices. 
 
• Donors and foreign aid organizations should monitor and evaluate how international 
aid to combat infectious diseases in Burma is affecting domestic expenditures in health 
and education. Large infusions of foreign aid directed at the health sector can potentially 
lessen the burden of infectious diseases in Burma, but it can also have unintended 
consequences. Foreign aid can create dependency and divert health professionals and 
their institutions from addressing other serious health problems. Foreign aid can provide 
national authorities with a ready excuse for decreasing even further their already paltry 
expenditures in health. Donors and foreign aid organizations have a responsibility to 
monitor domestic expenditures in health and education and, if problems arise, raise their 
concerns with the appropriate authorities. 
 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
 
• Relevant UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local 
NGOs should establish a regional Narcotics Working Group. Since 1999 the Burmese 
government and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have been engaged in an 
aggressive campaign to eradicate poppy cultivation and heroin production in Burma. 
UNODC has attempted to develop crop-replacement initiatives for poppy farmers. 
However, these initiatives have often faltered, leaving farmers and their families with few 
alternatives to feed their families. Tens of thousands of people have been forcibly 
relocated to villages along the Thai border where they have no sustainable income and 
are exposed to infectious diseases, especially malaria. At the same time, the region is 
experiencing a significant increase in the production and use of methamphetamines. At 
least three cease-fire organizations in Burma continue to manufacture and sell 
methamphetamines inside the country and across the border. Methamphetamine use 
increases sexual risk-taking and greater exposure to communicable diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS. Markedly increased STD rates have been found in northern Thai women who 
use methamphetamines. Finally, large profits from the sale of methamphetamines are 
fueling the “Casino Economy” along Burma’s border with China. These casinos and 
other entertainment venues are magnets for prostitution and trafficking of Burmese 
women and girls.  
 
                                                           
3 Although a private humanitarian organization, the ICRC is not a nongovernmental organization. It has a widely 
recognized role to play due to its permanent and universal mandate granted by the 192 States signatory to the 
Geneva Conventions. This role distinguishes the ICRC from other humanitarian organizations. 
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Given this situation, the Narcotics Working Group should develop a sophisticated list of 
indicators to measure the use and trafficking of drugs in the region. Distinct from 
traditional indicators, these indicators would capture detailed information about types of 
drug, how much is being trafficked, and by whom. Access to hard-to-reach populations 
and regions would require fieldwork and cross-border approaches that value trust-
building and cultural appropriateness. The working group could also monitor the human 
and environmental impact of poppy-eradication programs and their effects on farmers 
and their families.  
 
Three Diseases Fund 
 
• The Three Diseases Fund (3D Fund) should play an active role in promoting the 
growth and capacity of local nongovernmental and community-based health 
organizations to respond to infectious diseases in Burma and the border regions. Only 
a few local nongovernmental and community-based organizations operate in the health 
sector in Burma. Yet these organizations have the potential to play a key role in the effort 
to lessen the burden of communicable diseases in the region. These groups are well 
situated to provide the community services required for the implementation of treatment 
and prevention programs. They can also work in areas that may be inaccessible to UN 
agencies and international organizations.  
 
The 3D Fund, which is now the largest aid donor to combat infectious diseases in Burma, 
deserves good marks for establishing an oversight board that includes independent 
experts and for posting regular updates and reports of quarterly meetings of its board on 
its web site. Yet the 3D Fund faces several challenges that must be overcome to conduct 
its work effectively. First and foremost, it must contend with the military regime’s 
restrictions on the travel of foreign aid organizations. The ICRC’s closure of several field 
offices operating in or near combat zones suggests that access to these areas will continue 
to be heavily restricted and prevent aid from reaching those most in need. Second, while 
the 3D Fund’s commitment to bypass the central government and fund civilian 
administrations and local nongovernmental organizations at the state and township level 
is admirable, it may be difficult to implement. The term “civilian administrations” is a 
highly ambiguous concept in Burma, especially in rural areas where the military and 
police hold unquestioned authority and influence.4 This situation has been further 
complicated by reports that the Burmese authorities are establishing government-run 
“coordination committees” at the district and township level to coordinate with the 3D 
Fund and other relief efforts. According to the February 2006 Guidelines, members of 
these new coordination committees would be drawn from junta-backed social 
organizations such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association, founded by 
junta leader Senior General Than Shwe.5 The involvement of representatives of these 
organizations could easily politicize and complicate the dispersal of funds at the district 
                                                           
4 The National League for Democracy (NLD) raised this issue in a letter dated June 12, 2006, to the First Secretary, 
British Embassy, Rangoon. The letter is in the files of the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley. 
5 Htet Aung, “Government to keep tight rein on aid in Burma,” The Irrawaddy, March 13, 2007.  
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and township level. To overcome these obstacles, donors to the 3D Fund must be 
prepared to withhold funds until proper conditions prevail. 
 
Such challenges notwithstanding, the 3D Fund’s pledge to ensure its programs are 
accountable, transparent, equitable, and reach those most in need is highly commendable 
and deserves the support of governments and international health institutions.      
 
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
 
• The Government of Burma must stop engaging in violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law and must hold accountable government and military 
officials who are responsible for these abuses. Burma’s policies of forcibly relocating 
civilian populations and requiring them to engage in forced labor have caused widespread 
migration, food insecurity, disruption in livelihood, and lack of access to regular medical 
care. In conflict zones, the Burmese military is committing violations of the laws of war 
including intentional and wanton destruction of civilian homes and food supplies; killing, 
sexually assaulting, and torturing civilians; destroying medical supplies intended for 
civilian populations; and arresting, detaining, and killing medical workers. These abuses 
have left civilians, particularly young children, vulnerable to death and illness from 
malnutrition, malaria, TB, night blindness (vitamin A deficiency), and diarrheal diseases.   
 
In the first six months of 2007, the Burmese authorities detained over a dozen HIV/AIDS 
activists, most of whom have since been released.  Of particular concern is Phyu Phyu 
Thin, a National League for Democracy youth member and a leader in the group’s 
HIV/AIDS section, who was arrested on May 21, 2007 by authorities from the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Police Special Branch. According to relatives, she has since 
disappeared. Since 2002, Phyu Phyu Thin and her group have provided hundreds of 
HIV/AIDS patients with counseling, medicines, education, and housing.6 
 
Internally Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Migrants 
 
• The Governments of Burma, India, Thailand, and Bangladesh should ratify the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. These governments should also stop violating the human rights of 
migrants. Refugee status for migrants fleeing their home country due to fear of 
persecution prohibits routine deportation and increases the availability of services and 
assistance, including medical care, to limit the spread of infectious diseases among highly 
mobile populations. Moreover, state-sponsored discriminatory policies and practices, as 
well as state-condoned vigilantism by private groups, only serve to drive migrants further 
underground and prevent them from seeking medical care when they are ill or injured.  
Recent trans-border cooperation between India and Burma to capture ethnic insurgents 
has resulted in increased abuses against migrants including arrest, mistreatment, torture, 
and execution.    
                                                           
6 “Relatives of missing HIV activist threaten to sue authorities,” The Irrawaddy, June 21, 2007. 
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• The Government of Burma should take steps to halt the internal armed conflict and 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that are creating an 
unprecedented number of internally displaced persons and migrants. Internal armed 
conflict and abuses of rights, including forced displacement and forced labor, are creating 
major social upheavals leading to thousands of people fleeing their homes and living in 
internally displaced persons camps within Burma or in migrant camps in the border 
regions. These camps lack adequate food, sanitation, clean water, shelter, and medical 
care. Large mobile populations living under such poor conditions may be a conduit for 
the introduction of infectious diseases such as TB, malaria, HIV/AIDS, lymphatic 
filariasis, and avian influenza to new and unprepared communities.    
 
• The Government of Burma should recognize citizenship for the Rohingya in Arakan 
State by repealing or amending the 1982 Citizenship Law. Until that time, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must provide adequate resources 
to the Rohingya who are languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Under the 1982 
Citizenship Law, the members of the Muslim minority in North Rakhine State, generally 
known as the Rohingyas, have been denied Burmese citizenship, which has seriously 
curtailed the full exercise of their human rights and led to various discriminatory 
practices, including restricted access to medical care, food, and adequate housing. These 
oppressive practices have caused waves of Rohingya migration out of Burma into 
Bangladesh where they currently live in refugee camps administered by UNHCR. These 
camps are sorely inadequate, leaving the Rohingya in fetid, overcrowded living 
conditions where health care is lacking and the TB infection rate is soaring.  
 
Responses to Infectious Diseases in Burma’s Border Regions 
 
• UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local NGOs must 
cooperate closely to develop health care programs along Burma’s borders. Some of the 
highest rates of TB, malaria, and HIV/AIDS in Burma are found along its frontiers. Yet 
the Burmese government provides little or no public services, including health care, to 
people living in the border regions and limits the travel of international organizations to 
conflicted areas of the border. Some ethnic-based organizations provide health care in 
these areas, but their resources are extremely limited. These organizations need to receive 
greater support. In addition, health care programs must be initiated across the border and 
brought to the Burmese frontier. The Back Pack Health Worker Team operates out of 
western Thailand and sends supplied health care workers on foot into eastern Burma to 
gather medical data and provide medical treatment and preventative care. It represents 
one successful cross-border model that should be expanded and replicated on Burma’s 
borders with China, India, and Bangladesh.  
 
• The governments of Burma and its neighbors must stop obstructing the passage of 
medical supplies and health care workers across the borders and develop national 
policies that promote cross-border health care. The Burmese frontier appears to be 
permeable to almost everything—people, timber, gems, natural gas, and infectious 
diseases—except public health programming. In order for cross-border health programs 
to reach people living in Burmese conflict and cease-fire zones, the governments of 
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Burma and its neighbors must stop obstructing the passage of medical supplies and health 
workers and develop national policies to support these efforts.   
 
Regional Coordination and Response 
 
• UN agencies, national and local governments, and international and local NGOs must 
cooperate closely to facilitate greater information-sharing and collaboration among 
agencies and organizations working to lessen the burden of infectious diseases in 
Burma and its border regions. These institutions should also work together to develop 
a regional response to the growing problem of counterfeit antimalarial drugs. In 
January 2007, our two centers, in collaboration with the Global Health Access Program, 
convened a regional conference on “Responding to Infectious Diseases in the Border 
Regions of South and Southeast Asia” in Bangkok, Thailand. The conference brought 
together 190 participants, representing 95 institutions from nine countries—Australia, 
Bangladesh, Burma, China, India, Thailand, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam—to 
discuss the efforts of governments, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and 
health clinics to combat infectious diseases in Burma and its border regions. Conference 
speakers highlighted some of the key challenges health professionals face as they 
confront the spread of communicable diseases in the region. These include limited 
disease surveillance and data collection; divergence of “official” statistics from data from 
conflict zones; the paucity of data from narcotics surveillance, including drug availability 
and use and data on infectious disease prevalence and incidence among drug users; lack 
of prevention and treatment programs; and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law and medical neutrality in some border regions that restrict the ability of 
health professionals to access vulnerable communities.  
 
Conference participants, especially from the NGO sector, stressed the need to: (1) 
implement a mapping process, utilizing global-positioning technologies, to record the 
location, activities, and service-range of health-based organizations working to combat 
infectious diseases in Burma and the border regions; (2) convene a series of border-
specific training workshops to standardize procedures for surveillance, data collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information about infectious diseases in the region; (3) 
convene a second regional conference similar to the 2007 Bangkok conference to report 
on the progress in implementing standardized procedures for data collection and analysis 
and meet with colleagues and donors from the region; and (4) promote the development 
and capacity of community-based health organizations to provide health care for their 
own peoples. 
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Guidelines for UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs  
on Cooperation Programme in Myanmar 
Issued by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, February 2006. 
(See http://www.burmalibrary.org.) 
 
• The UNODC Representative called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs after completion of 
his assignment in December 2005. During the meeting, he reported that there are 22 INGOs 
who have been engaging in Southern Shan State, Wa area. He observed that there have been 
no collaboration and coordination among these INGOs. He also mentioned that these INGOs 
are not aware of the presence of the other INGOs working in that area and the effective 
services have not been rendered to the people in that area. 
 
• In this regard, he recommended the Minister that there should be collaboration and 
coordination among these INGOs and their programmes should be coordinated and guided by 
the central responsible body. 
 
• In the light of these circumstances, the programmes and projects that are being conducted 
with the assistance of UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs were 
reviewed and analyzed. 
 
• It is clearly observed that there are many programme of activities that will benefit both sides 
and contribute to the well being of the communities in Myanmar. 
 
• It is also observed that UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs that have 
been providing assistance for the socioeconomic development of Myanmar should be 
systematically coordinated and guided so as to achieve more effective and efficient 
outcomes. 
 
• Myanmar welcomes the assistance being provided by these organizations. Myanmar side will 
cooperate and give support for the successful implementation of these cooperation 
programmes and projects. 
 
• Aiming at efficient, smooth and systematic implementation of the activities to bring about 
more effective results, I would like to explain the Programme Guidelines for carrying out the 
cooperation programme. 
 
• The Programme Guidelines cover the Objectives, Proposal for Basic Cooperation 
Agreement, Proposal for the Project, Proposal for MOU and Implementation Arrangement. 
 
• The objectives of the Programme Guidelines are as follows: 
o To enhance and safeguard the national interest 
o To prevent the infringement of the sovereignty of the State 
o To cooperate without any string to the State 
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o To provide guidance to be on the right track, render necessary assistance as well 
as cooperate and coordinate with the view to contributing the socio-economic 
development of the Nation  
 
Initial Coordination 
• The initial coordination among UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/ 
INGOs with respect to cooperation programme will be carried out by the Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development. 
 
• The line ministry will be responsible for the implementation of the respective projects. 
 
Proposal for Basic Cooperation Agreement 
• The Draft Basic Agreement for cooperation to be signed between the Union of Myanmar 
and the UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs shall be submitted to 
the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development. 
 
Proposal for the Project 
• Any proposed project to be implemented in cooperation with UN Agencies, International 
Organizations and NGO/INGOs shall be submitted by these organizations to the Ministry 
of National Planning and Economic Development. 
 
• The project proposal which is to be implemented in Myanmar shall be in line with the 
objectives of the Programme Guidelines. If the proposal is not in line with the objectives of 
the Programme Guidelines, consultation shall be made with the concerned Ministry to 
revise the proposal. 
 
• If NGO/INGOs submit the project proposal which involves more than one Ministry, the 
Ministry which receives the proposal will scrutinize and transfer it to the Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development.  
 
Proposal for Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
• NGO/INGOs shall submit the Draft MOU, which is to be implemented in Myanmar, to the 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development after consultation with the 
concerned Ministries on the Draft MOU. 
 
• Draft MOU which is to be implemented in Myanmar shall be in line with the objectives of 
Programme Guidelines. If the MOU is not in line with the objectives of the Programme 
Guidelines, consultation shall be made with the concerned Ministry to revise the MOU. 
 
• If NGO/INGOs submit the draft MOU which involves multiple sector to the concerned 
Ministry, that respective Ministry will scrutinize and transfer the draft MOU to the 





• Signing of Basic Agreement, Project proposal and MOU 
o The Basic Agreement between the Union of Myanmar and UN Agencies, 
International Organizations will be signed by the Ministry of National Planning and 
Economic Development on behalf of the Government. 
o The MOU/Project Proposal involving Overall Framework/Multiple Ministry/ 
Multiple Sector, will be signed by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development. 
o If the MOU/Project Proposal is concerned only with the individual Ministry, that 
respective Ministry will sign the MOU/Project Document. 
o NGO/INGOs shall seek the approval from the concerned Ministry before signing any 
sub-contract covered by the MOU/Project Document. 
 
 
• Registration and opening of the offices 
o NGO/INGOs shall register with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the opening of 
office will be allowed only after registration of organization. 
o At the time when NGO/INGOs open their offices they shall inform the Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Home Affairs and concerned Ministries. 
o When NGO/INGOs close their offices, it is also required to inform the Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Home Affairs and concerned Ministries. 
o NGO/INGOs may apply for extension of their registration in accordance with the 
existing procedure. 
 
• Appointment of staff 
o Regarding the appointment of international staff in the UN Agencies, International 
Organizations and NGO/INGOs in Myanmar, these Agencies and Organizations shall 
seek the prior consent from the Myanmar side. 
o Regarding the appointment of international personnel for the Representative's Offices 
in Myanmar, the Agencies and Organizations shall seek the prior consent from the 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development. 
o Regarding the appointment of international staff for the respective projects, the 
Agencies and Organizations shall seek the prior consent from the concerned Ministry. 
o The list of international and local staff working in Myanmar shall be provided to the 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development and the concerned 
Ministry. 
 
• Internal Travel 
o The Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development will coordinate for 
the travel programme and necessary approval for the official(s)/mission from the 
headquarter of the respective organizations with which Ministry of National Planning 
and Economic Development signed the MOU/Project Document. Official(s) from the 




o If the MOU/Project Document is signed by the other Ministries, that Ministry will 
coordinate for the travel programme and necessary approval for the official(s) 
/mission from the headquarter and official(s) from Myanmar side will accompany 
them in the trip. 
o If the official/personnel is from UN Agencies, International Organizations and 
NGO/INGOs in Myanmar, the Ministry responsible for the project will coordinate for 
the travel programme and necessary approval from the concerned authorities. 
Official(s) from Myanmar side will accompany them in the trip. 
 
• Management 
o The relevant Ministry which has signed with the UN Agencies, International 
Organizations and NGO/INGOs will coordinate the matters on importation of 
equipment and motor vehicles for the project as well as the entry visa for the officials/ 
mission from the Headquarters in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
State. 
 
• For the smooth implementation of the projects, the Central Coordination Committee will be 
formed. The committee will be chaired by the Minister for National Planning and Economic 
Development and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Home Affairs will be 
vice-chairmen. The members of the committee are the Deputy Ministers from the concerned 
Ministries and the Deputy Minister for the Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development will act as Secretary. The Director General of Foreign Economic Relations 
Department will act as Joint Secretary. 
 
• The Central Coordination Committee Meeting will be held every three months. Special 
meeting will be held if needed. 
 
• The meeting among Central Coordination Committee and UN Agencies, International 
Organizations and NGO/INGOs will be held every three months. 
 
• The coordination at the central level will contribute to smooth and successful implementation 
of the project activities. 
 
• The Ministries concerned will hold the coordination meeting with the respective Departments 
monthly (or) every two months. 
 
• State/Division and Township Coordination Committees will be formed at the State/Division 
and Township level consisting of the head of the General Affairs Department as chairman 
and the members from the concerned Departments. The Secretary of the Committee will be 
the Planning Officer of the respective State/Division and Township Planning Department. 
 
• The State/Division and Township Coordination Committees are responsible for coordination 




• Upon the arrival to the State/Division/Township, the team leader from the organizations 
which will implement the projects shall inform the State/Division and Township 
Coordination Committees. 
 
• The UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs shall refrain from the 
activities not within the scope of work. If it is necessary to carry out the activities which are 
not within the scope of work, the respective organization shall seek the prior approval from 
the concerned Ministry. 
 
• The UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGO shall provide monthly and 
quarterly reports to the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development as well as 
to the concerned Ministries. 
 
• If the proposed activities to be undertaken is substantive and is related to the another 
Ministry, the Scope of Work/Terms of Reference shall be revised officially and if the work is 
marginal, concurrence from the concerned Ministry will be required. 
 
• Through close cooperation and coordination among the Ministries, UN agencies, 
International Organizations and NGO/INGOs in accordance with the Programme Guidelines, 
it will lead to smooth, systematic and efficient implementation of the project activities 
bearing better results. 
 
• The organizations which would like to implement the cooperation programme in Myanmar 
shall comply with this Programme Guidelines. 
 
• Many organizations currently working in Myanmar may not require to change substantially 
the way they are working now. However, if there are some practices which are not in line 
with the Programme Guidelines, the organizations shall carry out their programmes in 
conformity with the Programme Guidelines in consultation with the concerned Ministry. 
NGO/INGOs which have not yet registered are required to do so. 
 
• There are many NGO/INGOs which have been implementing their projects without any 
difficulty in Myanmar. For these organizations, we would not like to see any inconvenience 
in their activities. Accordingly in the process of their works, they may continue to carry out 
project activities in line with this Programme Guidelines. 
 
• In the event of special circumstances, the Ministry concerned will consider the situation with 
understanding in order to implement the project smoothly. 
